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This study was sponsored by the National Academy of Social In-
surance (NASI) under the auspices of its Workers’ Compensation Steer-
ing Committee. NASI regularly convenes steering committees and
study panels charged with conducting research, issuing findings, and, in
some cases, making recommendations based on their analyses. Mem-
bers of these groups are selected for their recognized expertise and with
due consideration for the balance of disciplines and perspectives appro-
priate to the project. Findings and recommendations of the groups are
the responsibility of the individual group members, not NASI, its mem-
bers, or its supporters. In 1998, NASI convened a study panel of its
Workers’ Compensation Steering Committee (see p. 145 for a list of
panel members) to review the earnings replacement benefits under the
various state and federal workers’ compensation programs for workers
injured or made ill by their jobs.
The Benefit Adequacy Study Panel’s task was to examine the extent
to which workers’ compensation wage replacement benefits paid to in-
jured workers replace their lost wages, and to assess the adequacy of
wage replacement. Replacement of lost wages is acknowledged as one
of the primary objectives of these programs, but it has not been studied
extensively until the last few years. Of course, we recognize that bene-
fit adequacy is not the only important issue in workers’ compensation
policy. Moreover, some states provide certain benefits for reasons other
than wage replacement. The fact that this report focuses exclusively on
benefit adequacy reflects the overall approach the NASI Workers’ Com-
pensation Steering Committee has taken to reviewing the various poli-
cy issues in workers’ compensation programs.
We also understand that a variety of policy and behavioral factors
may influence the extent to which lost earnings are replaced by a work-
ers’ compensation program. These include the benefit structure speci-
fied by statute, the extent to which systems encourage reduction in the
level of losses, and the extent to which procedural and operational
characteristics affect workers’ recoveries. Examples of these include
the cost of obtaining benefits, compromise and release agreements, and
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procedures for terminating benefits. These factors, and many more, in-
teract in complex and sometimes unpredictable ways with wage re-
placement benefits in a workers’ compensation system. In particular,
we are not asserting that adequacy of benefits alone would ensure a
high-quality workers’ compensation system.
Two recent developments have made this inquiry timely: first, a se-
ries of changes in workers’ compensation statutes through the decade of
the 1990s, generally designed to take costs out of the system; and sec-
ond, a group of empirical studies that promise to provide better infor-
mation than we have had before about actual replacement of wage loss-
es by workers’ compensation systems. Critics of the statutory changes
in the 1990s believe that these changes may have significantly under-
mined the adequacy of workers’ compensation benefits (Spieler and
Burton 1998). They argue that changes in workers’ compensation
statutes in the period from 1992 to 1998 reduced the amount and dura-
tion of cash benefits, changed the rules on compensability to make re-
covery more difficult, altered the way disability is assessed, and made
other changes that made it more difficult to qualify for benefits.
Supporters of these statutory changes do not agree that they result-
ed in significant benefit reductions. They argue that in most states ben-
efits increased, and even in the few states that reduced benefits for some
types of claims, they often increased them for others. Moreover, sup-
porters argue that the benefit reductions usually were made to bring
benefits in line with the norms in other states. Proponents also argue
that these changes placed greater emphasis on prevention, increased re-
liance on objective determinations of disability and compensability,
created new tools for preventing and resolving disputes, and eliminated
mandates, such as for vocational rehabilitation, that were not cost
effective.
Interest in the issue of benefit adequacy was also stimulated by a
series of “wage loss” studies conducted in California, Wisconsin,
Washington, New Mexico, and Oregon in the last five years. The data
and methods used in these studies constitute a significant breakthrough
on the comparison group problem. Using electronic administrative
records of earnings, it is possible to develop more adequate comparison
groups to answer the counterfactual question, “What would injured
workers have earned in the absence of their injuries?” In other words, it
is now possible to more accurately estimate the lost earnings that work-
ers’ compensation benefits are designed to replace.
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The NASI Benefit Adequacy Study Panel reviewed the published re-
search literature on benefit adequacy and then formulated an approach to
this difficult and contentious issue. During a series of meetings held over
a five-year period, the study panel determined that it would be useful to
produce a report reviewing what was known, and what was not known,
about benefit adequacy in workers’ compensation programs. Members
of the panel volunteered to prepare draft chapters, which were reviewed
and discussed by the entire panel. The draft report was then peer re-
viewed according to the procedures of the NASI Board of Directors.
This book represents the result of that deliberative process.
PLAN OF THE PRESENTATION
The remainder of Chapter 1 consists of a brief overview of work-
ers’ compensation programs. Chapter 2 explores alternative meanings
of benefit adequacy. What are the conceptual issues involved in assess-
ing benefit adequacy? Do other social models exist for evaluating bene-
fit adequacy? How do the unique features of state workers’ compensa-
tion programs complicate things when considering benefit adequacy?
Chapter 3 addresses the methodological issues involved in deter-
mining benefit adequacy. What data are available to measure benefit
adequacy? Why is it so difficult to estimate what injured workers’ earn-
ings would have been in the absence of injury? How do the method-
ological choices influence the outcome of the analysis?
Chapter 4 traces the statutory benefit structure among the state
workers’ compensation programs over the period 1972–1998 to assess
the “intent” of legislators in providing earnings replacement benefits. It
compares benefit levels for standard situations among the programs,
and also uses the workers’ compensation “Model Act, Revised” prom-
ulgated by the Council of State Governments in 1974 as a benchmark.
The Model Act was designed to provide guidance to state legislatures
on good legislative practice in workers’ compensation. It incorporated
the recommendations of the National Commission on State Workmen’s
Compensation Laws (NCSWCL 1972).
Chapter 5 describes the recent wage loss results from California,
Wisconsin, Washington, New Mexico, and Oregon. These studies are
based upon the pre- and postinjury earnings of actual workers. They
employ various techniques to derive a comparison group of noninjured
workers that is used to estimate the earnings that the injured workers
would have received in the absence of injury. These empirical methods
are found to produce the most convincing assessment yet of benefit ad-
equacy in workers’ compensation programs.
Finally, Chapter 6 reviews the findings of the study and provides
the panel’s conclusions on benefit adequacy in workers’ compensation
programs. An appendix to the chapter presents thoughts on the need for
further research.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF WORKERS’
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS
Workers’ compensation programs provide wage replacement, reha-
bilitation, and medical benefits to workers with work-related injuries
and occupational diseases. They also pay survivor benefits to depend-
ents of workers who die as a result of such injuries. In 2001, benefit pay-
ments for workers’ compensation totaled $49.4 billion, or a little more
than $500 per covered worker (Williams, Reno, and Burton 2003).
Origins of Workers’ Compensation
Workers’ compensation laws did not appear in the United States
until the early part of the twentieth century. Prior to the enactment of
these laws, the only avenue available for injured workers seeking com-
pensation for a work-related injury was to bring a tort liability lawsuit
against their employers. Common law principles established that em-
ployers had a duty to not injure their workers, to warn them of risks,
and to provide a reasonably safe environment. In practice, securing
common law redress for injuries was very difficult. The worker had to
establish that the employer was negligent, and even a negligent em-
ployer could use three types of defenses that usually precluded a find-
ing of liability:
1) Fellow servant rule. This held that an employer was not liable
for an injury caused by the negligence or carelessness of fellow
employees.
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2) Contributory negligence. This held that the employer had no
responsibility to the injured worker if the negligence of the em-
ployee contributed to the cause of the accident, even if her con-
tribution was minor.
3) Assumption of risk. Where the employee is considered to im-
plicitly accept all obvious and customary risks of her occupa-
tion. Wages were considered to take the increased risk of injury
into account.
To the extent that these defenses were persuasive in a court of law, com-
mon law remedies were received by relatively few workers.
As the number of accidents rose in the latter part of the nineteenth
century, legislative efforts were made to limit employer common law
defenses. Such statutes, however, still clung to the common law theory
that employers were only responsible for their direct negligence. These
“employer liability” laws generally served three purposes (Somers and
Somers 1954, p. 21):
1) making it illegal for employers and workers to sign contracts
relieving the employer of liability for accidents as a condition
of employment (27 states by 1908),
2) extending the right of suit in death cases (41 states by 1904),
and,
3) abrogating or modifying common law defenses, usually by
eliminating the fellow servant doctrine. These laws generally
applied to railroad workers, miners, and other occupations
deemed particularly hazardous.
However, these statutes did not appease workers, who continued to
fight for expanded responsibility of employers. Employers, too, were
dissatisfied with these laws. They faced large legal expenses and a good
deal of uncertainty, both financially and in the stability of society at
large. Numerous commissions were formed to investigate these issues
and generally reached the following conclusions about the employer li-
ability system as it existed at that time (Somers and Somers 1954;
Hobbs 1939):
1) The system was antiquated, as it was designed in the preindus-
trial era, when both the organization of production and the
types of employment were different.
2) The benefits provided were inadequate, and there was uncer-
tainty as to whether a worker was eligible to receive them.
3) The system was wasteful and had high costs to employers.
4) There were many delays.
5) Rewards were inconsistent.
6) There was a lack of prevention, although insurance companies
at the time were introducing some preventive measures for cer-
tain employers.
7) The lack of a good system was creating a public burden.
In searching for a solution to these deficiencies, policymakers
looked to Europe for an alternative system (Larson and Larson 2000).
As early as the 1830s, Germany had been moving toward a social in-
surance model, but it came to its fruition under Bismarck in the late
1880s and was adopted in Britain about a decade later. The basic idea of
this model was that employers and employees would jointly pay for in-
surance that would provide benefits for people with disabilities, regard-
less of the cause.
Unlike in Germany, however, the United States adopted this model
only for workplace accidents. So employers alone contributed to insur-
ance costs, but only for injuries resulting from accidents in the work-
place. Eventually, workers’ compensation coverage was extended to
disability due to occupational diseases as well.
Workers’ compensation benefits are nontaxable. In the early years
of the twentieth century, this was not much of an issue (the federal in-
come tax dates only to 1912), but with federal income taxes, state in-
come taxes, and payroll taxes easily taking one-third of gross earnings
today, this is a very significant factor. Most workers’ compensation sys-
tems today pay wage replacement benefits based on gross wages, al-
though a minority have switched to benefits based on net earnings or
after-tax wages in the past decade.
Another important feature of this system was that workers’compen-
sation programs became the “exclusive remedy” for work-related injury
and illness. That is, as a tradeoff for receiving no-fault workers’ com-
pensation benefits, workers were no longer allowed to sue their employ-
ers for damages resulting from negligence in the workplace. By accept-
ing this “historic compromise,” workers were guaranteed benefits for
work-related injuries and illnesses (putting aside, of course, disputes
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about what constituted a work-related condition). Employers had their
potential liability limited to the benefits provided under workers’ com-
pensation programs, regardless of their culpability for the injury to the
worker. Moreover, their exposure to the costs of illnesses and injuries
was much more predictable under the workers’ compensation plan.
By 1920, all but eight states had a workers’ compensation law. The
48th state, Mississippi, enacted its law in 1948. Over the years, through
legal interpretation and legislative enactment, workers’ compensation
statutes have been expanded to include near universal coverage and in-
clusion of many conditions which were not originally thought to be em-
ployment related (including stress, mental disabilities, repetitive
strains, and occupational diseases).
National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws
In the United States, there is a heavier reliance on private benefit
programs than in other developed countries. Most social insurance pro-
grams that do exist are federal, and federal law encourages state adop-
tion of unemployment insurance programs. This is not the case for
workers’ compensation programs, in part because they began prior to
the 1930s, when the U.S. Supreme Court reinterpreted the interstate
commerce clause of the Constitution to allow federal regulation of
private sector employers (NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937)). In 1970, Congress established the National Commis-
sion on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws to “undertake a compre-
hensive study and evaluation of State workmen’s compensation laws in
order to determine if such laws provide[d] an adequate, prompt, and eq-
uitable system of compensation” (29 USC 676(a)(1)). In addition, the
commission was directed to determine if there was a role for federal
legislation to improve these programs.
In 1972, the commission made a series of “essential” recommenda-
tions, including:
1) Workers’ compensation should be compulsory rather than elec-
tive.
2) Employers should not be exempt because of the number of em-
ployees or because workers are agricultural employees, gov-
ernment employees, or casual or domestic workers.
3) Full coverage should be provided for work-related diseases.
4) The maximum weekly wage benefit should be at least 100 per-
cent of the state’s average weekly wage, and cash benefits for
temporary total disability should be at least two-thirds of a
worker’s gross weekly wage.
5) Workers’ compensation programs should not impose arbitrary
limits on the duration or total amount of benefits.
6) Workers’ compensation programs should provide adequate
medical care and rehabilitative services.
Over the decade or so following the commission’s report, most
states improved their compliance with these (and other) recommenda-
tions. However, a biannual U.S. Department of Labor publication that
tracks state compliance with the recommendations of the commission
indicates that states, on average, only complied with 12.9 of the 19 “es-
sential recommendations” as of January 1, 2002 (U.S. Department of
Labor 2002).
ATTRIBUTES OF A WORKERS’
COMPENSATION PROGRAM
Receiving workers’ compensation benefits for a work-related in-
jury or illness depends on two factors: coverage and compensability. In
other words, is the job the worker holds covered by workers’ compen-
sation laws, and is the injury or illness considered work-related? If the
answers to both of those questions are in the affirmative, then the re-
maining issue is the amount of benefits to be paid. The answers to all
these questions vary depending on the state in which the worker is em-
ployed, works, or is injured, and can be quite complex. This section
provides a general description of some of the provisions found in work-
ers’ compensation programs and some of the issues involved.
Coverage
Most workers in the United States are employed in jobs that fall un-
der the umbrella of workers’ compensation protection. In 2000, that
amounted to an estimated 126.6 million persons, or about 97 percent of
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all employment (Mont et al. 2002, Table 3). Indeed, coverage is manda-
tory in every state except for Texas. Even in Texas, 84 percent of work-
ers are covered (Shields and Campbell 2001, p. 1).
However, all states allow for some exceptions. For example, in
some states workers in very small firms are excluded. Also, agricultural
workers, household workers, employees of charitable or religious orga-
nizations, and some units of state and local government are exempt
from coverage requirements in certain states. Self-employed persons
are also generally not covered in U.S. jurisdictions (see U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor 2002).
Compensability
Compensability rules define which injuries or illnesses qualify a
worker for workers’ compensation benefits. Statutes pertaining to com-
pensability, and the administrative procedures and court cases interpret-
ing them, are extremely complex and involve many nuances. An injury
or illness is only compensable if it is found to be “work-related” based
on certain legal tests. In most states, the work-related requirement for
an injury involves four specific tests. There must be 1) a personal in-
jury, 2) by accident, 3) which arises out of employment, and 4) in the
course of employment. (See Larson and Larson [2000] for a thorough
and authoritative treatment of these issues.)
The “personal injury” requirement has been interpreted in some
states to only cover conditions with either a physical cause or a physi-
cal consequence, thus excluding many mental illnesses. The “by acci-
dent” requirement when construed strictly usually requires that the ac-
cident involve a definite time and place and that the cause of the
accident be fortuitous. Courts in some states have held that the “by ac-
cident” requirement is met if the result is unexpected, not just the event.
In most other jurisdictions, special provisions have been enacted to
compensate injuries not attributable to a single event and for occupa-
tional diseases.
The “arising out of employment” test means that the source of the
injury must be related to the job. This test is used to distinguish among
three types of risk that may result in an injury to an employee at the
workplace: 1) occupational risks, which are universally compensable;
2) personal risks, which are universally noncompensable; and 3) neu-
tral risks, where the cause of the injury is neither distinctly occupation-
al nor distinctly personal, or where the cause is unknown, which may or
may not be compensable depending on the legal doctrine used in the
particular state and the specific facts of the case.
An example of an occupational risk is a worker injured by a mal-
functioning machine. An example of a personal risk is a worker shot by
an angry spouse who sneaked into the worksite to vent her rage. An ex-
ample of a neutral risk is a worker struck by lightning while he sweeps
the floor in a convenience store. He will meet the “arising out of em-
ployment” test in a state that uses the positional risk doctrine for neutral
risks, but probably will not meet the test in a state that relies on the in-
creased risk doctrine for neutral risks.
Of course, not all injuries and diseases are the result of a single
cause. Thus, states have had to decide what degree of work contribution
is necessary in order for the “arising out of ” test to be satisfied. States
vary in the degree of work contribution required. For example, state re-
quirements vary from “any causal effect” to requiring that work contri-
bution be “significant” or “substantial” or even the “predominant”
cause of the injury or disease.
A related (but not identical) issue is whether or to what degree the
employer should be responsible for the total cost of disability when the
disability is the result of the combined effects of a preexisting condition
and a work injury. The historical general rule was that the employer
took the worker as he entered the plant gate. Thus, if a work injury
combined with a preexisting condition to produce disability, the em-
ployer was responsible for the full workers’ compensation benefit for
that disability. However, some states do not believe it is fair to require
the employer to pay for the full disability when the work injury was
only partly responsible. These states apportion between work and pre-
existing contributions and reduce the cash benefit accordingly or pay no
benefits for injuries where work causation was uncertain or minimal.
The “course of employment” test normally requires that the injury
occur on the employer’s premises and during working hours. Thus, an
assembly line worker who is injured in an automobile accident on the
way to work will not meet the course of employment test. However, a
salesperson injured while driving to a client is likely to meet the test.
The “course of employment” test is also used to decide whether injuries
that result from mixed social and business activities are work related. A
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law clerk who is encouraged to participate in an employer-sponsored
softball game and injures her hand diving for a fly ball may meet the
course of employment test, at least in some states.
Determining whether an illness or disease is work related is even
more challenging in other cases. In most states, occupational diseases
and back disorders (which, from a medical standpoint, are often the re-
sult of disease or normal aging) were evaluated using the four tests for
injury compensability. Historically, many occupational diseases could
not meet these four tests, particularly the “by accident” test, which was
often interpreted as requiring a definite time and an explicit source.
As a result, all workers’ compensation statutes established separate
criteria for determining the compensability of diseases. Typically a list
of occupational diseases and sources of exposure for these diseases are
spelled out in the statute, and if the worker can demonstrate that his or
her disease is on this list, the work-relatedness test is met. For a worker
who has a condition not on the list, there are legal tests for establishing
a work relationship found in most statutes, such as a requirement that
the disease be “peculiar to the worker’s occupation.” Thus, a nurse who
contracts pneumonia from a patient may qualify for workers’ compen-
sation benefits, while an office worker who contracts pneumonia from a
fellow worker may not qualify.
Benefit Levels
Benefit payments for workers’ compensation typically include full
compensation for all related medical costs as well as wage replacement
benefits designed to replace some portion of lost earnings. Medical
benefits typically pay for all reasonable and necessary medical expens-
es but are only provided for conditions that are related to the injury or
illness in question. In approximately 76 percent of workers’ compensa-
tion cases, only medical benefits are received (National Council on
Compensation Insurance 1998). These “medical-only” cases do not in-
volve compensable amounts of time away from work, and are mostly
minor injuries; they account for only 6 percent of all benefits paid.
Payments designed to replace lost wages are more complex and de-
pend on the nature of the disability as well as the jurisdiction. Is it per-
manent or temporary? Is the disability considered partial or total? Most
wage replacement cases in the workers’ compensation system involve
temporary total disability (TTD). To qualify for TTD benefits, workers
typically must meet some threshold of lost time from work. This
threshold ranges from a minimum of 3 days to a maximum of 7 days
among U.S. jurisdictions. After a certain number of days (usually 14 to
21), benefits are paid retroactively for the threshold period.
Usually TTD recipients return to work upon medical recovery and
do not receive any permanent disability benefits. Occasionally, they re-
turn to work prior to the date of maximum medical improvement (MMI)
with a reduced work schedule, or altered responsibilities and at an ac-
companying lower wage. In these instances, most states provide tempo-
rary partial disability (TPD) benefits. Cases classified as temporary dis-
abilities (either total or partial) account for nearly 70 percent of workers’
compensation cases where wage replacement benefits are received.
The most difficult and contentious category of benefits is perma-
nent partial disability (PPD) benefits. In these cases, the disability is
considered permanent but not severe enough to preclude work. PPD
benefits are usually paid to workers who initially receive TTD benefits,
but after the date of MMI still have a partial work disability.
There are typically two different types of PPD benefits, scheduled
and nonscheduled. Scheduled benefits are for injuries involving specif-
ic body parts (such as arms or legs) that are included in a “schedule”
in the workers’ compensation statute. In most states, physical loss or
loss of use of these body parts automatically qualifies the worker for
benefits. However, there is no consistency among the states in the
amount of benefits awarded for different body parts. Some states pro-
vide greater benefits for loss of an arm than a leg, and others are just
the reverse.
States also differ in the purpose cited for schedule benefits. Some
of those that tie the schedule benefit to the injured worker’s average
weekly wage characterize the schedule as a form of presumptive wage
loss used to facilitate administration of the law. In most states, the
schedule is the only permanent partial benefit payable to someone with
an injury on the schedule. However, there are a few states in which the
schedule benefit is a minimum, and if continuing loss of wages can be
shown, additional cash benefits will be paid. In addition, a few states
have schedules that do not tie the benefit entitlement to the injured
worker’s average weekly wage. In those cases, the schedule seems
more like a sickness and accident schedule than one designed to com-
pensate for lost earnings.
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Nonscheduled benefits are for injuries that are not included in the
schedule (such as back injuries). The system for determining benefits in
these cases is very complex and varies considerably across jurisdictions
(see Barth and Niss [1999] for a thorough treatment). Some states pro-
vide benefits based on an impairment rating scheme. The level of im-
pairment, often expressed as a percentage of full functionality or
“whole body,” is sometimes translated into a percentage of total dis-
ability. This percentage is then used to determine the benefit amount.
Some states modify the impairment rating to try and account for loss of
earning capacity by adjusting for vocational factors, such as the work-
er’s education, job experience, and age. Other states employ a system
that attempts to compensate workers for actual lost wages. In addition,
many states use combinations of these methods that have evolved over
the last 90 years.
Although PPD benefits contain the term “permanent,” they do not
always last the length of the recipient’s expected working life. Often,
PPD benefits are awarded for a set length of time (scheduled benefits
nearly always are for a specific number of weeks), and that period can
differ within a given state depending on the degree of the disability or
other factors. The duration of benefits may also depend upon the work-
er’s situation. In most jurisdictions, PPD benefits are based on a one-
time estimate of what the injured worker’s future loss of earnings will
be over the remainder of his or her working life. This estimate by its
very nature is fraught with uncertainty.
Most jurisdictions will pay these PPD benefits even if the injured
worker does not suffer an earnings loss after the condition has become
stable (after MMI). There is much disputation over the specific work-
er’s circumstances and the resulting workers’ compensation entitle-
ment, and many of these claims end up with compromise settlements.
PPD claims account for approximately 28 percent of all cases with
wage replacement benefits. Nevertheless, in terms of benefits paid,
PPD cases are the most expensive category because more than 63 per-
cent of wage replacement benefits paid are for PPD cases (Mont et al.
2002, Figure 3).
If the disability is severe enough, the worker can receive permanent
total disability benefits (PTD). In most states there are some injuries
that are presumed to be permanently and totally disabling, such as the
loss of two eyes or two arms. In these cases, PTD benefits are paid pre-
sumptively. The worker does not have to prove that she is unable to
work. Generally, workers can receive PTD benefits if an illness or in-
jury is deemed significant enough to preclude any gainful employment.
But in a few states, PTD benefits are payable if the worker is unable to
resume her prior employment, even if employment in another occupa-
tion is possible.
Sometimes these determinations take into consideration geograph-
ical, educational, and economic factors. An injured person might be
able to do some sort of work, but given his education, experience, and
the job opportunities where he lives, nonemployment may be the most
reasonable outcome. In these instances, PTD benefits can be taken
away or reduced if the recipient does return to work. Less than 1 per-
cent of all workers’ compensation cases are classified as PTD.
Fatal benefits go to dependent family members of workers whose
death is caused by a work-related injury or illness. There are frequently
no benefits associated with the deaths of workers who do not have any
dependents, although burial expenses may be paid, and usually a
“penalty” payment to the workers’ compensation administrative entity
is assessed. This provides a financial incentive for prevention efforts by
the employer. Less than 1 percent of all workers’ compensation cases
involve fatalities.
Sometimes instead of receiving weekly or monthly wage replace-
ment benefits and fully paid medical care, workers negotiate a settle-
ment (also referred to as a compromise and release agreement) with
their employers and/or insurers. Such an agreement is often made in
cases where the compensability of an injury is in dispute. Settlements
are also common in cases where the parties disagree about the amount
of benefits due in the future for an admittedly compensable injury be-
cause the amount is subjective, or difficult to ascertain in advance.
The settlement typically provides the worker with a one-time pay-
ment that represents the amount agreed to (the compromise) as the
worker’s recovery. Settlements where compensability is disputed, how-
ever, recognize that there is a possibility that the worker may not re-
ceive any recovery and therefore are usually more deeply discounted. A
settlement generally limits or terminates the employer’s liability (the
release). Thus, it is a “compromise” agreement that “releases” the em-
ployer from liability, or a “compromise and release.” The rules govern-
ing such settlements vary widely, with some jurisdictions not allowing
them at all, some allowing them only under specific circumstances, and
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some being fairly free with approval of such agreements. Most states
are careful to not approve settlements that make insufficient allocations
for future medical expenses, or they allow for the medical part of the
settlement to be reopened if need be.
There is another group of settlements that reflect litigation over the
degree of disability or the residual work capacity of the injured worker.
Such cases revolve around the medical aspects of the case (especially
causation) and the implications for the future work capacity of the indi-
vidual. These disputed cases can involve very expensive and time-
consuming litigation within the overall administration of this no-fault
insurance system.
Insurance
Employers secure workers’ compensation insurance coverage in
three ways. They may buy a policy from a private insurance carrier,
they may insure with a state fund, or they may self-insure (either indi-
vidually or as part of a group arrangement). However, all of these op-
tions are not available in every state. About 20 states have state funds
that compete with private insurance carriers. Five states (North Dakota,
Ohio, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming) have “exclusive” state
funds and do not allow employers to purchase private insurance. The
rest of the states rely on private carriers and self-insurance only. What-
ever insurance arrangement is used, however, the laws governing cover-
age, compensability, and the amount of benefits paid are the same with-
in a state.
Recent Policy Developments
Since the National Commission’s report in the 1970s, the state
workers’ compensation programs in the United States have gone
through a number of stages, driven by both political and economic
forces. The report held out the threat of mandatory national standards if
the states did not improve their programs to comply with 19 “essential
recommendations.” The states did make a significant effort to comply,
and through the decade of the 1970s benefits generally were increased
and eligibility was expanded.
One example is given by the level of maximum benefits for TTD.
The commission recommended that the maximum benefit should be set
to at least 100 percent of the state average weekly wage. When the
commission endorsed this goal in 1972, only one state was in compli-
ance. By 1979, 28 states had attained this level (Thomason, Schmidle,
and Burton 2001, p. 23). But as benefits improved, employers’ costs
rose accordingly. Thomason, Schmidle, and Burton (2001) report that
employer costs of workers’ compensation insurance rose from 1.11 per-
cent of payroll in 1971 to 1.95 percent in 1979, while benefits increased
by nearly 16 percent annually.
Many in the business community, including some initial supporters
of the essential recommendations, opposed further adoption at this
point because the cost impact was greater than they originally anticipat-
ed. This was the result of behavioral changes that led to greater utiliza-
tion combined with continued cost pressures from PPD benefits and the
perceived need for improvements in the delivery system and adjudica-
tory process which the commission did not address.
Employer costs as a percentage of payroll receded from 1980 to
1984, as investment earnings peaked in the insurance industry and the
underwriting cycle permitted a return to profitability among workers’
compensation insurers. Average employer costs declined from 1.95
percent of payroll in 1979 to 1.66 percent in 1984, and there were rela-
tively few legislated benefit changes.
However, costs began to rise again in the mid 1980s, peaking at
2.16 percent of payroll in 1991 as benefits continued to rise faster than
payrolls. Concerns about the rising employer burden of workers’ com-
pensation costs and the potential negative impacts on employment
growth ushered in what has been termed “the neo-reform era” (Spieler
and Burton 1998).
The period from 1992 to 2000 was characterized by a significant
reduction in workers’ compensation insurance costs for employers,
declining from an average 2.16 percent in 1991 to 1.25 percent in 
2000 (Thomason, Schmidle, and Burton 2001, Table A.1; Mont et al.
2002, p. 1). Spieler and Burton (1998) identified five causes of this
decline:
1) reductions in cash benefits,
2) changing rules of compensability,
3) transformation of the health care aspect of workers’ compensa-
tion benefits (managed care, etc.),
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4) the rise of disability management, and
5) challenges to exclusivity.
Others disagree with the conclusions of Spieler and Burton and
point out that cost declines occurred in states that had not made any of
the identified changes. They believe that the decline in workers’ com-
pensation costs was more affected by a significant reduction in injury
frequency and the rise of disability management programs that oc-
curred in nearly all states, and even in the workers’ compensation sys-
tems of other developed countries. This decline continued through
2000 in most jurisdictions and has not been satisfactorily explained.
Benefit replacement formulae were not generally changed during
this period, although there were a few exceptions. Similarly, benefit
maxima were not reduced; most of these are now tied to the state av-
erage weekly wage as the commission recommended. However, there
were a few states that reduced the maximum number of weeks for
TTD, which can affect benefit adequacy for longer duration cases.
Business representatives point out that this change occurred in states
where a significant number of TTD claims lasted for 18 months or
more, a period of time beyond what is commonly considered “tempo-
rary.” Overall, it would be fair to say that the thrust of workers’ com-
pensation amendments during the 1990s was to reduce system costs
through a variety of benefit reductions, coverage limits, and adminis-
trative efficiencies.
However, according to Spieler and Burton, “The primary target for
reform in the 1990s has been permanent partial disability benefits . . .”
(p. 219). These benefits, the most difficult and controversial in the
workers’ compensation programs, are paid to individuals who are able
to work but have sustained some permanent impairment. Reductions in
the weekly amount of and maximum duration for benefits and changes
in the way disability is assessed are two of the many techniques used
during this period to reduce the cost of permanent partial disabilities for
employers. Of course, changes such as these can have important impli-
cations for benefit adequacy.
Insurers point out that changes in the way disability was assessed
were done to increase predictability in the determination of PPD, and
they maintain that there is no evidence that these changes provided for
any less benefit adequacy than the methods of PPD determination they
replaced.
CONCLUSION
The vast majority of workers in the United States are covered by
state workers’ compensation programs. These state programs differ
widely in regard to coverage, compensability, benefit levels, and financ-
ing. They also differ in how they are administered and enforced. To ful-
ly understand workers’ compensation programs and their role in assist-
ing those with work-related injuries and illnesses, it is important to
review the programs by comparing and contrasting the experience
across states.
This book focuses on the adequacy of wage replacement benefits
paid by these programs. It does not examine the medical benefits pro-
vided by workers’ compensation programs, nor does it address the im-
portant issues of coverage or compensability. Thus, it will not analyze
the extent to which workers’ compensation programs provide benefits
to all people who are injured while working or who contract an occupa-
tional disease. Rather, it examines the level of benefits provided to
those workers who are covered by workers’ compensation statutes and
have an injury or an illness that meets their state’s definition of a com-
pensable condition.
Even within this more limited scope, however, there is much to be
discussed. What is meant by benefit adequacy? What are the method-
ological challenges and analytical advantages of using different mea-
sures of benefits? And, finally, what summary judgment can we make
about the adequacy of cash benefits in the current state systems? Have
legislative enactments of the last decade damaged this important social
safety net for working men and women? This book seeks to answer
these questions in a balanced and rational manner. We acknowledge
that emotions run high when discussing the adequacy of workers’ com-
pensation benefits, but we also maintain that facts speak louder than




Alternative Meanings of 
Benefit Adequacy
Making a determination of benefit adequacy in a social insurance
program requires measurement of both the losses suffered and the com-
pensation received. It is the adequacy of the benefit received that we are
after. But adequacy compared to what? In workers’ compensation pro-
grams, generally it means that the wages and benefits lost during a pe-
riod of absence from work due to a work-related injury or illness should
be compared to the compensation payments received by the injured
worker. But, which losses are to be included? And for what period of
time? In designing such systems, it is necessary to strike a balance be-
tween equity and ease of administration. This chapter considers various
methods for judging whether the compensation received is “adequate”
in a social insurance setting.
Discussions of benefit adequacy in social programs imply that ben-
efits paid to eligible beneficiaries can be measured against some objec-
tive standard. But benefit adequacy has no meaning independent of the
stated goals and the social and political context of a particular benefit
program. This chapter will put the discussion of workers’ compensation
benefit adequacy into a larger context by describing the nature of the
losses suffered by injured workers and some approaches to addressing
these losses that are used in various social programs.
We then describe the workers’ compensation approach to benefit
design and the commonly understood meanings of adequacy within the
workers’ compensation context. The following chapter adopts an oper-
ational definition of adequacy, discusses some of the difficulties in
measuring adequacy, and summarizes methodological approaches to be
followed in later chapters.
We offer some important initial caveats before beginning our ex-
amination of the meaning of benefit adequacy. First, we acknowledge
that the idea of benefit adequacy in a social insurance program is sub-
ject to a wide variety of interpretations. We attempt here to describe
some possible ways to measure adequacy and to explain the bench-
marks for adequacy that we have chosen to apply in later chapters. We
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recognize, however, that there is ample room for further debate regard-
ing the fundamental question of how to assess adequacy. For example,
measures of benefit adequacy may differ depending upon whether ade-
quacy is measured by what the law provides or what benefits are actu-
ally received. We will explore this issue in Chapters 4 and 5. The point
is that if the results differ, the reasons for the difference must be clearly
understood.
In addition, we recognize that the measures of adequacy we sug-
gest as appropriate are not perfectly addressed by the quantifiable
benchmarks we apply in this book. There is a gap between the “ideal”
and the “doable.” One reason is that the ability to measure adequacy
has been compromised by the lack of adequate data. The relatively
small number of studies, and limitations in existing data, mean that we
still have an incomplete understanding of many issues regarding bene-
fit adequacy in workers’ compensation programs.
We also recognize that there are legitimate political and economic
arguments that may influence an assessment regarding appropriate ben-
efit levels, in addition to the question of benefit adequacy. For example,
some argue in favor of lowering benefits below commonly understood
levels of adequacy, based on assessment of the effects of workers’ com-
pensation costs on employers’ competitive positions and resulting em-
ployment effects. Others argue that benefits should be raised in order to
increase employers’ incentives for improving workplace safety. For a
third example, it is generally accepted in workers’ compensation that
something less than 100 percent wage replacement is required in order
to preserve the incentive to return to work. These arguments can be, and
frequently are, couched in terms of benefit adequacy. For example, one
might ask, “Are benefits adequate to create meaningful incentives to
promote safety?”
In this book, the approach to the question of benefit adequacy has
been reduced to the narrower question of the sufficiency of wage re-
placement benefits to replace two-thirds of gross wages lost due to oc-
cupational injury or illness. This is the historical workers’ compensa-
tion standard and is still relevant today, as 36 of the 50 states endorsed
this benefit level for temporary total disability benefits under their
workers’ compensation statute in 2002. However, this is not a trivial
choice, and the panel debated long and hard about this issue.
Furthermore, we recognize that by using two-thirds of gross wages
as our benchmark we are ignoring many of the program provisions that
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affect this benchmark, including the fact that the two-thirds replace-
ment is based in most states on wages at the time of injury and not esti-
mated wage loss in the future. More importantly, we acknowledge that
there is no consensus on two-thirds of lost wages as a standard of ade-
quacy for permanent partial disability benefits. We also recognize that
the two-thirds replacement rate test does not take into account the im-
pact of replacing taxable wages with nontaxable workers’ compensa-
tion benefits, which can be significant because the tax burden varies
among the states and among workers with different preinjury income
levels.
The National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation
Laws (NCSWCL) endorsed a move to 80 percent of spendable earnings
as a more equitable benefit level, considering taxes, fringes, work in-
centives, and all the other issues (Recommendation 3.1). But as the
commission put it, “A perfect balance of these contending interests can
not be reached by a scientific formula or any other means” (NCSWCL
1972, p. 53). We note also that the commission endorsed a “transitional
formula,” which should be used “until the maximum weekly benefit 
in a State exceeds 100 percent of the state’s average weekly wage”
(NCSWCL 1972, p. 57). This transitional formula was the traditional
two-thirds of the gross weekly wage.
Broader approaches lead to discussions in which benefit adequacy,
in this sense, may be weighed against other program factors. These are
the critical questions in the realpolitik world of workers’ compensation
legislation. Balancing employer and worker interests while accom-
plishing the implicit social objectives of workers’ compensation pro-
grams is no small feat. Nor are these issues irrelevant to the issue of
wage replacement benefit adequacy.
For example, how should an employer-provided wage continuation
plan or paid sick leave be factored into the benefit adequacy question?
If an employer causes the worker to be paid during the waiting period
for wage replacement benefits, or pays supplemental weekly benefits or
a disability pension, how should this be credited against benefit ade-
quacy? And how should receipt of benefits from other employer-funded
or partially employer-funded government programs such as unemploy-
ment insurance, short-term disability programs, or Social Security be
taken into account? The answer is particularly challenging because it
depends on personal value judgments. However, we do not have the
means of measuring these supplemental sources of income to injured
workers. So, as a result of these differences of opinion and data con-
straints, we are satisfied with measuring benefit adequacy by the histor-
ical two-thirds gross wage replacement standard.
Last, we note that our investigation of benefit adequacy can only
address the benefits that are actually paid to those workers with in-
juries and illnesses that have been held to be compensable within the
workers’ compensation systems. Many workers with apparently com-
pensable injuries never file for benefits (Biddle et al. 1998; Michaels
1998; Pransky et al. 1999; and Morse, Dillon, and Warren 2000).
Others may have their claims disallowed for various reasons. Still oth-
ers may be compensated for injuries that are not work related, or may
fail to return to work when they are able. In short, we take the work-
ers’ compensation system at face value. If the system has found a
claim to be valid, we accept that. If the system has denied a claim, so
be it.
Tightened eligibility rules in some states may mean that workers
with injuries and illnesses that previously would have been compensa-
ble may no longer be eligible to receive benefits (Burton and Spieler
2001; and Spieler and Burton 1998). These changes were sought by
employers concerned that injuries and illnesses were being held
compensable when work factors played only a minor role in causation,
or when employers believed that no work relationship existed. For
these workers, the costs of injury and disease may be borne by other
social programs, and/or by the workers and their families. Our discus-
sion of wage replacement benefit adequacy pertains only to the popu-
lation of workers who apply for and receive workers’ compensation
benefits.
In order to assess benefit adequacy in workers’ compensation pro-
grams, four questions must be addressed. First, what are the incurred
losses that are attributable to occupational injury and disease? Second,
what are the possible approaches to the replacement of these losses?
The discussion of these questions provides a context for the more fo-
cused discussion of workers’ compensation benefits that follows.
Third, what is the statutory workers’ compensation approach to the re-
placement of losses? In answering this question, we explore the histor-
ical and current understandings of workers’ compensation benefits.
Fourth, what benchmarks are available to measure adequacy of work-
ers’ compensation benefits, and what will these measures tell us about
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the adequacy of benefits? This last question is addressed more fully in
Chapter 3.
WHAT LOSSES DO WORKERS INCUR AS A RESULT OF
OCCUPATIONAL INJURY OR DISEASE?
Economic Losses
The consequences of illness or injury can be divided into “econom-
ic losses” and “noneconomic losses.” Economic losses include all di-
rect monetary loss. For injured workers, these include medical and as-
sociated rehabilitation costs associated with the injury (or illness), loss
of earnings, and what we will call “nonwork losses.”
Medical and rehabilitation costs1
After an injury occurs or an illness develops, the worker will incur
monetary costs associated with treatment. This includes curative treat-
ment, designed to cure or ameliorate the level of impairment that re-
sults from the injury or illness (e.g., surgery to set a broken bone), as
well as palliative care, designed to limit the ongoing effects of impair-
ments (e.g., pain medication for chronic pain). In addition, various
costs may be incurred to restore the ability of the worker to function at
home and at work despite impairment. This may include medical reha-
bilitation (e.g., prostheses or other assistive devices), vocational reha-
bilitation (e.g., education and training for a changed employment situa-
tion), and other expenses.
Loss of earnings and nonwage compensation
As a result of injuries and illnesses, workers also lose earnings and
associated benefits.2 These losses include wages (regular hourly or
salaried wages, overtime, bonuses, etc.) and a wide range of nonwage
benefits (most importantly, health insurance and retirement pension
benefit, but sometimes also access to child care, education and training,
counseling services, etc.). Such losses can also trigger future losses.
For example, reduced current pension contributions can significantly
lower postretirement pension income, loss of earnings can reduce So-
cial Security benefit rates (both disability and old age), and loss of
health insurance can result in subsequent large health care expenditures
for the worker and his or her family, especially if routine preventive
care is deferred.3
Business representatives also point out that injured employees on
workers’ compensation benefits often have reduced expenses, such as
commuting, child care, food, and clothing costs. Moreover, business
representatives point out that purchasing power also plays a role in the
adequacy of benefits. States that have a large number of foreign work-
ers (e.g., Alaska) have had concerns, leading in some cases to corrective
legislation, about workers who are injured in their jurisdiction but then
relocate to other areas that have lower costs of living and lower wage
rates for similar work. This can result in benefits that might not meet
the adequacy standard in the state of injury, but create a strong disin-
centive to return to work given where they have relocated.
Nonwork losses
Economic losses for an injured worker may extend beyond the ob-
vious wage and benefit categories as well. Examples of other potential
economic losses include costs of nonwork activities, such as house-
work, home maintenance, or child and elder care, which the injured
worker can no longer provide and now must pay to have performed. In
addition, loss of another family member’s income because they are re-
quired to provide care for the injured worker would be an economic
loss that should be designated a nonwork loss. Such losses, which are
rarely compensated under workers’ compensation statutes, may never-
theless constitute a major change in the lifestyle or economic status of
the injured worker and his or her family.
Noneconomic Losses
In addition to wage stream interruption and specific monetary loss-
es, injured workers may suffer a variety of other losses resulting from
occupational injuries and illnesses. These noneconomic losses are gen-
erally more subjective in nature than the economic losses discussed ear-
lier. Examples include the “pain and suffering” resulting from the in-
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jury or illness, loss of enjoyment or quality of life, loss of ability to per-
form important nonremunerative activities such as house or yard work,
and loss of the ability to engage in recreational or social activities. Of
course, we understand that compensation for these losses was given up
in the “historical compromise” in exchange for more certain benefits,
including partial wage replacement.
POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO DETERMINING ADEQUACY
Three possible approaches to determining adequacy are described
below: 1) the personal injury model, 2) the loss of earnings model, and
3) the social adequacy model. We will examine each of these in turn.
The Personal Injury Model
The civil justice system allows injured individuals to seek full re-
placement of both economic and noneconomic losses when they can
successfully argue in court that someone breached a duty of care that
was owed to them. In most of these cases, full replacement does not ac-
tually occur because the individual bears the costs involved in obtaining
his recovery, including attorney fees. Of course, in order to determine
adequacy of benefits under a model that includes all economic and
noneconomic losses, noneconomic losses must be quantified in some
way. In the personal injury system, this is typically left to the jury to de-
cide. Quantification of these losses might derive from workers’ assess-
ments of loss of quality of life (see Sinclair and Burton 1995), workers’
compensation impairment models not tied to wages (e.g., in Oregon
and Alaska), or studies of damages awarded by juries in personal injury
trials.
Although we regard this as an important area of inquiry, we put it
aside as beyond the scope of this book. The lack of easily accessible
and defensible benchmarks creates a difficult barrier to measuring these
losses. Further, as we discuss in the following section, workers’ com-
pensation was not developed as a system intended to replace noneco-
nomic or nonwork disability losses, but as a no-fault system for rapid
and certain compensation for the economic consequences of workplace
injuries and illnesses.
The Loss of Earnings Model
A central goal of workers’ compensation programs is to replace a
portion of preinjury earnings for workers who are injured or made ill by
their work. This model therefore requires that we look at the actual
earnings losses of the individual worker that are attributable to work
disability. To foster ease of administration, there are frequently “rules
of thumb” that constitute rough approximations to these pure princi-
ples. But the specific controlling factors that determine both benefit
rates and benefit adequacy vary according to the worker’s prior and
predicted future economic status.
The adequacy of benefits is therefore measured by the extent to
which the benefits paid replace the worker’s actual losses attributable to
work disability. A pure application of this model would include all tem-
porary earnings losses while healing (including both wages and bene-
fits), as well as replacement of lifetime earnings losses, which includes
earnings, fringe benefits, and retirement benefit losses.
As actually applied in workers’ compensation programs, this mod-
el produces results that can be perceived as both fair and unfair. It is fair
because workers theoretically receive compensation proportional to ac-
tual losses associated with work disability. Despite possible equivalen-
cy of impairment, length of disability, or noneconomic losses, those
who earned more prior to the injury would receive higher benefits;
those who earned less would receive lower benefits. From a different
perspective, this model may be unfair because it perpetuates economic
inequalities. Workers who earned little before an injury would receive
low benefits, irrespective of level of impairment, economic need, or ex-
tent of noneconomic losses.
This model also can produce significant inequalities between those
with partial and total disabilities. For example, a worker with a total
disability would receive the two-thirds statutory replacement rate for all
100 percent of his lost wages, while a worker who lost 50 percent of his
wages would receive the statutory replacement rate on the 50 percent of
wages lost and would earn 100 percent of the wages not lost. When the
total incomes in terms of benefits and wages are compared, the injured
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worker with the partial disability has a larger income even though ben-
efits replaced the same percentage of lost wages. Moreover, this model
focuses only on economic losses. Thus, workers with severe impair-
ments who nevertheless succeed in the labor market would receive low
benefits. But these workers may still have significant loss of quality of
life, loss of earnings, or other noneconomic losses. In other words, po-
tentially large noneconomic losses are ignored by a strict wage loss
model.
The Social Adequacy Model
Social adequacy measures the extent to which benefits provide a
“socially adequate” standard of living. It focuses on prevention of
poverty rather than replacement of lost wages.4 Unlike the loss of earn-
ings model, social adequacy presumes that the purpose of benefits is to
provide a minimum level of support. In preventing poverty, the focus is
on whether benefits meet an externally defined minimum. While the
loss of earnings model uses the actual wage loss as a ceiling for assess-
ing benefit adequacy, social adequacy focuses on the sufficiency of the
floor. The floor is based upon factors that are external to the particular
employer–employee relationship, the economics of that relationship, or
the wage-earning capabilities of the individual injured worker. Thus, in
sharp contrast to the loss of earnings model, the assessment of benefit
adequacy would not be tied to the individual worker’s prior wage level
or presumed loss of future earnings.
Typically, social welfare or assistance programs are measured by
this standard. In contrast, social insurance programs usually focus on
retention of prior economic position of the individual worker through
replacement of earnings. As a result, benefits in social insurance pro-
grams generally tend to be higher overall, and higher benefits (in ab-
solute terms) are usually paid to beneficiaries who had higher earnings
in the past.
However, it is important to also measure social insurance benefits
against reasonable external benchmarks that define the adequacy of the
floor in order to assess whether these benefits function to prevent
poverty or accomplish other social objectives. In designing the theoret-
ical social adequacy model, various “floors” could be utilized, e.g., the
federal poverty level, the income generated by full-time work at the
minimum wage, a “living wage,” or perhaps the amount provided by a
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) grant.
The social adequacy model reverses many of the perceived ele-
ments of the work disability model. Under this model, workers receive
benefits based on economic need, as measured by an external standard.
Thus, workers who have been able to achieve higher standards of living
due to higher preinjury wages will likely experience greater losses in
their standards of living under such a model.
TREATMENT OF LOSSES IN WORKERS’
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS
The Purposes of Workers’ Compensation
Workers’ compensation programs provide benefits to workers
whose disabling injuries or illnesses are caused by work. In general,
benefits are provided only for the consequences of illnesses and injuries
that “arise out of and in the course of ” employment. A primary goal of
workers’ compensation programs is to replace a portion of the earnings
by workers who are injured or made ill by their work while maintaining
the incentive to return to work.
Another major goal is to provide appropriate and sufficient treat-
ment to promote an optimal recovery and return to work, thus minimiz-
ing the need for wage replacement payments in the future. However,
the focus of this study is strictly on the adequacy of cash benefits paid
as wage replacement to injured workers. The adequacy of medical
treatment and rehabilitative care is a separate area of study that is be-
yond our purview.
Thus, when people talk about the adequacy of cash benefits5 in the
workers’ compensation context, they generally are referring to the ex-
tent to which benefits replace lost earnings. Further, wage losses as
measured in workers’ compensation programs usually do not include
nonwage (or fringe) benefits. For a number of reasons, including histor-
ical precedent, administrative simplicity, and the perceived impact on
return to work incentives, workers’ compensation programs generally
ignore nonwage compensation, nonwork losses, and noneconomic loss-
es, although there are a few exceptions. The total losses borne by the in-
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jured worker and his or her family (or other social programs) can there-
fore be considerable, even if wage replacement adequacy is achieved.
Key Differences between Workers’ Compensation and Other
Social Programs
From the standpoint of a discussion of benefit adequacy, there are
five key differences between workers’ compensation programs and oth-
er social programs in the United States.6 First, unlike federal disability
income programs, workers’ compensation programs provide benefits
for both short-term and partial disability (and therefore partial loss of
earnings). Federal disability income programs (Disability Insurance
and Supplemental Security Income) require full and long-term disabili-
ty before providing benefits. Our analysis of benefit adequacy focuses
on earnings losses from work disability, even if the individual continues
to work.
Second, workers’ compensation programs are exclusively under the
control of states, with no federal role or involvement.7 The state sys-
tems differ somewhat with regard to benefit levels, more widely in eligi-
bility standards, and considerably in procedural rules and administra-
tion.8 This means that any cross-jurisdictional study of benefit adequacy
requires acceptance of the unique features of the different state systems
and awareness of their impact.
Third, under no-fault workers’ compensation programs, injured
workers receive certain benefits and are thereby precluded from seek-
ing damages from their employers, even if their injuries were negli-
gently or recklessly caused by the employer (exclusive remedy princi-
ple). Thus, workers as a group gave up the right to sue their employers
in the political compromise that led to the adoption of workers’ com-
pensation programs early in the twentieth century.9
Fourth, other social programs seek to achieve a different balance
between loss replacement and social adequacy than workers’ compen-
sation. Many social insurance systems balance social adequacy against
earnings losses by setting benefits in relation to wages, but also creating
a minimum benefit rate and/or designing benefits to provide a higher
replacement rate for lower-wage workers. As a result, benefit adequacy
discussions in needs-based social welfare programs usually focus on
social adequacy. This is in marked contrast to workers’ compensation
programs, which generally focus on wage replacement adequacy,
return-to-work incentives, and affordability for employers. Neverthe-
less, as we shall see in the next section, workers’ compensation benefits
do have some characteristics that are generally associated with social
welfare systems.
Last, with a few exceptions, workers’ compensation differs from
most other social insurance systems in that it is funded entirely by em-
ployers. Thus, employers have an influence on program design and ad-
ministration that reflects their status as stakeholders in the program.
Earnings Replacement in Workers’ Compensation
Although workers’ compensation programs are built on a model of
replacement of wage losses, these programs usually do not fully replace
lost wages. Concerns about costs, beneficiary incentives, social adequa-
cy, and other factors have all influenced the design of the benefit struc-
ture. Most typically, workers’ compensation programs have paid a
wage replacement benefit for total disability set at two-thirds of the
gross wage,10 which we take as the basis for our standard of benefit ad-
equacy.
Our choice of an adequacy standard that requires benefits to replace
two-thirds of lost wages is supported by the evolution of the provision
in the Workmen’s Compensation and Rehabilitation Law, commonly
referred to as the Model Act, which was issued in two versions by the
Council of State Governments. The original Model Act (Council of
State Governments 1965)11 provided in cases of total disability that
cash benefits were 55 percent of the worker’s preinjury wage, plus an
additional 2.5 percent for each dependent, up to a maximum of five de-
pendents (or 67.5 percent of preinjury wage). For partial disability, the
Model Act provided that cash benefits were 55 percent of the worker’s
loss of earning capacity, plus an additional 2.5 percent for each depen-
dent, up to a maximum of five dependents. The original Model Act also
provided that scheduled income benefits should be paid at a weekly rate
of 55 percent of the worker’s preinjury wage for durations determined
by the extent of impairment as measured by the American Medical As-
sociation’s evaluation procedure.12 The original Model Act also provid-
ed that all types of cash benefits were subject to a maximum weekly
benefit that was two-thirds of the state’s average weekly wage.
The National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation
Laws referred favorably to the Model Act at several places in its 1972
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Report.13 However, the National Commission changed the recommend-
ed replacement rate for total disability so that benefits should replace at
least two-thirds of the worker’s preinjury wage.14 The commission also
recommended that a worker’s benefits for total disability be subject to a
maximum weekly benefit of at least 200 percent of the state’s average
weekly wage. The commission was unable to reach an agreement on
recommendations for permanent partial disability, other than recom-
mending that each state and the federal government examine these ben-
efits.
Subsequent to the completion of The Report of the National Com-
mission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws in 1972, the Council
of State Governments appointed a new Advisory Committee on Work-
men’s Compensation Laws, which was asked to review the original
Model Act and to incorporate changes to fully meet all 74 recommen-
dations of the National Commission. The resulting product, the Work-
men’s Compensation and Rehabilitation Act (Revised) (Council of
State Governments 1974), which we will refer to as the Model Act (Re-
vised), serves as the basis for the analysis of social adequacy of benefits
used here.15
The Model Act (Revised) provides for total disability that cash ben-
efits are two-thirds of the worker’s preinjury wages and for partial dis-
ability that cash benefits are two-thirds of the decrease in wage-earning
capacity. The Model Act (Revised) also provides that scheduled bene-
fits should be 55 percent of the worker’s preinjury wage for the dura-
tions determined by the extent of impairment as measured by the Amer-
ican Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
Impairment (1971).
The Model Act (Revised) (1974, p. 20) states that “The Report of
the National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws did
not make a recommendation with respect to the 55 percent figure in this
subsection and, therefore, this Committee made no change in the sug-
gested language. However, a State may wish to raise this figure to two-
thirds so as to be consistent with subsections (a) [pertaining to total dis-
ability] and (b) [pertaining to partial disability].” The Model Act
(Revised) also provides that all types of cash benefits should be subject
to a maximum weekly benefit that (since 1981) is 200 percent of the
state’s average weekly wage.
The essence of this evolution of the Model Act published by the
Council of State Governments is that the latest version recommends
that cash benefits be two-thirds of earnings losses for total disability
and for partial disability based on loss of earning capacity. For sched-
uled PPD benefits, the Model Act (Revised) maintains weekly benefits
as 55 percent of preinjury wages, although states are given the option of
adopting two-thirds of preinjury wages for scheduled benefits to be
consistent with the other types of cash benefits. Accordingly, we will
use the 55 percent replacement rate for scheduled benefits as the basis
for our comparisons in Chapter 4 between state statutory provisions
and the benefits prescribed by the Model Act (Revised). Our evalua-
tions in Chapter 6 of the adequacy of actual workers’ compensation
cash benefits will rely on the standard that benefits should replace two-
thirds of lost wages, in part because that is the general approach used in
the Model Act (Revised). We also recognize that the Model Act (Re-
vised) provides some basis for an argument that a replacement rate low-
er than two-thirds of lost wages may be appropriate for workers receiv-
ing permanent partial disability benefits.16
Temporary total disability (TTD) benefits in workers’ compensa-
tion programs most clearly illustrate the strategy for replacing wage
losses.17 TTD benefits seek to replace wages that are lost because a
worker cannot perform his or her regular job for a temporary period of
time. However, because of the tension between the wage replacement
goal and concerns about employer costs, return-to-work incentives, and
other goals, TTD benefits do not completely replace earnings losses.
First, only two-thirds of preinjury wages are typically replaced. This is
thought to preserve worker motivation to return to work.
In addition, wage replacement benefits do not begin until after a
waiting period, ranging from three days to seven days among the states.
This could be thought of as an implicit “deductible” provision for in-
jured workers, although it is usually retroactively reimbursed if disabil-
ity continues beyond a certain number of days. Third, weekly benefits
are always limited by an externally determined maximum benefit, most
often connected to the state’s average earnings level. Nearly half of the
states set this maximum benefit rate at 100 percent of the state’s aver-
age weekly wage. The result is that higher-paid workers receive a low-
er percentage replacement of gross wage losses than lower-wage work-
ers. In addition, most jurisdictions specify a minimum benefit,
presumably reflecting some political judgment about the minimum re-
quired for social adequacy. As a result, low-wage workers may receive
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a higher replacement rate than higher-wage workers, even extending
beyond full wage replacement for low-wage workers in some jurisdic-
tions.
Last, in a few states the duration of workers’ compensation TTD
benefits is capped at an arbitrary period of time, ranging from 104
weeks to 500 weeks (from 2 to almost 10 years). Although a disability
lasting several years is not commonly thought of as “temporary,” this
limit means for a few workers benefits may end before the worker has
reached maximum medical improvement or before he has returned to
work. Obviously, this would reduce the adequacy of wage replacement
for that worker. On the other hand, scheduled benefits that pay a fixed
number of weeks regardless of work status may exceed adequate com-
pensation. Both provisions place ease of administration over adequacy
considerations in policy design.
Also, using two-thirds of gross earnings to approximate post-tax
income does not take individual differences in tax status into account.
The more recent trend in workers’ compensation programs of using
spendable earnings as the benefit base addresses this problem but does
not resolve it completely. Again, program administrative feasibility
may cause compromises in adequacy or equity. The net result of these
program attributes is that benefits may be less than actual wage losses
(e.g., for high-wage workers) or more than wage losses (e.g., for work-
ers in low tax brackets), depending on the circumstances of the particu-
lar worker and the workers’ compensation program parameters. Nor
does a two-thirds of gross wage benefit consider savings to workers
from reduced employment expenses such as commuting, food, and
child care, or the possible receipt of benefits from other payment sys-
tems.
PPD benefits vary much more widely than TTD benefits (see Barth
and Niss 1999). In theory, these benefits are designed to replace the fu-
ture loss of earning capacity caused by the permanent effects of a com-
pensable injury, after a worker has reached maximum medical im-
provement (MMI). However, PPD benefits often do not accurately
replace actual long-term wage losses.
Partial or inaccurate wage replacement is due to a multitude of pro-
gram design factors. As indicated earlier, administrative simplicity may
have trumped other considerations. Most determinations of future earn-
ings losses are made on a one-time basis. Workers’ compensation is a
system that handles a very large number of claims, and perfect justice is
probably unattainable in a system that operates in an area of subjective
judgments and strong feelings. In addition, maximum benefits may pre-
vent full recovery or the numbers of weeks of benefits may be capped.
Each of these would reduce overall adequacy but reflect the intention of
policymakers to preserve return-to-work incentives.
Moreover, an increasing number of states have converted to impair-
ment-based assessments, usually from loss of earning capacity systems.
These impairment-based systems do not attempt to directly determine
the specific impact of the injury or resulting impairment on earnings,
but look instead at the level of physiological or functional impairment
that is caused by the injury. The compensation amounts are then set
based upon a predetermined scale of benefits. According to Barth and
Niss (1999), 19 states use the “impairment” standard, and 9 others use
it in some circumstances.18 Most use worker wage information in cal-
culating the benefit payment. Unfortunately, there are no studies that
compare the adequacy of benefits for similar cases across the different
types of designs presently in use for compensating PPD.
Permanent total disability (PTD) benefits are provided to individu-
als who cannot work at all, or who are presumed to be unable to work,
as a result of a work-related injury or illness. These benefits are usually
not adjusted for inflation or projected wage increases. In view of the
longer-term and more serious nature of the worker’s disability in PTD
cases, the failure to make these adjustments over the life of the claim
likely results in lower wage replacement rates. Some states also termi-
nate PTD benefits after a statutory number of weeks. Moreover, com-
promise and release settlement of disputed permanent disability claims
may result in the termination of these benefits with a lump-sum pay-
ment that may or may not accurately reflect future developments in the
case. Moreover, if a worker’s claim is litigated, in most states the work-
er bears the cost of obtaining the recovery, which reduces his or her net
benefit.
Social Adequacy in Workers’ Compensation
Because the goal of workers’ compensation programs is to replace
lost earnings, benefits in workers’ compensation programs are not
specifically designed to meet a social adequacy standard. Nevertheless,
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despite the dominance of the wage replacement model, workers’ com-
pensation programs do not completely ignore the issue of social ade-
quacy. For example, a higher relative wage replacement benefit may be
paid to lower-wage workers as a result of the maximum cap on weekly
benefits for highly paid workers. A few states also provide increases in
benefits based on the claimant’s number of dependents, a factor unre-
lated to actual losses but presumably related to social adequacy goals.
Some states set a minimum benefit level tied to a percentage of the
state average weekly wage. While not linked to any specific measure-
ment of poverty, the only plausible explanation for these minimum ben-
efit levels is that there is a desire to set a social minimum, as well as re-
placing preinjury earnings. These minimum benefits can actually
generate weekly benefits that exceed the weekly earnings losses (be-
cause the worker was employed part time or at a very low-wage level,
or because the worker was injured long ago and therefore his or her past
wages do not reflect current norms, or because of some other eccentric-
ity of the particular system). Such anomalies are more easily under-
stood if one accepts that social adequacy, although not the primary
workers’ compensation objective, is nevertheless one reasonable goal
for a social insurance program.
In 1972, the National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensa-
tion Laws (1972, p. 53) found that benefits in most states were “not ad-
equate.” Not only did benefits inadequately replace lost earnings, but in
many states they did not even meet minimal social adequacy standards.
Even for higher-wage workers, “. . . the maximum weekly benefit for
temporary total benefits in more than half of the States did not reach
this poverty level” (p. 61).
CONCLUSION
So there are a number of reasons why workers’ compensation ben-
efits likely do not replace the full wage losses of injured workers. The
question for this book is how close they come to meeting our two-thirds
wage replacement standard. Of course, a broader recognition of losses
would also encompass the value of the worker’s full compensation
package, including the value of lost nonwage benefits, costs incurred as
a result of loss of these benefits (e.g., uninsured health expenses of the
worker and his or her dependents), losses associated with the fact that
the worker may forfeit future wage increases, losses of future income
as a result of current loss of wages and pension benefits, and so on. But
the workers’ compensation programs do not include these losses, and
we do not consider them in our assessment of wage replacement bene-
fit adequacy.
When workers’ compensation programs were designed in the early
twentieth century, their focus was clearly on wage losses. Partial re-
placement of preinjury wages and medical treatment in a no-fault insur-
ance system was exchanged for the possibility of tort relief from em-
ployers. The use of wage loss, without consideration of other losses,
may no longer be the most accurate measure of economic losses ema-
nating from a work-related injury or illness. Adequacy measures that
are tied solely to wage loss fail to measure all of the other losses that in-
jured workers may experience. On the other hand, the failure to consid-
er the impact of income and payroll taxes and the value of personal
leisure also means that we are underestimating the value of the wage re-
placement benefit. Nevertheless, the following chapters will reveal that
we have no realistic alternative measure; thus, we will proceed with es-
timates of benefit adequacy based on lost wages alone. However, be-
cause we are aware of a broader standard of benefit adequacy, we will
refer to the measures developed in this volume as measures of “wage
replacement adequacy” or “earnings replacement adequacy.”
Our analysis in this book employs the wage replacement standard
to empirically assess benefit adequacy in workers’ compensation pro-
grams. This will be done at the individual worker level, for all workers
as a class, and by measuring benefit adequacy against a broad social
standard. The next chapter considers issues that arise when one actual-
ly attempts to measure wage replacement adequacy.
Notes
1. We include these here as a separate category of losses. Workers’ compensation
was designed to provide medical treatment for occupational injuries. Because the
subject of medical care in workers’ compensation is a separate area of study (and
controversy), we do not attempt to address in this chapter issues associated with
provision of these services, or replacement of these losses.
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2. This is sometimes described as work disability, but work disability must be dis-
tinguished from disability caused by work. Disability caused by work focuses on
the question of the cause or etiology of the disability. “Work disability” is the de-
creased ability of an individual to compete in the labor market as a consequence
of an injury or illness. Work disability can be both temporary (during the period of
healing and recuperation) and permanent. Permanent work disability can result
directly from the physical or mental impairments that stem from the injury. Work
disability is also commonly viewed as encompassing losses that result from dis-
crimination or exclusion that may be a consequence of the injury or impairment.
This can be confusing in discussions of workers’ compensation, which provides
benefits to replace losses related to work disability if the disability is caused by
(“arising out of ” and “in the course of ”) employment. For a broader discussion of
work disability, see Nagi (1991).
3. Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court held that state workers’ compensation laws can-
not require that employers continue health insurance for a worker and his or her
family while the worker is eligible for workers’ compensation benefits (District of
Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade, 506 US 125 [1992]; enjoining
enforcement of District of Columbia Workers’ Compensation Equity Amendment
Act section which required employers who provide health insurance for their em-
ployees to provide equivalent health insurance coverage for injured employees el-
igible for workers’ compensation benefits).
4. For an exploration of social adequacy as a measure of social insurance adequacy,
see Graetz and Mashaw (1999).
5. We use cash benefits as a synonym for indemnity benefits, as that term is used in
workers’ compensation. These terms include all benefits that are paid directly to
workers and exclude those payments made to providers of services (including
medical, psychological, and rehabilitative). We make the assumption that all cash
benefits paid to workers are intended to replace lost earnings.
6. There are, of course, many other differences. As noted earlier, benefits are only
paid if the injury or illness is work related. Moreover, these state systems are de-
signed in a manner that differs in both financing and administration from other so-
cial programs.
7. There are a number of federal laws with specific and limited coverage, including
the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, the Longshore and Harbor Workers
Act, the Black Lung Act, and the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Com-
pensation Act. In a sense, these are federal workers’ compensation laws for feder-
al employees or for other specific workers.
8. Some procedural rules can have significant impact on benefit adequacy. Most par-
ticularly, the allowance of compromise and release agreements (also known as
lump-sum agreements or washouts) enables program beneficiaries to negotiate a
one-time payment for cash and medical benefits in a claim. This practice can
change the actual amount of money received and the availability of the cash over
the period of need. See Barth and Niss (1999) for an examination of the ways in
which workers’ compensation programs compensate permanent partial disabili-
ties.
9. See Williams and Barth (1973, Chapter 2) for a brief account of the historical de-
velopment of workers’ compensation.
10. There are now, however, six jurisdictions that use the spendable earnings ap-
proach, and eight others that use a gross wage replacement rate other than two-
thirds.
11. The original Model Act was drafted by an Advisory Committee on Workmen’s
Compensation, which consisted of 21 members who represented important con-
stituencies of the program. In addition to Arthur Larson, a Duke University pro-
fessor who chaired the committee, members included representatives from em-
ployers and employer associations, unions, state workers’ compensation agencies,
other government agencies, universities, insurance carriers and associations, and
the American Medical Association.
12. The first edition of the Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment was
not published by the American Medical Association until 1971. However, a series
of 13 articles with ratings of permanent impairment for various body systems was
published in the Journal of the American Medical Association between 1958 and
1970, and the drafters of the original Model Act relied on these articles.
13. For example, the National Commission report (NCSWCL 1972, p. 44) referred to
the Model Act and the recommended standards published by the U.S. Department
of Labor as “standards which reflect earlier deliberations and which are widely
accepted as desirable.”
14. NCSWCL recommended that total disability benefits should be at least 80 percent
of the worker’s spendable weekly earnings, which were defined as the worker’s
gross weekly wages minus the worker’s deductions for federal income taxes and
the Social Security program. As explained in the Compendium on Workmen’s
Compensation, published by NCSWCL (Williams and Barth 1973, p. 132):
This system makes benefits 80 percent of spendable earnings. The 80 percent
figure was chosen because for an average size family (four persons) earning the
U.S. average wage (estimated to be $150 per week in 1972), the benefit would
be $105.53. In contrast, a benefit of 662/3 percent of the gross weekly wage
would be $100. The commission felt the extra $5.53 was an appropriate adjust-
ment reflecting the increasing importance of supplements since the 662/3 per-
cent allowance was first developed. Since supplements (such as employer con-
tributions for pensions plans) are not included in the gross or spendable average
weekly earnings figures, an adjustment to compensate for their omission is
appropriate.
This explanation makes clear that the commission intended for benefits to be at
least two-thirds of lost wages, since the 80 percent of spendable earnings ap-
proach would have provided even higher benefits.
15. The Model Act (Revised) was prepared by an Advisory Committee on Workmen’s
Compensation, which consisted of 16 members, who represented important con-
stituencies of the program. In addition to Indiana State Senator Wilfrid J. Ullrich,
who chaired the committee, members included Andrew Kalmykow and John F.
Burton, Jr., who had served on the NCSWCL.
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16. Use of the Model Act (Revised) will not produce a 55 percent replacement rate for
all PPD cases. For example, the Act provides that partial disability that results in
loss of earning capacity should provide benefits that are 662/3 percent of the loss
of that capacity. Many states base nonscheduled PPD benefits on the loss of earn-
ing capacity approach. Also, even when the PPD benefits are based on a sched-
uled duration with weekly benefits that are 55 percent of preinjury wages, most
such cases will also involve temporary total or temporary partial disability bene-
fits for which the Model Act (Revised) indicated that benefits should be 662/3 per-
cent of lost wages. Thus, the Model Act (Revised) will result on average in re-
placement rates for PPD benefits that exceed 55 percent of preinjury wages even
if the scheduled PPD benefits are based on that replacement rate.
17. The different categories of benefits in workers’ compensation are described in
Chapter 1. See U.S. Department of Labor (2002) for a description of benefits (and
other provisions) in the different states.
18. However, there are wage loss components built in because the ultimate award is
tied to the weekly benefit rate which is based (within limits) on the worker’s





Chapter 2 discussed several theoretical approaches to assessing the
adequacy of workers’ compensation benefits; in this chapter, we de-
scribe the principles and pitfalls of measuring benefit adequacy empiri-
cally. We focus on the traditional measure of workers’ compensation
benefit adequacy, the replacement of injured workers’ lost wages. This
is the most widely used measure, and it certainly provides critical infor-
mation. However, we acknowledge that it ignores several important cat-
egories of losses discussed in Chapter 2, including nonwork losses and
noneconomic losses. For this reason, we will use the term wage re-
placement adequacy to represent this less global concept. It is not the
perfect measure of benefit adequacy, but it has the great advantage of
being feasible with current methods and data.
This chapter begins with an operational definition of wage replace-
ment adequacy and describes some conceptual and methodological is-
sues involved in measuring losses. We then describe the kind of data
that would be ideal for estimating lost earnings and the practical prob-
lems involved in actually measuring replacement of lost earnings.
These problems are both inherent in the task and derive from limita-
tions in the data that are available to measure replacement. We then turn
to some important issues in measuring and comparing injury-related
losses. Finally, we preview the empirical approaches to benefit adequa-
cy described in Chapters 4 and 5.
The chapter also includes two technical appendices. Appendix 3A
provides a discussion of some of the methodological issues that must
be settled before an empirical measure of adequacy can be derived. Ap-
pendix 3B presents the mathematical and statistical details involved in
estimating wage losses and wage replacement adequacy.
OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF REPLACEMENT ADEQUACY
In a policy sense, benefit adequacy is measured by the relationship
between actual and target replacement rates, where the replacement
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rate is the ratio of benefits received to injury-related losses. If a worker
is injured, loses $1,000 in wages, and receives wage replacement bene-
fits of $800, she has an 80 percent replacement rate. If the workers’
compensation statute specifies a target replacement rate of 100 percent,
her wage replacement at 80 percent is inadequate; if the statutory target
rate is 60 percent, her wage replacement is more than adequate.
To measure wage replacement rates, we need to measure benefits
paid and injury-related wage losses incurred. Although we have speci-
fied that we will confine our attention to the replacement of the injured
worker’s lost earnings, any attempt to measure replacement adequacy
still needs to nail down a specific definition for both benefits and losses,
answering a number of questions.
1) Do benefits include just workers’ compensation benefits, or do
they include payments from other social or private insurance
systems? Including other benefits provides a better measure of
the overall adequacy of private and social insurance for injured
workers, but a worse measure of the adequacy of workers’
compensation benefits. We choose to focus on the adequacy of
workers’ compensation benefits alone, recognizing that we will
be underestimating the benefit adequacy for workers who have
multiple benefit sources.
2) Do they include all benefits paid, or just benefits received, ex-
cluding the costs of obtaining those benefits, like attorney fees
or medical and legal costs? We choose benefits received, a bet-
ter measure of adequacy to the injured worker, although we are
not always able to achieve this empirically. Sometimes admin-
istrative data do not differentiate the costs of securing benefits.
3) Do losses include lost employee benefits, like employer contri-
butions to health insurance and retirement programs?1 Inclu-
sion of employee benefits would take into account the fact that
employee benefits currently average about 38 percent of wages
and salaries for all civilian workers in the private sector (U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics 2002). However, we lack sufficient
information about changes in benefits for workers whose em-
ployment status, jobs, or hours change as a consequence of in-
jury. In some cases, no benefits will be lost; in others, the value
of lost benefits might be greater than earnings. Omitting bene-
fits from estimated earnings losses means that we are overesti-
mating true replacement rates.
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4) Are losses measured before taxes or after taxes? This is impor-
tant because workers’ compensation benefits are exempt from
federal and state income taxes and payroll taxes. However, af-
ter-tax earnings are obviously significantly lower than pretax
earnings. This is the reason that a handful of states and most
Canadian provinces have converted to a benefit based on
“spendable earnings,” or after-tax income. Federal income tax
rates vary by income, family status, allowable deductions, and
other factors. For many injured workers, more than 25 percent
of lost earnings would have been paid in taxes.2 This would
mean that replacing 75 percent of pretax losses would be
equivalent to replacing 100 percent of after-tax losses.
Ideally, we would like to compare lost spendable earnings with
workers’ compensation wage replacement benefits. This would mean
comparing after-tax earnings with benefits. However, as with other
employment benefits, we lack specific information on taxes paid by in-
jured workers, which vary by, among other things, marital status, num-
ber of dependents, and the earnings of other family members. We gen-
erally do not compare after-tax losses with benefits for this reason,
although it is possible to impute tax rates to individuals, and this has
been done in some studies. Of course, the bias from using pretax losses
is in the opposite direction from the bias from not counting lost fringe
benefits.3
In summary, our approach is to focus on workers’ compensation
wage replacement benefits received, comparing them with pretax lost
earnings, exclusive of nonwage compensation. Each of these choices
affects the magnitude of the estimated replacement rate and may also
have affected the legislative choice of a target replacement rate. How-
ever, we take our guidance from the majority of states, which declare
that in cases of temporary total disability, two-thirds of gross pretax lost
wages should be replaced, subject to maximum and minimum benefit
levels. For the purposes of this analysis we use a replacement rate of
two-thirds of gross wages as the standard of benefit adequacy.
Measuring Losses: Conceptual Issues
To measure wage replacement, we need to determine the amount of
injury-related losses and compare the losses to workers’ compensation






Figure 3.1 A Conceptual Model of Temporary Injury-Related Losses


















Figure 3.2 A Conceptual Model of Permanent Injury-Related Losses
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determining the amount of income benefits paid, these difficulties pale
in comparison to the effort required to measure lost earnings.
Lost earnings are actual earnings minus what would have been
earned if the injury had not occurred. Figures 3.1 and 3.2, adapted from
Reville (1999), display a conceptual model of wage losses. Before the
injury occurs, the worker’s earnings are observed, and Figure 3.1 shows
them at about $20,000 annually and increasing slowly through time.
After the injury, the worker recovers at home or in the hospital. Earn-
ings disappear until the worker begins work again. At that point, wages
may return to the uninjured earnings path (indicated by the dashed
line). However, upon return to work, some people work fewer hours or
at a lower rate of pay than before the injury. Eventually, most recover to
the preinjury earnings path, but some never do. This permanent loss of
earnings reflects permanent disability. For the permanently disabled
worker in Figure 3.2, injured earnings never reach the level of unin-
jured earnings. Thus, total losses include both the wages lost during the
period of temporary total disability and the permanent losses that will
accumulate in the future.4 Of course, for any specific individual, there
is no assurance that wages would necessarily have continued on the
projected path had the injury not occurred.
If we could draw a figure like Figures 3.1 and 3.2 for each injured
worker, we could calculate lost earnings as the difference between the
dashed line—uninjured earnings—and the solid line, which is the shad-
ed area in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. This is impossible, however, since we
cannot observe uninjured earnings. They do not exist in the real world,
where each person is either uninjured or injured. We can’t turn time
back, prevent the injury, and then observe the earnings of the same in-
dividual in the uninjured state. This creates the challenge of finding an
effective way to estimate uninjured earnings.
Measuring Benefits: Conceptual Issues
While not as challenging as measuring lost wages, workers’ com-
pensation benefit measurements present some unique problems as well.
First, wage replacement benefits are subject to waiting periods of from
three to seven days in U.S. jurisdictions.5 This means that the worker
absorbs the income losses for the first few days, unless the employer
voluntarily makes up the difference.
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This “deductible” feature serves two purposes in the workers’ com-
pensation programs. First, it constitutes an implicit cost sharing for in-
come maintenance with the worker that reduces the likelihood of
claims for minor injuries. Second, it reduces the number of claims with
income replacement payments and thus the administrative burden on
the system. In fact, about 75 percent of all workers’ compensation
claims do not involve any indemnity payments at all, and these “med-
ical only” claims impose very little burden on workers’ compensation
agencies.
In addition, wage replacement benefits are generally subject to a
retroactive period. Typically, this means that if the injured worker is
out of work for more than a certain period of time, usually 14 to 21
days, then she collects income maintenance payments for the waiting
period as well. The premise behind such provisions is that workers
who are more seriously injured (according to length of time away from
work) should not have to absorb the implicit cost sharing of the wait-
ing period.
Another common practice in some workers’ compensation pro-
grams causes difficult problems in assessing benefit adequacy. In many
states, workers and employers/insurers are allowed to settle workers’
compensation claims that involve disputes between the two parties.
Called settlements, compromise and release agreements, redemptions,
or washouts in various jurisdictions, these claims present serious diffi-
culties in assessing benefit adequacy, even by the wage replacement
standard.
One issue is that the lump-sum payments that generally accompany
such settlements may constitute a mixture of different kinds of benefit
payments, frequently not neatly enumerated as to their purpose. Thus, a
lump-sum payment might encompass future medical costs, special re-
habilitation costs, and wage replacement costs. Since the settlement is
negotiated, there may be no way of determining exactly what is being
compensated. Each side may have its own interpretation of the pay-
ment, and the lump sum is just a monetized representation of the losses
that are being compensated, much as in the personal injury model dis-
cussed in Chapter 2.
In addition, a claimant with attorney representation generally must
pay the fees and other costs of the litigation out of the lump-sum or pe-
riodic payments. The likelihood of attorney involvement is greater in
states where compensability tests are unclear or the mechanism for
measuring permanent partial disability is more subjective. This book
does not take into account the worker’s net recovery after payment of
these costs.
Another crucial difficulty comes in determining the time period for
which the lump-sum settlement is compensating. One extreme would
be to spread the wage replacement benefits over the rest of the injured
worker’s life, on the grounds that this particular injury will never again
be compensated (that is, the release part of the compromise and release
agreement). Another extreme would be to assign the wage replacement
benefit to the year in which it is paid or perhaps the next few years. The
former will probably result in underestimating the adequacy of benefits
paid in the period following the injury, while the latter will likely over-
estimate the adequacy of these benefits.
Finally, some settlements occur because of a dispute over whether
the injury is covered at all by workers’ compensation, or whether it is a
given employer’s responsibility. In that case, the settlement may look
low because the parties have compromised on an amount between full
payment of benefits and zero benefits (the amount due if the injury is
not compensable). For claims with disputes over compensability, it is
difficult to interpret the replacement rate, although the calculated re-
placement rate will likely underestimate the actual replacement of cov-
ered losses.
ALTERNATIVES FOR CALCULATING LOST EARNINGS
Preinjury Earnings
One estimate of uninjured earnings is average earnings in the prein-
jury period; in fact, this is typically how workers’ compensation benefits
are determined. To calculate temporary disability benefits, workers’
compensation systems typically use preinjury wages to estimate the
wages that would have been earned had an injury not occurred. Then
they assess losses as the difference between current wages and preinjury
wages. This approach produces reasonable loss estimates for short-term
injuries, where workers fully recover and return to work in a matter of
days or weeks.6 It is much more problematic for injuries with long-term
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impacts. This is because the future earnings of uninjured workers will
typically differ from their current earnings. For example, young people,
just out of school, can expect their earnings to rise substantially over the
first decade in the labor market. On the other hand, the earnings of most
people in their early sixties will fall over the ensuing decade.
Age-Earnings Profiles
These observations have led some researchers to use age-earnings
profiles to project uninjured earnings over the years following injury.
Age-earnings profiles show how average earnings in a group vary with
age. They can be constructed for the working-age population as a
whole or for subgroups of workers, categorized by relevant characteris-
tics like gender, race, and education. Figures 3.3a and 3.3b display esti-
mated age-earnings profiles for women and men from ages 22 to 62.
Both figures could be used to project earnings of specific workers
by scaling their observed preinjury earnings according to the growth
rates implied in the profile. Variations on this method might develop
different growth rates depending on personal or employer characteris-
tics. An important study using this approach was done by Berkowitz
and Burton (1987), who projected future earnings depending on the in-
jured worker’s age, gender, and preinjury earnings. An earlier study by
Johnson, Cullinan, and Curington (1978) adjusted preinjury earnings
for inflation and average productivity changes in the private sector of
the economy as a way to keep the wage losses more contemporary.
Matching and Regression
Many events may increase or reduce earnings, including promo-
tions, pay raises, spells of unemployment or ill health, retirement deci-
sions, cyclical changes in economic conditions, and long-run labor
market trends. Although we cannot predict for a specific individual
which of these events will occur or when they will occur, statisticians
have developed techniques to measure average changes in earnings for
groups of people with similar personal and employer characteristics.
Suppose that a researcher can identify a group of workers who all
have characteristics that should produce, on average, the same earnings
profile over time. If some of them are injured and some are not, then the
uninjured group can be used to identify the dashed line in Figure 3.1 or
3.2, representing the hypothetical earnings of the injured worker if he
had not been injured. The success of this approach depends on how
closely the injured and uninjured workers are matched.
Current statistical approaches can be seen as an extension of the
age-earnings profile method. If one selects uninjured workers to be
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very similar to the injured workers and uses statistical methods that ac-
count for the impact on earnings of the characteristics of workers and
their employers, it is possible to estimate future earnings for a group of
workers rather precisely. After deriving these estimates of uninjured
earnings, the comparison in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 can be made using ob-
served postinjury earnings.
Two different approaches have been used to estimate uninjured
earnings: matching and regression. The matching approach uses a com-
parison group of uninjured workers and attempts to match each injured
worker to one or more uninjured workers with similar relevant charac-
teristics in the immediate preinjury period. For example, uninjured
workers would be matched to specific injured workers employed in the
same workplace at the time of injury who, in addition, were within five
years of the age of the injured worker, had the same gender, and had
preinjury wages within 10 percent of the injured worker. The idea here
is that people with similar characteristics should have similar earnings
profiles. So, if their injuries could have been prevented, the earnings of
the injured people would have been similar to their uninjured matched
counterparts. Although we wouldn’t expect this to be true in every case,
statisticians have shown that, under reasonable conditions, it will be
true on average.
So the average earnings of uninjured workers matched to a specific
injured worker can provide an estimate of what the injured worker’s
earnings would have been in the absence of injury. In each observed
postinjury period, this estimate of uninjured earnings is subtracted from
the actual wages (if any) of the injured worker. This difference pro-
duces an estimate of the injured worker’s gross earnings losses for each
period. These estimated losses can then be averaged for all injured
workers over all observed postinjury periods to obtain an estimate of
average losses.
The other currently used statistical approach to measuring losses,
the regression approach, doesn’t try to match individual injured and
comparison workers. Instead, it uses regression analysis techniques to
generate profiles of average earnings over time for uninjured workers
with specific individual, job, and employer characteristics. It then ap-
plies these models to injured workers with the same characteristics,
generating estimated uninjured earnings for those workers. As with the
matching method, the difference between the actual postinjury earnings
of injured workers and their estimated uninjured earnings constitutes
their wage losses. These losses can then be averaged for all workers
over all observed periods to obtain a measure of average wage losses.
One can reasonably think of the matching method as controlling for
differences between injured and uninjured workers before applying the
statistical measure to estimate losses, and of the regression method as
using information from all injured and comparison workers but then ac-
counting for the differences between them when estimating losses. The
estimate of uninjured earnings in both cases is tailored to the character-
istics of each injured worker.
DATA REQUIREMENTS
To use either matching or regression methods, researchers need a
significant amount of data on many injured and uninjured workers.
They need a very large group—thousands—of workers, because indi-
vidual workers’ earnings fluctuate a lot, and much of this fluctuation is
unrelated to workplace injuries. Information on many workers is need-
ed so researchers can average out unrelated fluctuations in earnings, al-
lowing accurate estimation of injury-related losses.
Ideally, researchers would have several years of preinjury and
postinjury earnings and employment information. The years of observa-
tion should be the same for injured and uninjured (comparison group)
workers to maximize comparability. The preinjury information is im-
portant to establish that the injured and comparison groups have similar
uninjured earnings. A long postinjury earnings and employment history
is important because the effects of injuries on earnings can be long term
and can continue to change for a considerable period after the injury. In
addition, the researcher needs access to data on personal and employer
characteristics. There must be enough of this information to allow the re-
searcher to control (by matching or regression) for differences between
the injured and comparison groups that might affect uninjured earnings.
Because data are needed on thousands of workers, primary data-
collection through surveys of employers or workers would generally be
prohibitively expensive. For this reason, we look to administrative data
sources. No single source is adequate, so estimating lost earnings gen-
erally requires matching data from several different sources.
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Earnings and Employment Data
There are two administrative sources for earnings and employment
data that have very broad coverage: state unemployment insurance
wage records and Social Security Administration (SSA) earnings files.
Unemployment insurance records provide quarterly reports of wages
and employer identifiers for individuals working in a specific state.
About 98 percent of in-state employment is covered, a notable excep-
tion being self-employed persons. Earnings are reported quarterly, but
hours worked and hourly wages are not reported.
As a result, when earnings change from one quarter to the next, we
cannot distinguish between a change in the hourly wage, a change in
hours worked per week, or a change in the number of weeks worked in
the quarter. In addition, when earnings are reported from more than one
employer, we also cannot be sure whether employment was simultane-
ous (multiple-job holders) or sequential (although the earnings reported
in the preceding and following quarters may provide some indication).
State unemployment insurance wage records are confidential, so
states will generally limit access and require stringent security and con-
fidentiality agreements. Typically, they only share data with scrambled
Social Security numbers and employer identifiers, so any matching of
records with other sources must be done by a state agency.
SSA earnings files have rarely been shared with researchers, al-
though the SSA has recently funded a Disability Research Institute and
is reportedly in the process of establishing new arrangements for data
access through this institute. SSA earnings data are annual, a disadvan-
tage when compared with quarterly unemployment insurance data. It
may also be more difficult to match SSA earnings data with employer
characteristics, since it is fundamentally a database of individuals.
However, SSA data are national and cover self-employed workers,
which means that people won’t disappear from the database if they
move out of state or into self-employment. Only railroad employees,
some state and local government workers, and the clergy are excluded
from SSA earnings records.
Employer and Worker Characteristics
Administrative data on relevant employer characteristics are very
limited. Probably the best source is state employment security data,
which can be linked to unemployment insurance wage data using the
state employer identifier. Employment security data (collected in the
ES202 data system) provide four-digit industry category, county of op-
eration, and number of employees. Some states require multisite em-
ployers to provide data for each site, but others do not.
Where available, state workers’ compensation data may provide the
best available source of personal information about injured workers.
The breadth and quality of these data vary by state, and several states
do not have usable computerized data. Where data are available, they
may be available for only a subset of workers’ compensation cases. For
example, many states that have computerized data systems collect data
only for lost-time cases, while others may also collect data for medical-
only cases. Few jurisdictions collect data on unsuccessful claims.
Most workers’ compensation data systems have information on
age, gender, part of body injured, and nature of injury, in addition to the
employer at time of injury and earnings data (usually weekly earnings).
Some state workers’ compensation systems also collect data on occupa-
tion, job tenure, and marital status, particularly where this affects the
benefit level, as in net wage replacement states. Unfortunately, there is
no comparable data source for uninjured workers, although it may be
possible for states to get data on age and gender of workers from SSA
and to link these data to other files.
Employer, insurer, and third-party administrator data offer poten-
tial alternatives to state workers’ compensation data. However, these
data are very difficult and expensive to collect. Data systems (software
and hardware) are not uniform, which adds to the difficulty and ex-
pense of building a database. Also, unless coverage rates are very high,
there may be questions about whether the resulting sample is truly rep-
resentative of the state’s employed or injured population. However,
with great effort it is possible to acquire and utilize data from these
sources, as demonstrated by the recent efforts of the Workers Compen-
sation Research Institute in their CompScope™ program (see Telles et
al. 2001).
Income Replacement Benefits Received
State workers’ compensation agencies typically collect benefit in-
formation, and all the caveats that apply to the personal data apply to
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benefit data as well. In addition, there may be significant delays be-
tween the payment of benefits, reporting of data by employers and in-
surers, and data entry and processing by the administrative agency.
Only a few state data systems record the actual timing of payments. In
at least one state, benefit data are not forwarded to the state until the
case is closed. In addition, fees paid to claimants’ attorneys or other
claim expenses often are deducted from payments to the worker, and
these fees may or may not be reported in state data.
Most state data systems record only income benefits paid to date. If
a case is not resolved when the data are collected, the amount of any fu-
ture benefit payments will be unknown. In this case, unless data are col-
lected years after injuries occur, recorded benefit payments will be in-
complete and benefit adequacy will be underestimated. This is one
advantage of insurer data, because it is possible to collect information
on reserves for future losses on an individual claim basis.
Compromised or “settled” cases present another problem in ana-
lyzing benefit payment data. As described earlier, the lump-sum pay-
ment may cover both income and medical benefits, and the amounts of
these benefits are not always distinguished. In this case, the researcher
must decide how to apportion the payments, so as not to mistakenly
classify future medical benefits as wage replacement benefits. Fre-
quently, all compromise payments are treated as income benefits,
which may overestimate wage replacement rates in states that allow the
compromise of future medical benefits.
ALTERNATE MEASURES OF ADEQUACY
The current “state of the art” in measuring wage replacement ade-
quacy involves securing administrative data on a large sample of work-
ers’ compensation indemnity claimants and an even larger sample of
potential comparison workers who were not injured. Injured workers
should be matched to uninjured workers according to the set of charac-
teristics available, to ensure that they were comparable before the in-
jury occurred.
The losses sustained by injured workers can be estimated by com-
paring their earnings after the injury, if any, to the earnings of uninjured
comparison workers for the same time period. Aggregate income re-
placement benefits paid to the injured worker under the workers’ com-
pensation program are divided by aggregate estimated wage losses to
arrive at an average wage replacement rate.
According to the standard we have adopted, adequacy will be de-
fined as two-thirds replacement of wage losses over the duration of the
disability. But the analytical methods that provide the most accurate es-
timates of uninjured earnings from a statistical perspective may not be
feasible in a given state and, even if they are, may not be optimal from
a policy perspective. Some states simply may not have the automated
workers’ compensation data necessary to carry out such studies. In ad-
dition, these studies can be costly and time consuming.
Even though these methods develop measures that are closer to true
wage losses than other methods, they typically cannot produce up-to-
date descriptions of workers’compensation benefit adequacy. That is be-
cause it is impossible for such studies to produce results for periods
more recent than four to six years ago due to the time needed after the in-
jury to establish future earnings patterns, and the time needed to accu-
mulate the necessary data and perform the analysis. Policymakers typi-
cally prefer to base decisions on more current information. This raises
the issue of whether alternate methods can produce useful measures of
adequacy. We will consider this question in a subsequent chapter.
Chapters 4 and 5 describe, in detail, several different measures of
workers’ compensation wage replacement adequacy. Chapter 4 uses
statutory benefit levels, i.e., those prescribed by statute, without regard
to what is actually paid, to determine the relative adequacy of pre-
scribed benefits among states and changes in statutory benefits over
time. Chapter 5 describes current state-of-the-art studies that have mea-
sured wage replacement adequacy in five states: California, New Mexi-
co, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin.
Statutory Workers’ Compensation Benefits Method (Chapter 4)
Benefit structures in workers’ compensation are defined by state
statute. The statute sets out the weekly benefit amount (as a percentage
of the worker’s preinjury wage), the maximum and minimum weekly
benefit amounts (generally tied to the state’s average weekly wage),
and (perhaps) a maximum period for collection of benefits. Frequently,
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benefit rates differ for temporary total, permanent partial, or other dis-
ability levels. Chapter 4 explores these statutory benefit rates by using
an identical distribution of injured workers and determining what bene-
fits would have been paid under the statutory frameworks in each state
during the period 1972 through 1998. It reports a weighted national av-
erage of expected statutory benefits in current dollars, as well as de-
scribing the variation among states.
Chapter 4 attempts to standardize losses by using the same distribu-
tion of injured workers in each state. This presumes that the variation in
statutory benefits is proportional to the wage replacement rates and oth-
er benefit parameters in each state. If benefit payments varied in direct
proportion to statutory benefits, and the proportion of injured workers
receiving workers’ compensation benefits were the same across states,
the measures presented in Chapter 4 would provide an accurate index of
relative benefit adequacy among states. Of course, this measure is still
not designed to address the absolute adequacy of any state’s benefits. For
example, if states generally have inadequate statutory benefits, a state
could be above average in its relative adequacy but still provide inade-
quate benefits by the two-thirds wage replacement standard.7
The choice of the distribution of injured workers also can affect the
relationship between statutory benefits and adequacy differentially
among states. Suppose that one state chose its benefit structure to be
most generous to the most common injuries in that state, while another
state chose its benefit structure to pay the most inadequate benefits to
its most common injuries. A national distribution of injured workers
would underestimate the true adequacy of the first state and overesti-
mate the adequacy of the second state. The approach in Chapter 4 also
assumes that similarly injured workers in different states would have
the same losses. This may not be the case because of differing econom-
ic conditions among states or subtle differences in workers’ compensa-
tion programs.
The value of the statutory benefit measure depends in large part
upon whether its underlying assumptions are met. Because of variations
in state laws and administrative practices, including such issues as set-
tlement of claims and employers’ and/or insurers’ authority to terminate
benefits, workers may not always receive the amounts specified in the
statute. The more the relationship between benefits received and statuto-
ry benefits varies across states, the less useful this measure becomes.
The advantages of this method include its relative ease of applica-
tion and the fact that statutory benefit levels are known at the time of
policy discussions about the adequacy of a state’s benefits. The statuto-
ry benefit method allows us to determine relative generosity among ju-
risdictions, but it does not allow us to determine whether any given
state pays benefits that meet a specific adequacy criterion (e.g., replace-
ment of two-thirds of lost earnings). This is because we cannot know
from statutory benefit data what the actual losses or actual benefit pay-
ments may be. We only know what the statute says they should be.
Lost Earnings Method
Chapter 5 summarizes recent empirical research that examines the
wage losses that individual workers actually incur, and the extent to
which these estimated losses are actually replaced by workers’ com-
pensation benefits. Our growing ability to construct and analyze large
data sets enables researchers to look at individual worker’s losses, con-
struct appropriate comparison groups, and compare actual paid benefits
of the injured worker with earnings of uninjured workers. The unin-
jured workers’ earnings are used to develop estimates of the counterfac-
tual, i.e., what earnings would have been had the injury not occurred.
Estimated losses are then calculated as the difference between each
worker’s estimated uninjured earnings and observed postinjury earn-
ings. Paid benefits can then be compared to this loss estimate to deter-
mine average wage replacement adequacy.
These analyses provide the current state-of-the-art information
with regard to the extent to which benefits replace lost wages and are
consistent with the conceptual model outlined in this chapter. They pro-
vide absolute measures of wage replacement adequacy, not relative
measures. However, the lost earnings method also has its limitations.
These include cost, delay, and feasibility issues, which will be further
explored in Chapter 5.
After we have presented both the statutory benefits method (Chap-
ter 4) and the lost earnings method (Chapter 5) and their empirical re-
sults in detail, we will offer some conclusions about the adequacy of
wage replacement benefits and methods for their estimation.
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Notes
1. For example, an injured worker might lose a job with health insurance and be hired
at a new job with similar wages but without health insurance. Clearly, there has
been a significant loss, but it is very difficult to quantify the amount of the loss.
2. State tax rates also vary between jurisdictions. Federal income tax rates on lost
earnings for families with more than $15,000 but less than $65,000 in annual in-
come would generally be 15 percent, and Social Security (FICA) and Medicare
taxes would add another 7.65 percent. In a state with an income tax rate of 5 per-
cent, the marginal tax rate on lost earnings would be 27.65 percent.
3. The adequacy measures using after-tax losses assume that workers who pay less in
taxes do not lose government services. While this is often true, it does not neces-
sarily apply to a long-term reduction in the payment of Social Security taxes, for
example.
4. Of course, any changes in earnings that are not due to the injury must be distin-
guished from those that are. Because this is virtually impossible, an analytical
method that controls for such differences by using a matched group of uninjured
workers has a practical advantage over other methods.
5. Most Canadian provinces have no waiting period, and some jurisdictions in Aus-
tralia actually impose an “employer offset,” which means the employer directly
bears the cost of the first 5 or 10 days of disability.
6. Although even here there are important policy issues, such as how the earnings of
seasonal workers or newly hired workers are to be assessed. If the observation pe-
riod is long, these workers could be disadvantaged. What is the appropriate base-
line earnings level for a worker who has an irregular work history?
7. Note, however, that Chapter 4 does compare statutory benefits with benefits calcu-
lated under the guidelines of the Model Act (Revised) and the federal poverty stan-
dard. These at least provide a yardstick that is external to any particular workers’
compensation system.
Appendix 3A
Overview of Methodological Issues
This appendix provides a discussion of some of the methodological issues
that are involved in estimating wage replacement adequacy by the lost wages
method. This discussion provides a “how-to” guide to the decisions that must
be made in preparing such estimates. As such, it also provides a caution about
the accuracy of the assumptions that must be made.
Regression versus matching methods. Regression and matching meth-
ods each have their relative strengths and weaknesses. Perhaps the most im-
portant strength of matching methods is that they appear more intuitive to pol-
icymakers and thus are easier to explain. In addition, they are more flexible in
how they control for differences between the comparison group and the in-
jured group. On the other hand, matching methods may leave groups of work-
ers unmatched and therefore may not provide loss estimates for them, a prob-
lem not shared by regression methods.
In matching studies done to date, the proportion of unmatched workers
has been much higher for small employers than larger ones. These matching
studies have drawn comparison workers from unemployment insurance wage
files. Because there are no personal characteristics available on those files, the
comparison group has been matched by employer and earnings in the prein-
jury year. With small employers, a match is much less likely because there are
fewer employees to choose from. For that reason, regression estimates may be
more representative of losses for the full range of workers and employers, even
if they are less intuitive and harder to explain. Other issues may arise that make
one method preferable to the other for practical reasons. For example, if the
available comparison group is smaller than or not much larger than the injured
group, it may be hard to achieve good matches, so regression-adjustment
might be preferred.
Choice of comparison group. In estimating losses, we must account for
the impact of characteristics that affect both the probability of injury and the
level of uninjured earnings. If we do not, differences between the two groups
may cause average estimated losses to be higher or lower than actual losses.
Researchers therefore try to choose comparison groups so that, when matching
or regression methods are applied, omitted or unobserved factors do not affect
both injury probability and uninjured earnings. Two different comparison
groups have been used in studies discussed in Chapter 5: uninjured workers,
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and injured workers with short-duration temporary disability or medical-only
claims.
If we believe that unobserved factors that affect uninjured earnings also
affect the duration of disability, we may prefer a comparison group of unin-
jured workers. Suppose, for example, that we expect workers with low prein-
jury earnings to have longer durations off work than otherwise identical high-
wage injured workers. Then workers with short-duration injuries will tend to
have higher preinjury earnings. If they constitute the comparison group, we
will overestimate preinjury earnings for workers with longer-duration injuries.
As a result, we will overestimate losses (which are uninjured earnings minus
injured earnings) and underestimate wage replacement rates.
On the other hand, we may believe that injured workers are more similar
to each other on unobserved factors that affect earnings than they are to unin-
jured workers. In this case, we may find the short-term injury group preferable
as the comparison group. In either case, the pattern of preinjury earnings, ad-
justed by matching or regression, should be the same in the comparison and in-
jured groups.
Treatment of missing earnings data. If workers have no earnings, they
are not generally reported as having zero earnings in unemployment insurance
wage records—they are simply not in the database. However, if they move to
uncovered employment or to out-of-state employment, or if their employer
doesn’t report covered earnings, they will actually have earnings that are not
reported. When earnings data are missing from administrative sources, re-
searchers have to decide whether to treat the earnings as unknown or as zero.
Treating missing earnings as zero will underestimate earnings and, if injured
and uninjured workers move into uncovered or unreported jobs at different
rates, will misestimate losses. Treating them as unknown, and imputing wages
for these individuals, will overestimate average earnings of both injured and
uninjured workers to the extent that some of these workers actually had zero
earnings. If injured workers are more likely than uninjured workers to actually
have zero earnings, losses will be underestimated. Recent studies have tended
to treat unreported earnings as zero.
Inflation. Wages and benefits should both be analyzed in constant dol-
lars, so that inflation will not distort the picture of earnings losses presented.
Using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) is generally accepted as the most ap-
propriate way to adjust for inflation. Researchers should be careful to specify
which variant of the CPI is being used and whether it is the national or a re-
gional CPI.
Treatment of losses after the observed period. Statistical analysts can
estimate losses during the period for which they have data, which is usually
from three to five years postinjury. For some workers, however, losses contin-
ue long past the observed period. Since injured workers typically average
about 36 years of age, these losses can continue over decades. For this reason,
losses during the observed period may greatly underestimate lifetime losses.
This presents researchers with a problem: do they only calculate losses for the
observed period, acknowledging that this will produce a substantial underesti-
mate of lifetime losses, or do they project losses into the future, using unverifi-
able assumptions about future losses? There is no standard answer to this ques-
tion, and the researcher (and the reader) must judge what is the most
reasonable approach.
Discounting future losses. Economists (and others) use present value
calculations to compare monetary quantities at different points in time. This
represents an acknowledgment that a dollar today does not have the same val-
ue as a dollar one year from now. Thus, to generate the “present value” of a
stream of lost earnings, future losses must be discounted. Because losses may
continue long after the injury, the choice of discount rate can have a substantial
impact on the present value. From a social perspective, an appropriate discount
rate is the risk-free real interest rate, best approximated by the average yield,
after inflation, of six-month Treasury bills or one-year Treasury bonds. Recent
studies have used the discount rate chosen by the SSA, which is between 2 and
3 percent annually. The federal Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
uses a considerably higher discount rate of 7 percent.
Generalizability. When a study is done in Arizona for 1995 injuries, we
may feel confident that this study gives an accurate picture of losses and wage
replacement for the injuries studied. However, there is no reason to believe that
this study would apply to Colorado or New Jersey. Indeed, we might be con-
cerned about whether the results would apply to 1999 injuries in Arizona. At
this point, researchers do not know how to generalize studies of lost earnings,
although this important issue is a topic of current research. (In a different set-
ting, see Hotz, Imbens, and Mortimer 1999.) With wage loss studies only
available for five states to date, we simply do not know how much variation
there may be among the states.
Sensitivity analysis. Researchers can make different assumptions about,
for example, discount rates and ways of projecting losses. There is no “right or
wrong” way to make these assumptions. But, the assumptions will have im-
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portant influence on the results obtained. Further, these results will be inter-
preted in a difficult political environment where workers’ compensation bene-
fits will likely be a very contentious issue. Therefore, it is always useful to per-
form a sensitivity analysis to see how results would change under different
assumptions.
Appendix 3B
Statistical Basis of Loss Estimates
Conceptual basis of estimates of lost earnings. Let yi1 represent earn-
ings when person i is injured, and yi0 earnings when person i is uninjured. Ei-
ther of yi0 or yi1—but not both—can be observed for any person, because we
cannot observe the same person at the same moment both injured and unin-
jured. Let Ii be an indicator of injury (= 1 if injured, = 0 otherwise). Then the
observed outcome for person i is yi = Iiyi1 + (1 – Ii)yi0. The injury effect or loss
for person i is
(1) λi = yi1 – yi0,
where time relative to injury is implicit in the specification. We can rewrite the
impact of injuries on the injured population as:
(2) λ | I=1 = E(yi1 | Ii = 1) – E(yi0 | Ii = 1).
This cannot be estimated directly since we do not observe yi0, what postinjury
earnings would have been if the injured group had not been injured.
Statistical methods developed in the nonexperimental evaluation literature
allow estimation of a change in earnings relative to a counterfactual, in this
case relative to what the worker would have received if the injury had not oc-
curred. Typically, nonexperimental evaluation involves comparing a treatment
group with a nonexperimental comparison group, which may have different
characteristics than the treatment group. We assume selection on observable
covariates (Rubin 1974), that is {yi1, yi0 – II} | Xi (where – indicates indepen-
dence):
(3) E(yij | Xi,Ii = 1) = E(yij | Xi,Ii = 0), j = 0,1.
In the context of estimating the impact of a workplace injury, injured
workers are analogous to the treatment group. The comparison group could be
uninjured workers or workers with very minor injuries. The assumption of se-
lection on observables implies that, conditional on the observable covariates,
Xi, there is no systematic preinjury difference between the groups assigned to
treatment and control. This allows us to identify the effect of injuries on earn-
ings for the injured:
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(4) λ | I=1 = E{E(yi | Xi,Ii = 1) – E(yi | Xi,Ii = 0) | Ii = 1},
where the overall expectation is over the distribution of Xi | Ii = 1, the distribu-
tion of preinjury variables in the injured population.
In the remainder of this section, we will describe three methods of esti-
mating injury-related losses used in the nonexperimental evaluation literature
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983): matching controls to injured workers on ob-
served covariates, subclassifying on the basis of covariates, or using regression
methods to account for the influence of covariates. We then briefly discuss a
method to simplify conditioning on covariates: the propensity score. Finally,
we consider the problem of bias related to unobserved covariates.
Matching. One way of addressing this issue is to match each injured
worker to a set of control workers using the relevant covariates. The mean dif-
ference between the injured and control workers should then be an unbiased
estimator of losses. This method has the advantage of being relatively non-
parametric since it does not depend upon distributional or functional form as-
sumptions. The limitation of this method is that appropriate controls for each
injured worker may not always be available. This method is used in Reville
(1999).
Subclassification. This method divides injured and comparison groups
into relatively uniform subclasses based on identical or similar values of the
covariates, Xi. In this case, the mean difference within subgroups weighted by
the distribution of injured workers (Ii = 1) over subgroups, should provide an
unbiased estimate of λi.
Regression. Linear regression assumes linearity and constant effects. In
particular, suppose that:
E[yi0t | Xit] = α + X′itβ + γt and
yit1 = yit0 + δt,
where t represents the postinjury period and γt is the time effect common to all
individuals. Then,
(5) yit = α + X′itβ + Iitδt + γt + uit
where Xit denotes covariates of earnings such as age and education that align
the earnings of injured workers and uninjured workers in the sample, and Iit
denotes an indicator for whether the individual is injured. The goal is to esti-
mate δt, the difference between the earnings of similar injured and uninjured
workers. In this case, rather than balancing the covariates of the injured and
uninjured workers by matching or subclassification, we take their impact into
account, assuming a linear functional form.
Here, ui is independent of Xi under the assumptions given. Because Ii is in-
dependent of yi given Xit, Ii is also independent of ui given Xit. Therefore, ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) applied to equation (5) produces a consistent esti-
mate of the constant treatment effect, δt, for a given postinjury period. Thus,
we estimate the earnings of workers who are injured under the assumption that
they had not been injured by using information from uninjured (or less seri-
ously injured) workers. This is the standard difference-in-differences model,
which involves estimating equation (5) on a sample that includes both injured
and uninjured workers.
Note, however, that there is no reason to assume that the impact of an in-
jury is independent of all covariates. On the contrary, we expect that some co-
variates—such as age and tenure—will modify the impact of the injury. In this
case, we would need to replace each δt in equation (5) with a number of inter-
action terms, reflecting the modifying effect of the covariate on the impact of
the injury.
Selection on unobservables. A difficulty with the estimation of equation
(5) or using the matching or subclassification methods is that the variable Iit
may be determined by unobserved covariates that may be correlated with uit.
This may be represented by the following:
Iit = 1 if γ0 + Ziγ1 + εit ≥ 0,
Iit = 0 otherwise.
Estimation of equation (5) will lead to misleading results if the Zit are related
to uit and are not included in the Xit, or if εit is related to uit, as when, for in-
stance, the quality of the employer–employee match affects both the earnings
of the worker and the probability of making a workers’ compensation claim.
Econometric techniques for correcting for selection on unobservables
(e.g., Heckman 1979) require strong functional form and distributional as-
sumptions. Recent developments in the nonexperimental evaluation literature
(Dehejia and Wahba 2002; Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997) suggest that at
least in the context of job training, carefully defined comparison groups can
considerably mitigate this problem.




In the next chapter (Chapter 5), we will review empirical studies
examining the extent to which workers’ compensation benefits actually
replace lost earnings for workers in selected states. As previously indi-
cated, we believe these studies provide the most accurate method of
evaluating the performance of state workers’ compensation programs
against the wage replacement standard of benefit adequacy. However,
these studies suffer from three significant weaknesses.
First, there is a necessary lag between the occurrence of an occupa-
tional injury and the time at which the full extent of the worker’s subse-
quent wage loss (and benefit experience) becomes known. In addition,
data collection and analysis is itself a time-consuming process, which
means that it is difficult to evaluate the impact of a change in statutory
benefit parameters (or other aspects of the workers’ compensation pro-
gram) on wage replacement adequacy until several years have passed.
Thus, the information may not be timely.
Second, the cost and research effort required for these studies pre-
cludes an ongoing and comprehensive evaluation of more than 50 sepa-
rate workers’ compensation programs. Thus, the information (from an-
other jurisdiction) may not be relevant. Third, many states lack the data
necessary to conduct a wage loss study, either because the workers’
compensation benefits data are not readily available in computerized
records, or because there is no practical way to link benefits data to
earnings data for individual cases. Thus, the information may not exist.
In the absence of such studies, policymakers in the past have relied
on other means of evaluating benefit adequacy. These methods include
interstate comparisons of a limited number of statutory parameters,
such as the maximum weekly benefit paid for temporary total disabili-
ty; actuarial evaluations of the expected benefits given a wider range of
statutory benefit parameters; and the actual workers’ compensation
benefits paid to injured workers on a per employee or per injury basis.
Each of these methods has advantages and disadvantages as a mea-
sure of wage replacement benefit adequacy. In this chapter we examine
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the first two of these, as they have had the least attention in the litera-
ture.1 Specifically, we examine statutory benefit parameters, both as a
means of evaluating performance with respect to the earnings replace-
ment objective and as a method for measuring social benefit adequacy.
Our inquiry will seek to establish whether these simple measures tell us
a different story than that of the next chapter, and to decide whether that
is an advantage or a disadvantage.2
TTD MAXIMUM BENEFIT
Perhaps the simplest (and least costly) means of evaluating state
workers’ compensation programs is to compare important and well-un-
derstood statutory parameters across states. One widely used parameter
for this purpose is the temporary total disability (TTD) weekly benefit
maximum. As indicated in Chapter 1, TTD benefits are equal to a pro-
portion of the injured worker’s preinjury wage, subject to minimum and
maximum weekly benefit levels.
While workers’ compensation programs pay several other kinds of
cash benefits, TTD benefits are a useful measure of overall benefit gen-
erosity for a number of reasons. First, they are paid to nearly all
claimants who receive wage replacement benefits due to an occupation-
al accident or injury. Whether they eventually qualify for other benefits,
claimants generally begin on TTD benefits. Second, the formulae for
TTD benefits are less complicated (i.e., determined by fewer parame-
ters) than the formulae for other types of cash benefits, such as perma-
nent partial disability (PPD) compensation. Thus, it is easier to capture
differences in benefit generosity for TTD claims using a limited num-
ber of statutory parameters.
To be eligible for TTD benefits, the injured worker must experience
a period of total disability for more than a statutorily defined period
(termed a waiting period), which is typically three to seven days in U.S.
jurisdictions. If disability continues beyond the waiting period, the
claimant will receive benefits equal to a statutorily defined proportion of
his or her preinjury wage, termed the nominal replacement rate. The ef-
fective replacement rate may be more or less than the nominal replace-
ment rate because benefits are subject to the minimum and maximum
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weekly benefit amounts. If the claimant’s disability continues for more
than another statutorily defined period (termed the retroactive period),
which is typically 7 to 14 days in duration, the claimant will receive
compensation benefits for the waiting period as well. Finally, in some
states the duration of TTD benefit payments may not exceed a statutori-
ly prescribed maximum, ranging from 104 to 500 weeks (2 to almost 10
years).
Thus, the generosity of TTD benefits is determined by six parame-
ters: 1) the nominal replacement rate, 2) the weekly benefit maximum,
3) the weekly benefit minimum, 4) the waiting period, 5) the retroactive
period, and 6) in those minority of states that statutorily limit TTD du-
ration, the maximum duration. However, there is limited variation in
the waiting periods and replacement rates across states. And the week-
ly benefit minimum, retroactive period, and maximum TTD duration
affect only a small proportion of compensation claimants. Thus, the
TTD weekly maximum is probably the most common summary indica-
tor of the relative generosity of TTD benefits across states.
Nonetheless, by itself the TTD maximum provides little informa-
tion about whether workers’ compensation benefits are adequate ac-
cording to either definition of adequacy described in Chapter 2. How-
ever, the comparison of the TTD maximum to the poverty thresholds is
a potentially useful measure of the social adequacy of workers’ com-
pensation benefits that has some historical significance because it was
one of the measures used in the Report of the National Commission on
State Workmen’s Compensation Laws.3
Figure 4.1 provides data on the ratio of the TTD maximum to the
poverty threshold for state jurisdictions plus the District of Columbia
for the years 1972 through 1998. These data indicate that, on average,
the TTD maximum increased relative to the poverty threshold over this
period, from about 100 percent of the threshold in the early 1970s to
more than 160 percent of the threshold by the end of the 1990s. Figure
4.2 presents interstate comparisons of the TTD maximum/poverty
threshold comparison for the year 1998. The figure shows substantial
variation among states as the TTD maximum relative to the poverty
threshold ranges from just less than 90 percent for Mississippi to more
than 280 percent for Iowa.
The comparisons depicted in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 are useful in that
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Figure 4.1 Temporary Total Disability Maximum Relative to the Poverty Threshold, 1972–1998
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cial adequacy of workers’ compensation benefits may be judged. For
example, one could argue that for workers’ compensation benefits to be
socially adequate, the TTD maximum should be equal to or greater than
the poverty threshold. Using this standard, the data in Figures 4.1 and
4.2 indicate that there is not a serious problem with respect to the social
Figure 4.2 Temporary Total Disability Maximum Relative to the Poverty
Threshold, by State, 1998
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adequacy of workers’ compensation benefits. All states—except Mis-
sissippi—had socially adequate maximum benefits by this standard in
1998.
AVERAGE WEEKLY TTD BENEFITS
While the weekly TTD benefit maximum is a readily available
measure of workers’ compensation benefits, it has obvious weak-
nesses. As we have shown, it is only one of the parameters that deter-
mine the generosity of TTD benefits. If we believe that socially ade-
quate workers’ compensation benefits would provide the injured
worker with income sufficient to avoid impoverishing the worker and
his or her family, then the TTD maximum is a poor measure, as most
workers eligible for TTD benefits receive a weekly amount that is less
than the maximum. Thus, it is arguable that the average weekly TTD
benefit provides a better measure of social adequacy. Accordingly,
we calculated the average weekly TTD benefit using the following
methodology.
Methodology
First, a wage distribution for each state was constructed for each
year by centering a national wage distribution on the average weekly
wage paid to workers covered by unemployment insurance in the state
during the year.4 The weekly benefit paid to each worker in this distri-
bution was calculated according to the nominal replacement rate and
benefit minimums and maximums in effect in each particular state dur-
ing a particular year.5 We then calculated the average weekly benefit for
each state and year by averaging across all workers in the hypothetical
distribution.
In some jurisdictions, the weekly benefit payment varies according
to the claimant’s family and/or dependent status, i.e., whether the
claimant was married and had children. In those instances, a distribu-
tion of fatal compensation claims by family status—which is described
in more detail below—was used to represent the distribution of family
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types. This was combined with the wage distribution using appropriate
weights, benefits were then calculated for each claim in the combined
wage and family type distribution, and an average was taken for the en-
tire claim distribution.6
For several states, benefits are based on spendable or after-tax in-
come. In those cases, the before-tax wage distribution was converted to
an after-tax distribution by deducting estimated federal and state in-
come taxes as well as FICA. These taxes were calculated on the basis of
the claimant’s presumed tax status given the number of dependents as-
sumed by the combined wage-family status distribution. Once again,
benefits were calculated for each claim in the distribution and an aver-
age was taken.
Results
Figure 4.3 presents national data on the ratio of the estimated av-
erage weekly workers’ compensation benefit paid to workers who are
temporarily and totally disabled to the poverty threshold for a family
of four for the period 1972–1998. These data indicate that the average
weekly TTD benefit for the nation as a whole increased from 80 per-
cent of the poverty threshold in 1972 to a little less than 110 percent in
1998. The interstate variation in social adequacy is illustrated by the
data reported in Figure 4.4, which depicts the ratio of the TTD average
weekly benefit to the poverty level for individual states in 1998. While
there has been significant progress, these data indicate that 16 states
still paid an average TTD benefit that was less than the poverty level in
1998.
Interestingly, a comparison of these data with those in Figure 4.2
show that the identification of a particular state as adequate or inade-
quate sometimes depends upon the measure used. For example, using
the TTD maximum as a standard, Iowa had the most generous benefits
in the nation in 1998, but Iowa benefits actually fall below the poverty
standard when measured using the average weekly TTD benefit. This
difference between the generosity of the maximum and the generosity
of average TTD benefits is explained by two facts: 1) Iowa is a relative-
ly low-wage state (ranking 39th in the nation in 1998), and 2) Iowa uses
a spendable earnings benefit formula with relatively high marginal tax
rates for upper-income workers.
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EXPECTED STATUTORY BENEFITS
In the previous sections, we moved from a simple measure of ade-
quacy based on a single parameter that determines the generosity of
one type of cash benefits (the maximum weekly TTD benefit) to a more
Figure 4.4 TTD Weekly Average Relative to the Poverty Threshold, 1998
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comprehensive measure—using additional parameters—of that same
type of benefits (the average weekly TTD benefit). While generally cor-
related, these measures lead to different conclusions about the relative
generosity of workers’ compensation benefits. We may infer that it
would be possible to further improve our evaluation of wage replace-
ment benefit adequacy by developing measures that include additional
statutory benefit parameters and other benefit types.
In this section, we construct a comprehensive measure of cash ben-
efit adequacy incorporating all benefit types and using a more complete
set of statutory parameters. To do so, we use a national distribution of
workers’ compensation claimants to estimate the expected average
statutory benefit for a disabled workers’ compensation claimant who
experiences at least one day of disability. We calculate this expected
statutory benefit for each state and year from 1972 to 1998. This
claimant distribution, which was obtained from the National Council
on Compensation Insurance (NCCI), has several dimensions, including
the preinjury wage rate, the severity of disability, and the claimant’s
marital and family status.
Methodology
To estimate expected workers’ compensation benefits, we first cal-
culated the benefit payable to four different types of claims: temporary
total disabilities (TTDs); permanent total disabilities (PTDs); perma-
nent partial disabilities (PPDs); and fatalities (fatals). These claim
types correspond to the classification scheme typically utilized by state
workers’ compensation programs. For each claim type, expected bene-
fits are equal to the product of the average weekly benefit paid to the
claimant and the average duration of benefit payments in weeks. Both
components, the weekly benefit payment and benefit duration, were
calculated separately using appropriate wage or duration distributions
and then were multiplied together to obtain the total expected benefit
amount for each claim type. These separate claim type estimates were
then combined, using a national distribution of claims by type, to pro-
duce an overall average expected benefit estimate for all disabling in-
jury and illness claims. In the remainder of this section, we will de-
scribe the methods used to calculate each component of the overall
estimate.
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Weekly benefit
Similar methods were used to calculate weekly benefits for all four
claim types. The calculation of average weekly benefits for PTD, PPD,
and fatal claims is identical to that for TTD claims described above, ex-
cept for two additional adjustments. First, in some states weekly bene-
fit payments are reduced by coordination with other insurance benefits,
most notably Social Security Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI)
and Disability Insurance (DI) benefits. The amount of the reduction,
known as an offset, was calculated for each claim in the combined
wage-family status distribution to determine the Social Security month-
ly benefit due the claimant, which was converted to a weekly amount.
We assumed that Social Security disability insurance benefits only ap-
plied to PTD claims, that Social Security retirement and survivor bene-
fits only applied to PTD and fatal claims, and that other offsets (such as
unemployment insurance) were not applied to any workers’ compensa-
tion benefit.7
Finally, in a few states the weekly benefit is indexed to the cost of
living or the state’s average weekly wage. In those states, we inflated
the weekly benefit of PTD, PPD, or fatal claims as appropriate to ac-
count for inflation. If benefits were indexed to the CPI, benefits were ar-
bitrarily increased by 4 percent annually. If benefits were indexed to the
state’s average weekly wage, we assumed a 6 percent inflation rate for
benefits.
Temporary Total Disability Duration
Depending on the jurisdiction, two statutory parameters limit the
duration of TTD benefits. First, in all states, claimants do not receive
payment for the first few days of disability—known as a waiting period,
which lasts 3 to 7 days—unless their disability continues for a longer
period—known as the retroactive period, which is usually 10 to 14
days. Second, a handful of states either limit the number of weeks the
claimant may collect TTD benefits or limit the total dollar amount of
benefits the claimant may collect.
We applied the statutory parameters with respect to the waiting and
retrospective periods, as well as any limits on TTD duration of benefits
to a distribution of TTD claims by duration (provided by NCCI) to cal-
culate the average TTD duration for each state and year. This estimated
average duration was multiplied by the calculated average weekly ben-
efit to yield the estimated total benefits paid to TTD claims.
Permanent Total Disability Duration
Some jurisdictions limit the duration of PTD benefits (in weeks) or
the total dollar amount of benefits paid. Unless such a limit was specif-
ically mentioned in the statute, we assumed that benefits were paid for
life. In either case, we determined the duration of PTD benefits using
an age distribution of PTD claims and mortality information provided
by NCCI. Expected benefit duration, discounted at 3.5 percent and ad-
justed for mortality, was calculated for every claimant in the age distri-
bution, and was then multiplied by the average weekly benefit to obtain
expected total benefits.
Where PTD benefits are offset by SSDI benefits, the benefit period
is divided into four periods: 1) a six-month waiting period during which
we assume the claimant receives no Social Security benefits; 2) a peri-
od during which the SSDI benefit includes dependency benefits for de-
pendent children (for those claimants with dependent children); 3) a pe-
riod after the children are presumed to have reached majority during
which only the basic SSDI benefit is paid; and 4) a period, beginning at
age 65, when SSDI benefits are no longer paid.8 A separate benefit du-
ration is calculated for each of these periods, adjusted for mortality and
discounted to the present at 3.5 percent; each component is multiplied
by the applicable weekly benefit for that period, to estimate the present
value of lifetime benefits.
Where Social Security retirement benefits offset workers’ compen-
sation payments, benefit duration is broken into two subperiods: before
and after age 65. A separate duration is calculated for each subperiod,
adjusted for mortality and discounted at 3.5 percent, and then multi-
plied by the appropriate weekly benefit (offset or not offset).
Permanent Partial Disability Duration
Most state statutes recognize two different types of PPDs: sched-
uled and nonscheduled. Scheduled PPD benefits are typically paid to
claimants who have suffered injuries to a particular body part (such as
an arm or toe). The maximum duration of scheduled benefits for the
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loss or loss of use of a particular body part is specified by statute. For
example, in New York claimants who lose the use of a leg are entitled to
288 weeks of benefits, whereas claimants who lose an arm are entitled
to 312 weeks of benefits. In the event of a partial loss of a member or
other scheduled body part, benefits are prorated based on the amount
specified for the entire loss, so that a New York claimant who has suf-
fered a 25 percent loss of an arm is entitled to 78 weeks of benefits, or
one-fourth of the full allotment.
The basis for nonscheduled PPD benefits—that is, PPDs involving a
body part that is not specifically mentioned in the statute—varies wide-
ly among states (see Barth and Niss 1999). In some states, nonscheduled
benefits are based on the extent of functional impairment—essentially a
medical determination (19 jurisdictions). Other states require an evalua-
tion of the claimant’s lost wage-earning capacity resulting from the in-
jury (13 jurisdictions). In 10 jurisdictions, nonscheduled benefits are
proportional to the extent of actual wage loss, i.e., the difference be-
tween the claimant’s pre- and postinjury wage. There are also several
ways of estimating future wage loss, some of which may result in little
difference from lost wage-earning capacity methods in practice. Finally,
9 states use what Barth and Niss term a “bifurcated” approach. Workers
who have returned to work are rated for impairment, while other work-
ers are rated for loss of wage-earning capacity.
In some states, the limit on nonscheduled PPD duration is identical
for all such injuries, regardless of severity, while in other states the lim-
it varies according to the severity of the injury (i.e., the extent of lost
wage-earning capacity or functional impairment). In short, there are
very few general statements that hold true for all state systems used to
determine PPD benefits.
For functional impairment or the lost earning capacity jurisdic-
tions, we utilized a national distribution of PPD claims, by body part
and the degree of functional impairment.9 For wage loss states, we used
a wage loss distribution provided by Berkowitz and Burton (1987) to
determine the extent of wage loss associated with a given degree of
functional impairment. This average wage loss figure was then linked
with NCCI’s PPD distribution to create a wage loss distribution for
PPD claimants.
Statutory information was combined with the resulting PPD distri-
bution (wage loss, earning capacity, or functional impairment) to deter-
mine average disability duration. Similar to PTD claims, PPD benefit
duration was adjusted for mortality and discounted at 3.5 percent. Once
again, we multiplied average benefit duration by the average weekly
benefit to obtain the expected total benefit for PPD claimants.
Fatal Benefit Duration
While states pay fatal injury benefits to a variety of dependents,
NCCI claim data indicate that over 95 percent of all fatal work injury
claims involve workers with no dependents entitled to benefits, workers
whose sole dependents are their spouses, or workers whose sole de-
pendents are their spouses and children. Consequently, our fatal benefit
estimates were based only on these three categories of fatal injury
claims.
In most states, fatal injury compensation is paid to the spouse until
the event of his or her death or remarriage, while fatal benefits are paid
to children of the deceased worker until the age of majority.10 Most
states also pay a lump sum amount, typically equivalent to two years of
benefits, to a spouse who remarries. In some jurisdictions, there is a
limit on the duration of fatal benefit payments (in weeks) or on the total
amount of benefits paid to all dependents. Finally, all states pay for fu-
neral benefits up to a specified maximum. We assumed that in every
case, maximum funeral benefits were paid.
NCCI provided us with a distribution of fatal injuries by family sta-
tus, i.e., the proportion of fatal claims involving no dependents, a
spouse as the only dependent, a spouse and one child, etc. These data
were combined with statutory parameters to determine an average fatal
benefit duration. This was adjusted for mortality and the probability of
remarriage and discounted at 3.5 percent. The estimated duration was
then multiplied by the average weekly benefit to obtain an estimated
average total benefit for fatal claims. We also included an expected
lump sum settlement amount as well as the maximum payment for fu-
neral expenses.
In some states, the weekly benefit payment varies with the number
of dependents. For example, in Alabama the replacement rate for a
spouse with no dependent children is 50 percent of the preinjury wage,
while for a spouse with dependent children, the replacement rate is
two-thirds of the wage. In these cases, we calculated two average dura-
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tions for fatal benefits—the duration before the children reached the
age of majority and the duration thereafter—and two average weekly
benefit payments for those claimants with dependent children, one
based on the amount paid to a spouse with no dependent children, and
the other based on the amount paid to a spouse with dependent chil-
dren.
RESULTS
Figure 4.5 reports the national average expected wage replacement
benefit for workers’ compensation claimants in the United States, as
calculated using the methodology described in this section, for the peri-
od 1972 through 1998. Once again these are weighted results, using
state employment covered by unemployment insurance as state
weights, and reported in constant 1998 dollars.11
The data in Figure 4.5 show that in 1972, the average workers’
compensation claimant could expect to receive slightly more than
$8,500 in wage replacement and other cash benefits (in 1998 dollars) as
the result of his or her work injury. By 1998, average expected workers’
compensation benefits had risen to slightly more than $11,000, a 30
percent increase in real expected benefits. As can be seen, most of this
increase occurred between 1972 and 1976. Benefit levels have re-
mained relatively constant since that time, with a small rise at the end
of the period.
The immediate post-1972 increase in benefits is probably attributa-
ble to the effect of the Report of the National Commission on State
Workmen’s Compensation Laws, which recommended a number of
changes to state law liberalizing benefits, and which recommended fed-
eral standards for state workers’ compensation programs if they failed
to improve benefits.
Figure 4.6 depicts statutory benefit generosity for individual states
in 1998. The data in this figure show that expected statutory benefits for
a workers’ compensation claimant in 1998 ranged from a little more
than $30,000 for the average injured worker in the District of Columbia
to less than $5,000 for (hypothetically) identical injured workers in
Louisiana, a sixfold difference.
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While these data provide some useful information about the rela-
tive generosity of workers’ compensation benefits over time and across
jurisdictions, they fail to inform the question of adequacy, which is the
central issue of this volume. To evaluate benefit adequacy, we must
compare these benefit estimates against some standard. In the remain-
der of this chapter, we will present data that evaluate these expected
Figure 4.6 Expected Statutory Benefits, by State, 1998
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statutory benefit statistics using two criteria: the benefits that would be
paid under the provisions of the Model Act (Revised) promulgated by
the Council of State Governments in the mid 1970s, and the benefits
compared to the wage loss experienced by workers’ compensation
claimants according to NCCI’s national distribution of work injuries.
COMPARISONS WITH MODEL ACT (REVISED) BENEFITS
The Model Act (Revised) (hereafter Model Act) is one possible
standard with which to compare the statutory benefits of state workers’
compensation programs. The benefit provisions of the Model Act from
1974 are presented in Appendix 4A to this chapter. The provisions of
the Model Act reflect a consensus among many workers’ compensation
stakeholders about wage replacement benefit adequacy from the period
shortly after the NCSWCL’s report. In the intervening period of more
than 25 years, we judge that employers in particular have revised their
conceptions about benefit levels in light of the experience when states
implemented the commission’s recommendations. They now maintain
that benefit levels must be looked at in terms of the entire workers’
compensation law and utilization experience and not on a “stand alone”
basis.
The Model Act comparison is based on a two-step calculation.
First, we calculate the expected benefits that would be paid to each
state’s workers’ compensation claimants in each year between 1972 and
1998 according to the provisions of the Model Act. This calculation is
identical to that used to estimate expected benefits as described in the
previous section, except that the parameters defined by Model Act pro-
visions substitute for the state’s actual statutory parameters. Important-
ly, each jurisdiction’s average weekly wage in each year is used to
compute benefits under the Model Act. Second, we take the ratio of 
the state’s expected benefits, as described in the previous section, to the
state’s expected benefits under the Model Act. The result represents the
proportion of Model Act wage replacement benefits that would be paid
in each state under its statutory provisions, with 100 percent represent-
ing equality of benefits with the Model Act.
Data comparing expected benefits paid under the actual statutory
parameters in effect at the time with the benefits that would have been
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paid under the provisions of the Model Act are presented in Figures 4.7
to 4.9. Since Model Act benefit provisions remain constant throughout
the period, the data in Figure 4.7 unsurprisingly mirror those shown in
Figure 4.5. The results from Figure 4.7 show that the ratio of actual to
Model Act benefits increased somewhat during the first five years of the
period, rising from slightly less than 40 percent of the benefits that
would have been paid under the Model Act in 1972 to about 45 percent
in 1976. The ratio of actual statutory to Model Act benefits fluctuated
narrowly between 45 and 48 percent over the remainder of the period.
The average state has never exceeded 50 percent of the benefit level
prescribed by the Model Act, and several states do not achieve 25 per-
cent in 1998.
Figure 4.8 depicts the performance of individual states against the
Model Act criterion as of 1998. Once again, there is substantial varia-
tion among states that is similar to the results presented in Figure 4.6.
The differences between these two measures may be explained by the
differences in wage levels across states. High-wage states have high ex-
pected statutory benefits, which means high-wage states tend to be
ranked high in Figure 4.6. However, high-wage states also have high
benefits when the Model Act is used to calculate benefits for the state,
and so the ratio of actual benefits to Model Act benefits is dampened for
high-wage states. Thus, we see that in Figure 4.6, New York has ex-
pected benefits that are ranked third most generous in the nation, while
according to the data in Figure 4.8, New York ranks 14th in the nation
in the ratio of expected benefits to Model Act benefits. Among other
things, this comparison once again illustrates that the evaluation of ben-
efit adequacy depends on the measure employed.
As previously indicated, overall wage replacement benefits paid to
workers’ compensation claimants is a weighted average of four differ-
ent types of compensation benefits—TTD, PTD, PPD, and fatals—and
different formulae and parameters are used to determine the generosity
of each type. This raises the important question of whether there are
differences in wage replacement benefit adequacy among different ben-
efit types.
Figure 4.9 depicts national average measures of the ratio of expect-
ed statutory benefits to the benefits under the Model Act for the four
benefit types as well as the composite “overall” cash benefit measure
(designated as “Mean” in the figure) for the period 1972–1998. As can
be seen in the figure, there is substantial variation in the adequacy of
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wage replacement benefits among these different claim types. When
evaluated against the Model Act provisions, TTD benefits appear to be
the most adequate, while PTD benefits are the least adequate.
Interestingly, the data indicate that TTD benefits have improved
relative to the Model Act throughout the period, reaching nearly 90 per-
Figure 4.8 Expected Benefits Relative to the Model Act (Revised), by
State, 1998
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Figure 4.9 Expected Statutory Benefits Relative to the Model Act (Revised), by Type of Benefit, 1972–1998
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cent in the late 1990s. On the other hand, wage replacement benefit ad-
equacy for other benefit types has stagnated or even declined since the
mid 1980s. Among other things, this would suggest that a less compli-
cated measure of benefit adequacy, such as the average weekly TTD
benefit discussed earlier in this chapter, may be fatally flawed because
it fails to reflect important variation in benefit generosity.
Replacement Rate
Another criterion against which to evaluate statutory wage replace-
ment benefit adequacy is the extent to which workers’ compensation
benefits replace projected or assumed lost wages.12 In this section, we
examine measures of this criterion, using the same NCCI distribution
of workers’ compensation claims that was used to estimate statutory
benefits earlier in the chapter. Specifically, for TTD claims we assumed
that claimants suffer a total loss of wage income for the entire period of
disability as specified in the TTD duration distribution provided by
NCCI. For PTD claims, we assumed that claimants suffered a total loss
of wage income for the remainder of their lives. The duration of this
loss was determined by an actuarial evaluation of the expected length of
life, which depends on the claimant’s age as given by an NCCI distri-
bution of PTD claims. For PPD claims, we assumed that claimants suf-
fer a partial loss of wages equal to the disability rating provided by the
NCCI PPD distribution and that they suffer this loss for the remainder
of their normal working lives (i.e., until age 65). Of course, we recog-
nize that in wage loss states there may be some claimants who have a
permanent physical impairment but suffer little or no wage loss. Final-
ly, for fatal claims, we assume that there is a total loss of the deceased
worker’s wages and that the surviving spouse experiences this loss un-
til death or remarriage.
Given the long-tailed nature of PTD, PPD, and fatal claims, we cal-
culate two different sets of estimates of wage loss for these types of
claims. One set assumes that in the absence of the work injury, the
worker’s wages would have remained static over the remainder of his or
her life so that the extent of wage loss similarly remains unchanged.
The second set assumes that the injured worker’s wage would have
grown by 6 percent annually in nominal terms, so that wage loss would
have grown similarly over the remainder of the work life (i.e., until age
65). Obviously, this second set of wage loss estimates is substantially
greater than the first set.
To calculate the wage replacement rate, we take the ratio of expect-
ed statutory benefits to expected wage losses. Figure 4.10 presents the
national wage replacement rate simulations for the period 1972–1998,
using state average estimates that assume that wage loss remains static
over the course of the workers’ working life. The figure shows that the
pattern of these estimates is similar to those previously reported for ex-
pected statutory benefits and those same benefits relative to Model Act
benefits. The data suggest that in 1972 state workers’ compensation
programs replaced a little less than 20 percent of total lifetime wage
losses. This number rose to about 28 percent in 1985 before trending
downward, reaching a little less than 26 percent in 1998. If we believe
that benefits should replace two-thirds of lost wage income, then aver-
age workers’ compensation benefits for the nation as a whole must be
considered inadequate.
Figure 4.11 presents individual state wage replacement simulations
for 1998. Once again, these data reveal considerable variation in ade-
quacy across jurisdictions, ranging from a 57 percent replacement rate
in Pennsylvania to a 10 percent rate in Nevada. It is also clear that the
simulated wage replacement rate provides a ranking of states that is
nearly identical to that given by the Model Act ratio reported in Figure
4.8.
Figure 4.12 depicts national average data on the simulated wage re-
placement measure assuming that wage loss increases over the course
of a permanently disabled claimant’s working life, or the period of de-
pendency of a surviving spouse. These estimates indicate that wage re-
placement benefits replaced only about 10 percent of projected lifetime
lost earnings in 1972. This figure rose to more than 14 percent in the
early 1980s before falling back to just over 13 percent in the late 1980s
and 1990s. These estimates of wage replacement rates are even lower
than those based upon actual earnings of comparison workers in Chap-
ter 5 because the simulated earnings used here are not subject to the
normal vagaries of the labor market (unemployment, illness, etc.).
Finally, Figures 4.13 and 4.14 report estimated national average
wage replacement rates by benefit type during the study period. Figure
4.13 reports the result of simulations that assume that wage loss re-
mains static, while Figure 4.14 reports simulations that assume that
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wage loss increases over time. These two figures reveal substantial
variation in wage replacement adequacy among benefit types. Figure
4.13 shows that the simulated wage replacement benefit was most near-
ly adequate for PTD injuries and least adequate for PPD claims. Simu-
lated average wage replacement rates exceeded 55 percent for TTD
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Figure 4.11 Simulated Expected Replacement Rates, by State, 1998
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claims in 1998. Figure 4.14 shows a similar result for TTD claims,
where the wage losses are mostly short-term and about 55 percent are
replaced by workers’ compensation payments. However, the figure also
indicates that other disability classes may receive 20 percent or less re-
placement of simulated lifetime earnings.
Thus, a comparison of these two figures indicates that the extent of
wage replacement for different benefit types depends very significantly
on assumptions about long-term wage loss. In addition, comparisons of
the mean wage replacement rates with the PPD replacement rate indi-
cate that benefits paid for PPD disability are, by far, the most significant
determinant of overall benefit adequacy in this exercise. Further, the
simulated replacement rate data in both figures reveal that the wage re-
placement performance of PPD benefits has been markedly lower than
for other types of benefits.
However, we need to remember that the vast majority of workers’
compensation claimants do not receive PPD benefits. Thus, the typical
injured worker who recovers and returns to work without major diffi-
culty (TTD) is securing the most adequate earnings replacement bene-
fit. It is the permanent disabilities, and especially the permanent partial
disabilities, that appear to fare the worst in this simulated wage replace-
ment exercise. Moreover, there has never been any consensus about the
optimum level of wage replacement for permanent partial disability, re-
flecting the inherent subjectivity of the measurement.
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we reviewed the adequacy of wage replacement ben-
efits in state workers’ compensation programs using several different
measures. We examined both social benefit adequacy and income re-
placement adequacy. Four major conclusions can be drawn from the
analyses presented in this chapter. First, workers’ compensation wage
replacement benefits in most jurisdictions appear to be inadequate us-
ing the measures of social and income replacement adequacy employed
here. Second, the choice of which measure to use in the evaluation of
wage replacement benefit adequacy is critically important. While sim-
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ple measures such as the TTD maximum are readily available, they pro-
vide very different assessments of benefit adequacy than do more com-
plex—and more accurate—measures. Thus, they should be used very
carefully, if at all.
Third, wage replacement rates appear to vary substantially by type
of disability. TTD claimants appear to secure the most adequate wage
replacement benefits, and PPD claimants the least adequate. This find-
ing would not be surprising to experts in workers’ compensation mat-
ters, as the many difficulties with compensation of PPDs are well
known. It is also worth reminding ourselves that the majority of injured
workers receive TTD benefits and return to work without permanent
consequences.
Fourth, variation in PPD benefits accounts for most of the variation
in overall benefit adequacy in these simulations. While this type of ben-
efit is apparently less adequate than other benefit types, we should be
cautious about this conclusion. Because PPD benefits are the most dif-
ficult and complex for workers’ compensation systems, and because
these claims are the most likely to result in compromise and release
agreements (or other similar “settlements”), more confidence should
perhaps be placed in the results for other benefit types.
The data reported in this chapter support the conclusion that the ac-
tuarial evaluation of statutory benefit parameters may be a useful means
of benchmarking the adequacy of workers’ compensation benefits, with
some distinct advantages over alternative measures. Unlike empirical
measures, it is possible to obtain “real-time” estimates of statutory ben-
efits. Also, unlike data on actual benefits paid, these measures are not in-
fluenced by interstate differences in the composition of the workforce.
Assuming that actuarial assumptions about the extent and distribu-
tion of wage loss are correct, the statutory benefit measure provides a
“quick and dirty” method of assessing changes in wage loss replace-
ment adequacy. However, the statutory benefit index is not without its
faults. Perhaps the most significant is that it fails to capture important
differences in the application of state law to real claims that results in
substantial differences between expected benefits and the benefits that
injured workers actually receive. Actual benefits will be higher in states
that administer the law in a way more favorable to claimants, while the
opposite will be true for states with less liberal administration.
Notes
1. See Thomason, Schmidle, and Burton (2001) for a full exposition of the paid ben-
efits method. Thomason and Burton (2001) present the analysis of the Model Act
(Revised).
2. It should be noted that there are members of this panel that have serious reserva-
tions about the methodology employed in the studies described in this chapter.
3. The poverty threshold delineates the point at which a family is officially consid-
ered to be poor. This threshold, which varies by family size and composition, but
not by geographic location, was initially established in 1963–1964, revised in
1969 and 1981, but has been subsequently adjusted only to account for changes in
the cost of living as measured by the CPI. For the purposes of this chapter, we
have used the threshold that applies to a family of four.
4. This amounts to assuming that the shape of the wage distribution is similar in
each state, even though the level of the average may differ.
5. We used the nominal replacement rate, minimum, and maximum in effect on Jan-
uary 1 during the year in question. We did not consider the effects of waiting and
retroactive periods or the maximum duration of the TTD benefits for this set of
calculations.
6. This amounts to assuming that the family status of all workers’ compensation
claimants was similar to that of fatal claims.
7. Social Security benefits are based on the claimant’s wage history over a lengthy
period rather than the weekly wage in the period shortly before disability. Be-
cause we lacked information on the long-term earnings history of workers’ com-
pensation claimants and how that history relates to our wage distribution, we as-
sumed that the preinjury weekly wage accurately reflects current annual earnings,
which, in turn, accurately reflects the claimant’s wage history.
8. Of course, not all claimants will experience all four periods, depending on their
age and family status.
9. A few states (e.g., New Mexico and Oregon) use formulae that incorporate addi-
tional factors such as the level of education, occupation, and age to determine lost
earning capacity for a given functional impairment. In those states, we use CPS
employment data and claims data from the New York State Workers’ Compensa-
tion Board to determine the average lost earnings capacity for a given degree of
functional impairment, which is then linked with the NCCI PPD distribution.
10. In many states, benefit payments to dependent children may continue while the
child is enrolled in an educational institution after the age of majority, until a
somewhat later age, typically age 21 or 22.
11. Annual wage growth was used to convert nominal benefit dollars to constant dol-
lars.
12. The comparisons discussed in this section involve simulated (or assumed) wage
loss rather than actual wage loss from administrative data, which are the basis for
the analyses in Chapter 5.
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Appendix 4A
Model Act (Revised) Assumptions
Temporary Total Disability
Weekly Benefit
• Maximum = 200% of state average weekly wage (SAWW) lagged 
3 years
• Minimum = 20% of SAWW lagged three years
• Replacement rate = two-thirds
Duration
• Waiting period = 3 days
• Retroactive period = 14 days
• No other limit on duration
Permanent Total Disability
Weekly Benefit
• Same as TTD
• Indexed to change in SAWW
Duration
• No limit
Permanent Partial Disability—Scheduled Injuries
Weekly Benefit
• Minimum and maximum identical to TTD
• Replacement rate = 55% of wage loss, except for scheduled injuries
involving total loss or total loss of use of arm, hand, or leg, two-
thirds of lost wage-earning capacity
Duration
• Determined by the following schedule:
Injury type Weeks
Arm, above elbow 360
Arm, below elbow 324
Hand 324
Thumb, 1st phalange 65
Thumb, 2nd phalange 130
1st finger, 1st phalange 40.5
1st finger, 2nd phalange 81
99
2nd finger, 1st phalange 32.5
2nd finger, 2nd phalange 65
3rd finger, 1st phalange 16
3rd finger, 2nd phalange 32
4th finger, 1st phalange 8
4th finger, 2nd phalange 16
Leg, above knee 240
Leg, below knee 168
Foot 168
Great toe, 1st phalange 15
Great toe, 2nd phalange 30




Eye, loss of vision 150
Permanent Partial Disability—Unscheduled
Weekly Benefit
• Maximums and minimums identical to TTD





• Maximum = 200% of state average weekly wage (SAWW) lagged 
3 years
• Minimum = 50% of SAWW lagged 3 years
• Replacement rate = two-thirds
• Offset by 100% of Social Security retirement benefits
Duration
• Cease upon remarriage
• Upon remarriage, claimant receives two years of benefits
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Wage Loss Studies
Research on workers’ compensation benefit adequacy has been in-
hibited by the lack of adequate data. Determining exactly what an in-
jured worker would have earned in the absence of the injury (the coun-
terfactual case) is impossible. Therefore, making a determination as to
the adequacy of the wage replacement afforded by workers’ compensa-
tion programs is very challenging. As discussed in the previous chap-
ters, it requires estimating what the injured worker’s earnings would
have been in the absence of the injury.
This chapter will examine the issue of the replacement of lost
wages by workers’ compensation programs empirically. We begin with
a review of the rather limited literature available, including the studies
that laid the foundation for what we have termed “modern wage loss
studies.” Then we will review recent empirical wage loss studies in
some detail to determine what they reveal about the adequacy of wage
replacement in workers’ compensation programs.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Some contributions to this research literature were not based on
empirical studies of actual wage loss. The studies published by the
Workers Compensation Research Institute (WCRI) are particularly
noteworthy. In a pair of early publications, DeVol (1985, 1986) re-
viewed the adequacy and equity issues for short-term and long-term
disability, respectively, using benefit formulae from different states.
She also considered the potential impact of other income replacement
programs on workers’ compensation claimants. But these studies did
not use actual earnings data from injured workers; they were benefit
simulation models based on legislated benefit formulae and hypotheti-
cal earnings levels in different jurisdictions (similar to methods used in
Chapter 4). She found that because of peculiarities in the benefit struc-
tures, some workers (many in some states) could receive more than 100
101
percent wage replacement, while others received considerably less.
Careful examination of these inequities led the author to conclude that
benefit replacement based on spendable earnings (i.e., after tax), rather
than gross earnings, would provide greater equity (DeVol 1985, p. xiv).
Victor and Fleischman (1989) took this work a step further by in-
corporating the distribution of weekly wages, average duration of dis-
ability, marital status, spousal earnings, and other data for a sample of
16 states, focusing on temporary disabilities. While this study provides
much more detail on specific benefit provisions (in fact, the subtitle is
“a guide for policymakers”), it is still based on hypothetical claims and
theoretical wage replacement rates rather than on actual empirical data.
After consideration of the complex contributions of the statutory re-
placement rate, maximum and minimum benefits, dependent’s al-
lowances, waiting and retroactive periods, and the statutory definition
of the weekly wage, they also endorsed the concept of spendable earn-
ings replacement as “a more equitable and efficient alternative” (p. 60).
While these simulation studies were valuable contributions to the
literature and to our understanding of the issue of benefit adequacy,
they did not really answer the persistent questions about wage replace-
ment benefit adequacy. There are several reasons for this. First, and
perhaps most important, these studies cannot adequately simulate the
benefits paid in permanent partial disability (PPD) cases. In the vast
majority of states, PPD benefits are paid based on physician evaluations
and/or subjective factors that cannot be easily described by formula and
that have unpredictable relationships to lost earnings. Since more than
60 percent of all workers’ compensation costs are allocated to the 30
percent of wage loss claims that involve PPDs, studies that cannot take
them into account obviously provide only a partial description of the re-
lationship between benefits and losses.
A second limitation of these studies is that they assume that all
workers’ compensation recipients receive exactly the benefits to which
they are entitled by statute (and that the amount of their entitlement is
clear). In reality, we cannot be certain that the stream of benefits re-
ceived coincides exactly with the workers’ compensation benefits spec-
ified by statute. There is also evidence that a significant number of in-
jured workers do not file claims (Michaels 1998; Biddle et al. 1998;
Morse et al. 1998; Pransky et al. 1999; and Morse, Dillon, and Warren
2000). Likewise, there is evidence that some paid claims do not reflect
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true disability, in which case some would argue that any benefits paid
are “in error.” Plus, as any workers’ compensation expert can tell you,
there are many very complex and intricate rules and interpretations that
govern benefit entitlement under our workers’ compensation systems. It
would be delusional to assume that all these provisions can be ade-
quately captured in a simple benefit simulation study.
In his National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation
Laws discussion of the difficulty in dealing with the counterfactual
(noninjured) alternative that is needed to assess the degree of wage loss,
Berkowitz (1973) identified the following list of intervening factors:
“probabilities of death, unemployment, illness, continued tenure in the
occupation, future productivity in the occupation and future tax liabili-
ties” (p. 190). Further, he pointed out “the only feasible measure for
many of these items is one based on an estimate made for a group of
workers with presumably comparable characteristics” (p. 190). This
statement from nearly 30 years ago remains true today; but now, thanks
to the availability of more adequate administrative data and the com-
puting power to analyze them, it is possible to actually implement an
empirical research strategy to answer these questions more definitively.
Berkowitz and Burton (1987) provided the earliest empirical analy-
sis of the issue of benefit adequacy in a study conducted for the Nation-
al Science Foundation in the 1970s and ultimately published by the Up-
john Institute. They reviewed the widely varying procedures for
compensating permanent disabilities in 10 states, and collected actual
empirical data on wages earned before injury and workers’ compensa-
tion benefits subsequently paid to permanent disability claimants in
three states: California, Florida, and Wisconsin. They were able to
gather data on earnings for two years before the work-related injuries
(all of which occurred in 1968) and for five to six years following injury
(1968–1973) through the cooperation of the Social Security Adminis-
tration.
Berkowitz and Burton used a comparison group of workers, also
injured in 1968 but who received less than a 5 percent permanent dis-
ability rating in California, to estimate the wages that the more serious-
ly injured workers would have earned if they had not been injured.
“Expected growth ratios” for future wages were calculated by age, gen-
der, and earnings level for the California sample (which was the only
one with earnings data) and applied to workers with similar characteris-
tics in the other states. A major complication of the study was the level
of litigation in some workers’ compensation jurisdictions. As a result,
Berkowitz and Burton reported their estimates separately for uncontest-
ed and contested permanent disability cases in each state.
The empirical findings were somewhat surprising and very differ-
ent in each state. In Wisconsin, Berkowitz and Burton estimated that
workers’ compensation benefits replaced 85 percent of earnings losses
for uncontested PPD cases and 58 percent for contested cases (pp.
329–330). In Florida, they found that the workers’ compensation sys-
tem, on average, replaced 724 percent of earnings losses for uncontest-
ed permanent partial cases (!) and 51 percent for contested cases (p.
339). In California, workers in uncontested permanent partial cases
were judged to have suffered no earnings losses, and thus their wage re-
placement rate was infinite.1 Workers in contested permanent partial
cases in California achieved wage replacement of 41 percent of their
earnings losses (p. 353).
The overall wage replacement rate was 75 percent for Wisconsin
claimants, 59 percent for Florida, and 46 percent for California (p.
357).2 Thus, by our standard of two-thirds gross wage replacement,
benefits for PPD claimants were adequate in Wisconsin, but inadequate
in Florida and California. The authors also called attention to the very
high degree of variability in replacement rates by worker’s age and by
the part of body injured. Such results obviously give rise to questions
about the equity of workers’ compensation benefits, in addition to their
overall adequacy.
Johnson, Cullinan, and Curington (1978) completed another empir-
ical study of workers’ compensation benefit adequacy. They collected
original interview data from nearly 2,000 workers’ compensation bene-
ficiaries with severe permanent impairments in California, Florida,
New York, Washington, and Wisconsin. They adopted the following
measure of adequacy:
1) the extent to which impaired workers, who suffer a loss of
wage income, receive WC benefits, and
2) the extent to which those who receive benefits are compensated
for losses of wage income (p. 96).
Because they were studying workers with severe permanent impair-
ments, the wage losses observed five to seven years after injury were
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considerable. The average wage loss in 1975 was $5,842 (or $19,982 in
2003 dollars), and nearly three-fourths of their sample was still suffer-
ing wage loss of at least $500 per year (or $1,710 in 2003 dollars) at the
time of the survey. They found that about 26 percent of the injured
workers in the sample were no longer receiving any workers’ compen-
sation benefits. Moreover, they found that among those who were still
receiving benefits, only about 12 percent of the current wage loss was
being replaced five to seven years following injury. Overall, they esti-
mated about a 10 percent wage replacement rate for severely impaired
workers’ compensation claimants in five states (California, Florida,
New York, Washington, and Wisconsin) over the five years following
serious injury.
The California Workers’ Compensation Institute (CWCI) spon-
sored an empirical study of benefit adequacy in California in the early
1980s, which concluded that “income benefits provided by the Califor-
nia law are both inadequate and inequitable” (CWCI 1984, p. 1). From
a sampling frame of 8,364 serious workers’ compensation claims in-
curred between July 1, 1975, and June 30, 1976, in California, an inde-
pendent survey firm conducted 1,076 interviews (32 percent response
rate) with a sample of injured workers some six to seven years follow-
ing their original injuries.
The study found that the California workers’ compensation pro-
gram was replacing, on average, only 49 percent of the net earnings lost
by permanently disabled workers over their working lives. Perhaps
more troubling was that those workers with the least severe injuries re-
ceived the most adequate replacement rates, exceeding 80 percent on
average for those with 1 to 9 percent disability ratings. The only excep-
tion to this general finding was for the permanently and totally dis-
abled, whose wage replacement rate was 67 percent, exactly as speci-
fied by statute.3
These studies raised serious questions about the adequacy of work-
ers’ compensation benefits. A great deal more research attention has
been devoted to this issue recently; in particular, three independent ben-
efit adequacy studies in California, Washington, and Wisconsin. More
recently, the three principal authors of these studies conducted a study
of New Mexico workers’ compensation losses and benefits. They used
identical methods and definitions to compare benefit adequacy in these
states plus Oregon. Further, they reanalyzed their data to present com-
parable analysis of wage replacement in all five states for PPDs. We
turn now to a detailed review of these “modern wage loss studies.’’
MODERN WAGE LOSS STUDIES
Studies from several different states exploring the adequacy of
workers’ compensation benefits have been published in the past few
years. Several studies of the California workers’ compensation system
were sponsored by the California Commission on Health and Safety
and Workers’ Compensation and conducted at RAND by a team headed
by Robert Reville (see Peterson et al. 1998; Reville 1999; and Reville,
Polich, et al. 2001). They first studied the adequacy of permanent par-
tial disability (PPD) benefits received by injured workers at insured
firms in California. A later study extended the effort to employees of
self-insured firms.
Boden and Galizzi (1998, 1999) studied workers’ compensation
benefits in Wisconsin, focusing on measuring earnings losses of injured
workers, quantifying the effects of various characteristics on injured
workers’ losses, and determining the extent of wage replacement by
workers’ compensation benefits. Biddle (1998) explored the amount of
workers’ compensation benefits received by workers with different
characteristics in the state of Washington as part of a larger system per-
formance audit requested by the Washington state legislature. Both the
Washington and Wisconsin studies estimated losses for the full range of
injured workers, while the California studies included only workers
with PPD benefits.
Most recently, Reville, Boden, et al. (2001) conducted a study for
the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Administration, which in-
cluded a comparison between PPD benefits in California, New Mexico,
Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. While only covering PPDs, this is
the broadest comparative analysis across jurisdictions conducted thus
far. We will use these comparative results in the following discussion.
Earnings Loss
As discussed earlier, the ideal measure of lost wages is the differ-
ence between a worker’s actual postinjury wages and the wages that
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would have been earned had the injury not occurred. Our measure of
wage replacement adequacy is the ratio of wage replacement benefits
paid to those lost wages. Uninjured wages (the counterfactual) are not
observed but must be estimated. Generally, wage loss studies in the
past have used preinjury wages to represent the wages that would have
been earned had an injury not occurred. This may be acceptable in the
short run, but it does not account for promotions or other job changes,
raises, spells of unemployment or ill health, and various market and
economic trends that occur in the long run. To ensure that these factors
are included in the estimation, all of the authors of the modern wage
loss studies compare injured workers to a group of uninjured workers,
or a group of less seriously injured workers, that have similar char-
acteristics to those injured workers whose benefit adequacy is being
assessed.
Reville (1999) matched each injured worker to between 1 and 10
uninjured workers. These uninjured workers were employed at the
same firm as the injured worker, and they had similar preinjury wages.4
Unfortunately, demographic characteristics such as age, gender, educa-
tion, and job tenure were not available in California to make the match-
es more precise.
A different method to estimate losses was used by Boden and Gal-
izzi and by Biddle, who also used somewhat different comparison
groups. Their method involved using multiple regression analysis to es-
timate the profile of earnings over time (before and after the injury).
Biddle’s comparison group consists of Washington workers’ compensa-
tion claimants with medical-only claims (i.e., no compensable wage
loss). If 3 work days or less were missed due to injury or illness (Wash-
ington has a 3-day waiting period for workers’ compensation benefits),
it was assumed that the claim had no measurable long-term effect on la-
bor market experience. Boden and Galizzi used Wisconsin workers
with 8 to 10 days of lost time as the comparison group, assuming that
this group’s losses were confined to their short-term period off work,
i.e., with no long-term consequences for earnings.
The regression approach allowed these researchers to take into ac-
count the average impact of the characteristics of the workers, their em-
ployers, and their injuries. This statistical technique is similar in con-
cept to matching the comparison group to the injured workers on those
characteristics available to the researchers. However, when it is possi-
ble to control for additional characteristics, the effect of the injury on
earnings can be more accurately estimated with regression techniques,
and it does not depend on finding an uninjured worker with similar
earnings at the same firm.
To a great extent, differences in the choice of method and of com-
parison group are driven by necessity. At the time of the original RAND
study (Peterson et al. 1998), they did not have access to data on work-
ers with medical-only or short-term injuries. However, they were able
to obtain wage and employer information on uninjured workers at the
firms that employed the injured workers. In most firms, especially larg-
er firms, there were adequate numbers of uninjured workers to match
by firm and earnings level, so RAND elected to use a matching method.
Furthermore, since they lacked personal information about the unin-
jured workers, they could not have matched on additional characteris-
tics, nor did they have the option to use regression methods to take
worker characteristics into account.
In Washington (Biddle 1998) and Wisconsin (Boden and Galizzi
1999), the researchers only had access to information about injured
workers when they did their studies. Without the use of uninjured work-
ers as a comparison group, they therefore chose to use workers with mi-
nor injuries and hoped for only short-term consequences. Biddle’s
Washington workers’ compensation dataset allowed him to use cases
with less than four days of lost time (i.e., within the waiting period), but
Boden and Galizzi’s Wisconsin data did not include such cases. Also,
because the comparison group was workers with short-term injuries,
there were not enough cases at each firm to do within-firm matching, so
they used a regression methodology.
Given our purpose of assessing the adequacy of wage replacement
benefits, the earnings of comparison group members must behave very
much like the earnings of injured workers had they not been injured.
Matching methods attempt to satisfy this condition by matching on ob-
served characteristics. Regression methods attempt to do this by condi-
tioning regression estimates on observed characteristics.
In both cases, there is a straightforward test that will rule out inap-
propriate or misleading comparison groups. For the matched compari-
son group, one looks to see if there are differences between the prein-
jury earnings of the controls and the injured workers. For the regression
studies, one looks to see if the regression-adjusted path of preinjury
earnings differs between the two. In the studies reported here, there
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were no significant differences found in the preinjury path of earnings
between the two groups.5
Data
The data used in the California study were collected by the Work-
ers’ Compensation Insurance Rating Bureau and matched to employ-
ment and earnings data from the State of California Employment De-
velopment Department. Employees’ PPD claims from 1991 to 1993 at
firms covered by workers’ compensation insurance were used in the
analysis. Workers with multiple claims during the observed period and
those whose Social Security numbers were associated with three or
more names were excluded from the sample. Quarterly earnings data
were available from the fourth quarter of 1989 through the second quar-
ter of 1996. Therefore, from three to five years of postinjury wages
could be examined. The sample includes 29,322 PPD claimants that
were matched to a total of 102,526 noninjured controls.
The Washington data on workers’ compensation were provided by
the Washington Department of Labor and Industries. Workers aged
16–70 who were originally injured between July 1993 and June 1994
were included in the sample. Earnings data from the Washington Em-
ployment Security Department were matched to the claimant data, re-
sulting in 45,532 valid compensable claims and 11,875 medical-only
claims used to form the comparison group. Third-party liability cases,
workers who also received Social Security disability benefits, those
who received permanent total disability awards, or who had more than
one additional claim in the three years following their initial claim were
excluded from the analysis.
The Wisconsin data used by Boden and Galizzi (1999) came from
the Workers’ Compensation Division and the Unemployment Com-
pensation Division of the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Devel-
opment. Injuries reported from April 1, 1989, to September 30, 1990,
involving workers who lost more than seven days of work were in-
cluded. Quarterly wages were available for at least 1.5 years before 
the injury and up to five years after the injury. A sample of 54,309
injured workers who lost at least eight days of work was used for 
the analysis. Permanent total disability beneficiaries, workers receiving
a compromise settlement resulting from more than one injury, and
workers whose injuries resulted in death were excluded from the
sample.
New Mexico data were assembled by the New Mexico Workers’
Compensation Administration, in cooperation with the New Mexico
Department of Labor. The analysis included claims with injury dates
from 1994 through 1998. Quarterly earnings data were available from
the second quarter of 1993 through the third quarter of 1999. A total of
nearly 120,000 claims were available, of which 96 percent could be
matched to earnings data. Of these, 7,543 were permanent partial
claims, and another 287 involved lump-sum compromise settlements,
which were assumed to be PPD claims. Eighty-two percent of these
claims were successfully matched to 1 to 5 uninjured (control) workers
at the same establishment. The method was very similar to the original
RAND study.
Methodological Issues
None of the data sources can fully explain the observation of zero
wages in a given quarter. A lack of reported earnings may result from
leaving covered employment or the specific state being sampled (ad-
ministrative database), leaving the workforce for personal reasons such
as retirement or unemployment, or missing work because of an injury.
The studies used different methods for accommodating this lack of in-
formation.
Two methods were used in the original RAND report (Peterson et
al. 1998) to estimate wages lost due to injury in California. The “mini-
mum” method assumes that only the period of zero or missing (unre-
ported) wages immediately following the injury is actually lost earn-
ings due to the injury. Other periods of zero reported wages are
regarded as unrelated to the injury and are ignored in the analysis. This
would include instances of missing wages caused by moving out of
state, leaving covered employment, or leaving the workforce altogether.
The “maximum” method assumes that all periods with no reported
wages after the injury date are injury related. Thus, the minimum
method forms a lower bound on wage loss caused by the injury while
the maximum method provides an upper bound in the California study.
Of course, neither of these approaches can address the possibility that
some of the observed wage losses are the result of injured workers pro-
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longing their absence from work beyond the point where they are actu-
ally able to return to employment.
Biddle (1998) first includes all zero earning periods when calculat-
ing wages lost. Thus, as in RAND’s maximum method, all differences
between the injured worker’s wages and the control group’s wages are
assigned to injury alone. In the second method, parallel to RAND’s
minimum method, Biddle excludes all zeros as unrelated to the injury.
This assumes that departures from the labor force, moving out of state,
and moving into uncovered employment are not due to the work-relat-
ed injury. The Wisconsin study (Boden and Galizzi 1999) utilizes the
maximum method.
The Washington and Wisconsin studies both include descriptions
of the models that were created to predict how much injured workers
would have earned in the absence of injury. These two studies use es-
sentially the same statistical specification to estimate postinjury earn-
ings. The model consists of two primary elements. One of these ele-
ments represents the components of earnings that are unaffected by
injury, while the other represents the impact of injury on earnings.
Combining both sets, the Washington and Wisconsin studies devel-
op a final earnings estimation model which includes variables such as
age, job tenure, industry and occupation, type of firm, employer size,
stability of preinjury earnings, and frequency of employer change be-
fore the injury. Their analysis takes into account multiple claims of
workplace injury over the observed period. The models also include a
variable that gives the wage loss effect of a second injury.
Two analytical methods, which produce similar results, are used to
estimate Boden and Galizzi’s model. The first method uses the change
between two periods (i.e., first differences) and is not affected by un-
measured, but unchanging, differences between workers (e.g., motiva-
tion). The second method uses a repeated-measures model allowing for
first-order autocorrelation of errors. Biddle relies on fixed-effects esti-
mates.
Results
Although the data used in the studies are similar in each of the
states, the authors’ approaches to analyzing the data differ. Among the
differences are that only PPD claimants are considered in the California
studies. Benefits received by PPD claimants might include TTD bene-
fits and vocational rehabilitation maintenance (VRMA) allowance as
well as PPD benefits. Unlike the other authors, Reville does not break
the analysis down into different severity groups. Instead, he presents re-
sults by the number of years of postinjury data observed (3, 4, or 5) and
by the year of injury (1991, 1992, 1993, or 1994).6 Results are stated in
pre-tax 1997 dollars for wage replacement calculations using both the
maximum and minimum methods described above.
Biddle (1998) presents 3.5 years of estimated lost earnings after the
injury, and reports replacement rates in both pre-tax and after-tax terms
using constant 1994 dollars. He analyzes six different worker groups
based on severity of injury. To quantify severity, Biddle uses time lost
from work, in days: 14 or fewer, 15–30, 31–60, 61–180, more than 180,
and individuals receiving PPD awards.
Boden and Galizzi (1999) report their findings in 1994 after-tax
dollars for men and women separately. Injured workers are classified
into 11 severity groups measured by time lost and benefits received.
This includes the comparison group of workers who missed 8 to 10
days of work due to injury. Other groups include workers who lost 
11 days to 2 weeks, 2–3 weeks, 3–4 weeks, 4–6 weeks, 6–8 weeks,
8–12 weeks, 12–16 weeks, more than 16 weeks, individuals who re-
ceive PPD benefits, and those who receive compromise settlements.
The authors present postinjury earnings data for both the observed peri-
od of five years (or less) and for the full projected working lifetime of
the workers.
Because of these differences, the comparability of the studies is un-
clear, and we therefore present them separately. After we review these
separate results, we will examine the New Mexico comparative study
of PPD claims, where all states were treated as alike as possible.
California Results
In the California system, benefits are often distributed in lump-sum
payments. Reville (1999) allocates these payments over the observed
period. However, total benefits paid out to workers with larger disabili-
ty ratings are understated because weekly benefits may still be received
after this time period. Table 5.1 shows that injured workers earn at least
$14,250 less than comparison workers when considering three years of
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postinjury data by the minimum method. These claimants have pre-tax
wage replacement rates of 58 to 74 percent, depending on their year of
injuries. As mentioned earlier, the recession of 1991 seems to have de-
pressed the wage replacement rate through a significant labor market
impact. Lost wages increase by almost $5,000 when four years are con-
sidered instead of three, so losses obviously are continuing. Another
$3,000 is lost when a fifth year of postinjury experience is included in
the analysis, resulting in $23,692 lost wages over five years and a re-
placement rate of 48 percent on average.
For injuries in 1992 and 1993, the California results show three-
year replacement rates of more than 73 percent. However, as Table 5.1
shows, the replacement rates drop with each passing year as the lump-
Table 5.1 Cumulative Wage Losses and Replacement Rates for California
PPD Claimants, 1991–1993
Minimum method Maximum method
Only quarters with injured 
and control working
Quarters including injury-


















1991 5 23,692 48 46,677 38
1991–92 4 20,844 54 37,829 42
1991–93 3 15,939 67 29,201 50
1991 5 23,692 48 46,677 38
1991 4 21,705 51 38,743 41
1991 3 18,182 58 31,960 46
1992 4 19,121 60 36,016 45
1992 3 14,761 74 27,122 54
1993 3 14,258 73 27,990 53
NOTE: The minimum method assumes that only the period of zero or missing wages
immediately following the injury is attributable to the injury. The maximum method
assumes that any wage loss during the entire period of observation is attributable to
the injury. The truth lies somewhere in between.
SOURCE: Adapted from Reville (1999).
sum payments are spread over a longer period of time. Thus, for 1991
injuries, the wage replacement rate drops from 58 percent at three
years, to 51 percent at four years, and to 48 percent at five years. This
indicates that the length of the observed period after the injury may be
critical to assessing wage replacement benefit adequacy.
In addition, cumulative wage loss approximately doubles when all
periods of zero reported wages are included in the analysis as work in-
jury related, i.e., as calculated by the maximum method. An examina-
tion of five years of postinjury data reveals that workers’ compensation
claimants earn $46,677 less than the controls and have a pre-tax wage
replacement rate of 38 percent. Table 5.1 summarizes these results.
Considering the mean quarterly wages and benefits for injured
workers and controls, it seems clear that “adequate” replacement of lost
earnings is concentrated in the period immediately following the injury,
as was reported by Berkowitz and Burton (1987) for California workers
injured in 1968. Thus, California workers’ compensation benefits do
appear to compensate for much of the initial lost earnings associated
with disability. However, the fraction of lost earnings replaced declines
as the duration of disability increases.
Reville (1999) attempts to further extrapolate from the observed
wage trends to simulate 10 years of wage loss after the injury. It is as-
sumed that the recovery occurs after the last observable year and no de-
terioration in earnings resulting from the work injury occurs thereafter.
As would be expected, extending the time horizon to 10 years results in
a significant increase in lost earnings. The replacement rate falls to 29
percent in the minimum method and 25 percent in the maximum
method.
Washington Results
Biddle (1998) first examines the wages of the injured workers. He
finds that there is a significant drop in earnings in the quarter of the in-
jury for all workers who have a time loss of 15 or more days, whether
the zero wage observations are included in the analysis or not. The dif-
ference between injured worker’s average earnings and the comparison
group’s average earnings decreases as time progresses. However, some
wage loss persists throughout the 3.5 years that workers were followed
after the injury.
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Looking at the wage replacement rate of the injured workers, Bid-
dle finds a positive relationship with severity of condition (as indicated
by lost time). In Washington, those with greater lost time have higher
replacement rates than the less severely injured (see Table 5.2). Work-
ers missing more than 180 days due to an injury have a pre-tax replace-
ment rate of 73 percent for men and 54 percent for women. The least
severely injured (less than 15 days lost time) receive pre-tax replace-
ment rates of 9 percent and 8 percent for men and women, respectively.
This difference results partly from the fact that only 3.5 years of
postinjury data are considered for the severely injured. The more se-
verely injured workers will likely have uncompensated losses that ex-
tend well beyond that period, as seen in California. In Washington, as in
many other jurisdictions, PPD awards typically are given in a lump sum
after injury, even though wage loss can last for an extended period. This
results in a very high apparent replacement rate when compared to the
limited period (3.5 years) of postinjury lost wages, but one which might
be considerably lower if the full magnitude of future wage loss were
known. So Biddle projects an additional 10 years of earnings losses to
get a better idea of the true replacement rate for PPD claimants. He
finds only a 34 percent wage replacement rate after doing this, much
lower than the 97 to 100 percent indicated in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2 Earnings Loss and Replacement Rates, by Injury
Category, for Washington Workers
Injury category 
Average pretax 
wage loss ($) Replacement rate (%)
(days) Men Women Men Women
Less than 15 2,990 3,780 9 8
15–30 5,051 5,136 19 15
31–60 8,671 6,582 21 23
61–180 12,446 12,481 37 27
More than 180 33,915 29,505 73 54
PPD awards 16,270 13,259 97 100
NOTE: Both wage losses and benefits are observed for 3.5 years following the in-
jury or illuess.
SOURCE: Adapted from Biddle (1998).
Next, Biddle investigates whether wage losses are concentrated
among a few workers in a group or whether they are spread more wide-
ly throughout the group. He looks at the percentage of injured workers
(by severity group) who were earning at least 95 percent of their (six-
quarter) preinjury average wage. Attempting to isolate injury-related
loss in earnings, he finds that significant wage loss is a problem experi-
enced by a relatively small minority of workers’ compensation
claimants. For injured workers with 15- to 60-day time loss due to in-
jury, generally TTD cases, about 25 percent experience a significant
loss of wages following the injury. One year after the injury, about 10
percent are still experiencing a significant earnings loss.
Biddle also investigates the average wages lost and replacement
rates across different demographic and economic groups. These results
are confirmed through regression analysis. He finds that injured work-
ers with dependents receive more in benefits and thus, have higher re-
placement rates than those without dependents. Earnings losses are sig-
nificantly higher for married females than for either married or
unmarried males when other factors are held constant, presumably re-
flecting some postinjury voluntary withdrawal from the labor force.
Workers under age 26, workers who suffer head injuries, and workers
with low incomes before injury all experience substantially higher
wage losses than other workers.
Wisconsin Results
Boden and Galizzi (1999) calculate an overall pre-tax replacement
rate of 63 percent for men and 62 percent for women in Wisconsin
when considering the observed four to five years of postinjury earnings
data.7 TTD beneficiaries with shorter lost time durations due to injury
have higher replacement rates than those with longer durations (more
than 6 weeks). Workers who receive TTD benefits for a longer period of
time (12 weeks or more for men, and 16 weeks or more for women) and
do not receive PPD benefits have greater average losses than those who
receive PPD benefits and do not receive settlements. Men and women
have comparable average observed losses, but women lose a higher
proportion of their preinjury earnings (see Table 5.3).
The findings for PPD benefit adequacy suffer from the same flaw as
the Washington results. Because the time of observation after the injury
116 Wage Loss Studies
117
Table 5.3 Wisconsin Average Losses and Replacement Rates by Benefit Category, 1989–1990 Injuries
Observed period Projected 10 years
Mean after-tax loss 
estimates ($)
Total benefits as a 
percent of pretax 
losses (%)
Mean after-tax loss 
estimates ($)
Total benefits as a
percent of pretax
losses (%)
Benefit category Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
TTD benefits only
4–7 days 263 189 32 34 263 189 32 34
8–10 days 377 252 62 63 377 252 62 63
11–14 days 567 464 59 51 567 464 59 51
2.1–3 weeks 844 478 58 71 844 478 58 71
3.1–4 weeks 1,293 819 55 60 1,293 819 55 60
4.1–6 weeks 1,516 1,037 65 64 1,516 1,037 65 64
6.1–8 weeks 4,632 3,409 27 28 4,632 3,409 27 28
8.1–12 weeks 6,183 5,472 34 29 7,876 9,771 24 15
12.1–16 weeks 11,067 8,654 29 28 20,021 15,305 15 14
16.1 + weeks 17,434 11,365 41 40 25,313 16,078 26 25
PPD benefits 10,431 9,702 86 83 14,022 15,565 57 46
Compromise benefits 28,597 20,970 87 67 47,406 38,488 47 42
All claims 4,156 3,616 63 62 6,203 5,964 45 37
SOURCE: Adapted from Boden and Galizzi (1999).
is restricted, it is likely that wage losses are continuing beyond that
point. To the extent that lump-sum payments or other front-loaded
compensation is included, wage replacement benefit adequacy will be
overstated.
Rather different results are found when an extended period of
postinjury earnings is projected.8 Injured workers with more time lost
from work (presumably but not necessarily more serious injuries) and
PPD beneficiaries suffer the greatest projected losses. Although only
one-fourth of all injured workers in Wisconsin receive either TTD ben-
efits for more than 16 weeks, PPD benefits, or compromise settlements,
these beneficiaries suffer three-fourths of all lost earnings.
The average projected losses incurred by women are larger than the
average losses for men. On average, men with more than seven days
lost time due to a work injury will lose the equivalent of about 6 months
of earnings over their lifetime, while women will lose about 10 months.
Considering projected losses, replacement rates decline considerably
after TTD benefit duration of 6 weeks. On average, in Wisconsin men
receive wage replacement benefits of 45 percent and women receive 37
percent of the pre-tax wages they likely would have earned in the 10
years following their work injury.
Comparative Analysis for PPD Claims
In a joint NASI/Upjohn Institute published volume, the three pri-
mary authors of these state-specific studies presented comparable esti-
mates of the losses suffered and workers’ compensation benefits re-
ceived for PPD claimants in the three states (see Biddle, Boden, and
Reville 2001). These comparisons were further extended by the RAND
volume on the New Mexico permanent partial study, which extends the
comparison to five states: California, New Mexico, Oregon, Washing-
ton, and Wisconsin (see Reville, Boden, et al. 2001).
While this analysis of PPD benefit adequacy is not as broad as the
earlier ones (at least for Washington and Wisconsin), it does cover a
very interesting workers’ compensation subpopulation that accounts for
a major share of total workers’ compensation costs and administrative
complexity, even though it is a minority of claimants in the system. In
addition, the same matching method was used in each state, thereby
minimizing the impact of the differences in methodology among the
studies discussed earlier.
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All paid workers’ compensation indemnity benefits are used for
this analysis, including temporary and permanent disability benefits
(with lump sums), cash settlements for future medical benefits (Califor-
nia and Wisconsin only), and vocational rehabilitation maintenance al-
lowance. Earnings losses are forecast beyond the observed period fol-
lowing injury by projecting the final observed year wage losses forward
for a total of 10 years following the injury and discounting the results
back to the point of observation. It should be noted that workers’ attor-
ney fees and medical/legal costs have not been deducted from the gross
benefits paid, nor have any lost nonwage benefits been counted as eco-
nomic losses.
Table 5.4 reports the estimated 10-year wage losses, the potential
10-year earnings, and total indemnity benefits paid for PPD claimants.
The proportional 10-year wage loss and pre-tax wage replacement rates
are also given. Given differences among the states in the method of
compensating PPD cases, it is not surprising that the replacement rates
for 10-year losses are quite different.9 Pre-tax replacement rates range
from 29 percent in Wisconsin to 46 percent in New Mexico (see Biddle,
Boden, and Reville 2001 for details). However, it seems clear that, for
this group of states, PPD wage loss replacement falls far short of the
two-thirds of pre-tax income we have adopted as our standard of ade-
quacy.10
Table 5.4 Ten-Year Earnings Losses and Replacement Rates for PPD
Claimants
New
Mexico Washington California Wisconsin Oregon
Potential 
earnings ($) 167,244 250,251 238,262 222,055 197,737
10-year losses ($) 34,314 41,220 61,767 49,477 39,202
Total benefits ($) 15,832 16,734 22,612 14,452 16,636
Proportional wage
loss (%) 20 16 25 23 20
Pretax replace-
ment rate (%) 46 41 37 29 42
SOURCE: Reville, Boden, et al. (2001, p. 50).
Differences by Insurance and Earnings Status
The second RAND study offers insight into two additional benefit
adequacy issues, the nature of the workers’ compensation insurance
coverage (insured or self-insured), and the level of earnings of the in-
jured worker. Both are important policy variables that may bear on the
question of benefit adequacy.
Some believe that there is a significant difference in the way that
workers’ compensation programs are administered between insured
and self-insured employers. Because self-insured employers are gener-
ally larger employers, and because the relationship with the injured em-
ployee is usually more direct (although many self-insured employers
use third-party administrators), there is more opportunity for variation
in the administration of workers’ compensation by self-insured em-
ployers.
Table 5.5 examines earnings losses and replacement rates for PPD
cases separately for self-insured and insured firms in California. In-
demnity (wage loss) payments are fairly similar in the two sectors, dif-
fering by only about $1,500 (less than 9 percent). Earnings losses are
about 19 percent greater in self-insured firms, reflecting their higher
wage levels. However, the five-year earnings replacement rate differs
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Table 5.5 Earnings Loss and Replacement Rates for PPD Claimants,
Self-Insured and Insured Firms, 1993 Injuries
5-year pretax earnings
Self-insured firms
Earnings losses ($) 39,500
Potential uninjured earnings ($) 168,900
Total indemnity ($) 19,100
Replacement rate (%) 48
Insured firms
Earnings losses ($) 33,200
Potential uninjured earnings ($) 103,500
Total indemnity ($) 17,600
Replacement rate (%) 53
SOURCE: Reville, Polich, et al. (2001).
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by only 5 percent. This difference results from varying patterns of re-
turn to work in the two sectors (see Reville, Polich, et al. 2001).
Given maximum benefit caps, the earnings level of the injured
worker has obvious implications for wage replacement adequacy. As
discussed earlier, if benefits are capped at the state average weekly
wage, the gross wage replacement rate will be below two-thirds for a
sizeable number of workers. However, it must be kept in mind that the
wage distribution for injured workers may be different than the wage
distribution for the entire working population. There are several studies
that suggest that a disproportionate share of work injuries occur among
low-wage earners. Table 5.6 shows that wage replacement rates for Cal-
ifornia workers injured in 1993 that received PPD compensation varied
considerably by preinjury earnings level.
Results are shown separately for self-insured and insured employ-
ers and are organized by earnings quartile within each group. Thus,
among employees of self-insured workers, the bottom quartile of in-
jured workers (in terms of preinjury earnings), which included annual
Table 5.6 Earnings Losses and Replacement Rates by Preinjury Earnings
Percentile for PPD Claimants, Self-Insured, and Insured













Up to 23,000 31,170 81,136 18,121 58
23,000–34,000 36,715 130,828 20,348 55
34,000–48,000 39,751 188,722 19,312 49
48,000+ 50,481 274,841 18,522 37
Insured firms
Up to 13,000 16,278 49,473 14,703 90
13,000–21,000 24,818 71,098 16,801 68
21,000–32,000 38,382 109,466 19,019 50
32,000+ 53,146 183,745 19,889 37




earnings up to $23,000, received 58 percent replacement of their pre-
tax lost earnings for the five years following the injury. The top quartile
(with annual earnings over $48,000) received only 37 percent replace-
ment.
Similarly for injured workers at insured employers in California,
the bottom quartile (with annual earnings up to $13,000) received 90
percent gross replacement of lost earnings, while the top quartile
(earnings over $32,000) received only 37 percent replacement. This
primarily reflects the influence of the benefit minimums and maxi-
mums, which affect income replacement rates for lower- and higher-
paid workers respectively. Reville et al. observe, “. . . the injured work-
ers who fare best in the California system are the lowest-paid workers
at insured firms. Those with the lowest replacement rates are the high-
est-paid workers at both self-insured and insured firms” (Reville,
Polich, et al. 2001, p. xxiii).
CONCLUSIONS
It seems clear that these modern wage loss studies provide better
estimates of lost earnings and wage replacement rates for injured work-
ers. Since we can never know what the counterfactual situation would
have been, i.e., earnings in the absence of the injury or illness, it is im-
possible to know exactly what earnings have been lost. However, these
modern studies based on administrative data from purposely selected
comparison groups, improve our estimates of wage replacement ade-
quacy significantly. This in turn lends greater credibility to the results
of the empirical studies.
However, as we have seen, there is still no single answer to the ben-
efit adequacy question. Are workers’ compensation wage replacement
benefits adequate? It depends on where, when, and for whom the ques-
tion is asked. While overall adequacy measures may be useful to track
variation across time or jurisdiction, measures of adequacy for sub-
groups of the injured population (for example, by gender, age, type of
injury, race/ethnicity, or occupational category) may be more meaning-
ful. Measures comparing different groups as defined by workers’ com-
pensation claim status may be even more useful (for example, TTD
122 Wage Loss Studies
Adequacy of Earnings Replacement 123
claimants, PPD claimants, compromise and release claimants, and PTD
claimants). It is clear from most workers’ compensation statutes that
policymakers think of these as distinct groups. Our analyses of benefit
adequacy should do so as well.
A review of these studies has also revealed how slim our knowl-
edge base really is. While five state studies of PPD benefits may be a
fair start, we only have two studies of TTD benefits. This makes it diffi-
cult to draw any generalizations, especially when the results differ as
much as those for Washington and Wisconsin. Should our conclusion
be that these two states practice very different compensation philoso-
phies, or that we do not trust our results? It is clear that additional stud-
ies are needed before firm conclusions can be drawn about wage re-
placement benefit adequacy in general.
A firmer conclusion is that the wage replacement standard of com-
parison appears to have inherent appeal for evaluation purposes. It
seems appropriate to use such an individual yardstick to measure the
adequacy of benefits. This might also facilitate discussion about the
goals of workers’ compensation policy. Why is the benefit for perma-
nent disability different from that for temporary disability in many ju-
risdictions? What are policymakers trying to achieve? Can the propor-
tion of lost wages that are replaced help inform our perspectives on
such issues?
These modern analytical methods have very substantial data re-
quirements and are costly and time consuming to conduct. However,
this is due more to the intensity of the data preparation and data pro-
cessing required than to any inherent complexity of the analysis. It
seems clear that costs will decline as experience with these models in-
creases and their estimation becomes more routine. The development
of a standard, preferred methodology for such comparisons would help
to reinforce this trend. Our hope is that this volume will help to stimu-
late development of such a standard, through further discussion and
debate.
Of course, such methods may still be subject to some systematic
bias that has not yet emerged from the scholarly review of these studies.
Questions remain about whether different comparison groups produce
different results (sensitivity analysis). Wage loss can be expected to vary
with labor market conditions as well, as was demonstrated in California,
and therefore earnings replacement rates probably will vary likewise.
Lastly, a number of issues need to be addressed before we can do
meaningful and reliable interstate comparisons with wage loss studies.
Clearly, the same data definitions, methods, and comparison groups
must be applied across states. Comparisons must also allow for differ-
ences in the composition of occupations, industries, personal character-
istics, firm characteristics, injury characteristics (to the extent that these
are not endogenous), and probably many others. Then it might finally
be possible to accurately measure differences in state workers’ compen-
sation benefit systems by a better yardstick than we have had hereto-
fore, namely, the proportion of earnings actually replaced for injured
workers.
Notes
1. This means that they suffered no losses compared to other injured workers who
were judged to have less than a 5 percent permanent disability rating. This sug-
gests that the system wasn’t very good at differentiating between the losses of
people with 3 percent and 9 percent disability ratings, not that the latter lost no in-
come.
2. These numbers result from combining the contested and uncontested cases, ac-
cording to their frequency. In Wisconsin, only 14 percent of cases were contested,
while in Florida (70 percent) and California (90 percent) a majority of PPD cases
were litigated. Presumably, this affected the estimated replacement rates for un-
contested cases reported above, as it is likely that scheduled losses played a much
greater role in Florida and California among uncontested cases.
3. It is interesting that 15 years later, CWCI opined that, “. . . it is probably safe to
assume that in the final analysis, aggregate replacement rates in California will
probably be found to already meet or exceed the 662/3 percent standard historical-
ly used as a proxy for ‘adequacy’” (CWCI 1999, p. 14). This statement was in
reaction to calls for a substantial benefit increase in California, based in large part
upon the findings of benefit inadequacy from the RAND study reviewed below.
4. To qualify as similar wages, the log of the control’s average quarterly preinjury
wage must be equal to the log average quarterly wage for the injured worker plus
or minus 10 percent of the standard deviation of the log of average quarterly wage
of the population of PPD claimants with injuries in that quarter.
5. To verify the use of their comparison group, Boden and Galizzi (1998) compared
statistics from a random group of workers, workers with minor injuries, and se-
verely injured workers. They concluded that workers with minor injuries ap-
peared to be more like severely injured workers than the employed population of
Wisconsin. They also found that earnings in the calendar quarter following the in-
jury for workers with 3 to 5 days of lost time due to injury and workers with 8 to
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10 days’ lost time were virtually identical. Also, preinjury earnings of workers
with minor injuries were not statistically different than the preinjury earnings of
severely impaired workers. Finally, a regression estimation based on first differ-
ences shows that earnings of workers with 8 to 10 days of lost time quickly re-
cover to the level of the uninjured worker.
6. Year of injury turns out to be a critical analytical issue in California due to varia-
tion in labor market results. See CWCI (1999) for a full discussion of this issue.
7. We have converted their after-tax results to a pre-tax basis using data included in
their article.
8. Boden and Galizzi (1998) originally developed 12 different projections to esti-
mate losses beyond the observed period. Of these, the method chosen assumes
that losses continue to decline (or increase) for two years after the observed peri-
od at the same rate as was estimated at the end of the observed period. Losses then
remain fixed until the end of the projection period (10 years) or until age 75. Bo-
den and Galizzi also account for the variance in employment rates by age.
9. See Barth and Niss (1999) for a description of the variety of PPD methods.
10. However, it is worth noting that the results are quite sensitive to the methodology
selected. The comparison of PPD benefits in three states presented in Biddle, Bo-
den, and Reville (2001) indicated that Wisconsin replaced 46 percent of pre-tax
wages lost over 10 years, compared to 29 percent in the later study. Because the





A critical objective of workers’ compensation programs is to main-
tain a socially acceptable income stream for disabled workers while
they recover from job-related injuries or illnesses. This report address-
es a key aspect of workers’ compensation systems: to what extent do
cash benefits paid to injured workers replace their lost earnings?
We recognize that there are many other goals for workers’ compen-
sation programs. These include providing sufficient medical care and
rehabilitation services, efficiency of the benefit delivery system, and af-
fordability of the program for employers and workers. We have deliber-
ately avoided consideration of these other goals to make this project
manageable. In any event, the adequacy of wage replacement benefits
is such a critical goal for workers’ compensation systems that the topic
deserves examination by itself.
A Study Panel of the Workers’ Compensation Steering Committee
of the National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI) (see p. 145) has
been considering the issue of benefit adequacy for several years. These
practitioners and scholars of workers’ compensation have met periodi-
cally to review research findings and discuss analytical issues. Some
members of the group volunteered to draft sections of this book, which
were then reviewed and discussed in detail by the entire group.
In this book, we examine earnings replacement in several ways.
First, what are the earnings losses suffered by disabled workers, and to
what extent are those losses replaced by the benefits received through
workers’ compensation programs? We review both “theoretical” and
“empirical” answers to these questions. The former is represented by
the study of statutory benefits in Chapter 4, while the latter is presented
in a series of wage loss studies in Chapter 5.
Next, to what extent are these benefits adequate? To answer this
question, we must confront the issue of what we mean by “adequate”
benefits. This is a very controversial question, with many conflicting
points of view. Most members of the panel recommend that a fraction
of lost wages should be replaced by workers’ compensation benefits,
recognizing the need to strike a balance between substantial income
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support and return-to-work incentives and critical affordability objec-
tives. To some members of the panel, adequate benefits would be bene-
fits that replace 100 percent of lost earnings.
We use several yardsticks for wage replacement adequacy. First,
we use the historical yardstick of replacing two-thirds of gross wages as
a measure of benefit adequacy. While this may not be the ideal mea-
sure, 36 states now use it as their statutory replacement rate for tempo-
rary total disability (TTD).1 We acknowledge that this is a somewhat
arbitrary choice, but it has the advantages of historical primacy, wide-
spread acceptance, and analytical simplicity.
Second, we use the Model Workers’ Compensation Act (Revised),
promulgated by the Council of State Governments in 1974. The Model
Act represented an attempt to specify the benefit structure that would
constitute “best practice” in workers’ compensation, largely through
implementing the recommendations of the National Commission on
State Workmen’s Compensation Laws. While not all members of the
panel approve of this measure, we use the standards of the Model Act as
another yardstick to evaluate the overall benefit structure of workers’
compensation programs.
Finally, we have a social policy interest in preventing workers and
their families from becoming destitute because of work injuries. When
the National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws
issued its report in 1972, maximum weekly benefits in many states
were so low that full-time workers who had earned reasonable wages
could fall into poverty while receiving workers’ compensation benefits
(NCSWCL 1972, p. 18). To determine whether this is still occurring,
we asked: “Are workers’ compensation wage-replacement benefits suf-
ficient to keep injured workers from falling below the official poverty
line?” For this assessment we compare statutory benefit levels to the
U.S. poverty threshold for a family of four.
FINDINGS
Our historical analysis of statutory workers’ compensation benefits
in Chapter 4 found a significant upward trend in statutory benefit levels
after the Report of the National Commission on State Workmen’s Com-
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pensation Laws was released in 1972. With regard to the question of so-
cial adequacy, the average workers’ compensation weekly benefit for
TTD rose from about 80 percent of the poverty level for a family of
four in 1972 to around 110 percent in 1998 (see Figure 4.3, p. 74).
However, substantial interstate variation remains, and average TTD
benefits in 16 states still were below the poverty level in 1998 (see Fig-
ure 4.4, p. 75).
When statutory workers’ compensation benefits are measured
against the benefit levels included in the Model Act (Revised) adopted
by the Council of State Governments, it appears that TTD benefits have
improved steadily relative to the Model Act, rising from an average of
60 percent in 1972 to nearly 90 percent by 1998 (see Figure 4.9, p. 88).
Trends in benefit levels for permanent disability claims and fatal claims
also improved substantially in the 1970s but have been relatively con-
stant for the past 20 years.
In summary, evidence from the analysis of statutory benefits sug-
gests that TTD benefits rose relative to the poverty threshold and came
closer to meeting the levels in the Model Act over time. No similar
trend is evident for the more expensive permanent disability benefits.
The panel believes it is vital to check these findings on statutory
benefits with the results of recent empirical wage loss studies. The
wage loss studies compare the benefits received by injured workers
with estimates of the earnings they lost after the injury. Thus, wage loss
studies offer two advantages over statutory benefit measures: 1) the
measurement of actual benefits received, and 2) an improved estimate
of wage losses due to disability.
In the late 1970s, Berkowitz and Burton (1987) conducted the first
wage loss study in three states, California, Florida, and Wisconsin, with
funding from the National Science Foundation. They found that re-
placement rates for permanent disabilities varied substantially among
jurisdictions and among workers within jurisdictions. The average
earnings replacement rate for 1968 claimants was 75 percent in Wis-
consin, 59 percent in Florida, and 46 percent in California.
Twenty years later, several researchers adopted the methods used in
this early study to review benefit adequacy in different states. These
“modern” wage loss studies are described in Chapter 5. In California, a
group at the RAND Institute for Civil Justice conducted a series of
studies of benefit adequacy for the California Commission on Health
and Safety and Workers’ Compensation. Their innovation was to match
the preinjury earnings of injured workers to similar workers in the same
firms. Then, the subsequent earnings of the matched, uninjured workers
make possible more realistic estimates of earnings losses for injured
workers.
Reville and his colleagues (Peterson et al. 1998) found that the lev-
el of wage replacement for cases involving permanent partial disability
(PPD) seemed to come close to statutory wage replacement rates when
evaluated shortly after the injury, but appeared much less adequate
when viewed over a longer period of time. For California injuries in
1992–1993, aggregate benefit payments after 3 years were between half
(54 percent) and three-quarters (74 percent) of lost wages (see Table
5.1, p. 113). The major difference was due to the interpretation of the
periods of zero reported earnings.2 But when results were extrapolated
for 10 years, the results were strikingly different. Most workers’ com-
pensation benefits were paid in the first 3 years after injury, but many
workers continued to experience substantial wage losses into the future,
so losses far outstripped benefits after the initial period. As a result, ag-
gregate benefit payments compensated just 25 to 29 percent of estimat-
ed aggregate losses over 10 years.
In Wisconsin, Boden and Galizzi (1999) conducted a similar study
of earnings replacement losses for the Workers Compensation Research
Institute. While they employed a slightly different technique to estimate
what the earnings of the injured workers would have been in the ab-
sence of injury, and included all injuries (not just PPDs), their method-
ology was otherwise similar to the RAND study. When losses were es-
timated for 10 years after injury, aggregate benefits replaced just under
half of losses (45 percent) for men and somewhat less (37 percent) for
women (see Table 5.3, p. 117).
Boden and Galizzi also found that the greater losses were concen-
trated in a minority of long-duration cases. Longer-lasting injuries in-
cluded those with PPD payments, compromise settlements, or TTD
payments that lasted more than 16 weeks. These three groups together
accounted for one in four injured workers in the study, but involved
three out of four dollars of aggregate earnings losses.
Biddle (1998) conducted a similar wage loss study as part of a leg-
islative review of the workers’ compensation system in Washington.
That study verified that aggregate losses are larger and wage replace-
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ment is lower when results are extrapolated for 10 years after the injury.
This was particularly true for PPD cases because they are often settled
with lump-sum payments in Washington. Counting those settlements
when they are paid, the aggregate earnings replacement rate for Wash-
ington PPD cases appeared to be nearly 100 percent after 3.5 years; the
replacement rate dropped to 34 percent when losses were extrapolated
for 10 years. The Washington study also confirmed that large losses are
concentrated in a minority of cases.
Most recently, Reville, Boden, et al. (2001) conducted a study of
New Mexico PPD workers’ compensation benefits. They also brought
the results of the other wage loss studies into a common analytical
framework to facilitate comparisons among five states. Focusing only on
PPD claims, they extrapolated aggregate wage losses and benefits paid
for 10 years after the injury. Table 6.1 shows that under identical as-
sumptions, 10-year wage replacement rates ranged from a low of 29 per-
cent in Wisconsin to a high of 46 percent in New Mexico. No state ex-
ceeded 50 percent wage replacement for permanent partial disabilities.
Further, Figure 6.1 shows that aggregate wage losses continue at
significant levels (15 to 20 percent) even four to five years after injury.
Yet, most workers’ compensation payments occur within the first two to
three years. These results indicate that replacement rates for PPDs in
Table 6.1 Ten-Year Earnings Losses and Replacement Rates for
Permanent Partial Disability Claimants
New
Mexico Washington California Wisconsin Oregon
Potential 
earnings ($) 167,244 250,251 238,262 222,055 197,737
10-year losses ($) 34,314 41,220 61,767 49,477 39,202
Total benefits ($) 15,832 16,734 22,612 14,452 16,636
Proportional wage
loss (%) 20 16 25 23 20
Pretax replace-
ment rate (%) 46 41 37 29 42
SOURCE: Reville, Boden, et al. (2001, p. 50).
the aggregate fall short of the yardstick of two-thirds of gross wages,
often by a large margin.
CONCLUSIONS
The study panel believes that wage loss studies are the best yard-
stick to measure the adequacy of benefits. We feel the wage replace-
ment standard of comparison has great intuitive appeal for the evalua-
tion of benefit adequacy, and comparing the outcomes for injured
workers to the uninjured provides a natural labor market context for
such studies.3 In those states that have been studied, for all categories
involving substantial lost time from work or permanent disabilities, ag-
gregate replacement rates are considerably below the two-thirds stan-
dard when considered over the 10-year period following the injury.
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Figure 6.1 Relative Earnings of PPD Claimants as a Fraction of Com-
parison Workers
SOURCE: Reville, Boden, et al. (2001, p. 48).
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Additional wage loss studies from different jurisdictions are need-
ed to confirm these findings. In particular, it would be helpful to have
more studies that include TTDs and studies from states with different
methods of setting PPD benefits. Such studies would inform judgments
on the question of adequacy for different kinds of benefits, as well as
the appropriate level of employer responsibility for wage replacement
in case of permanent disability.
The panel also notes that it is not yet possible to determine whether
the statutory benefit studies presented earlier provide an appropriate
substitute for a wage loss study. Preliminary analysis of the few obser-
vations available indicate a positive, though not significant, correlation
(correlation coefficient of 0.4) between the wage replacement rates
from wage loss studies and the results of the statutory benefit studies re-
ported earlier. More work is needed to understand the connections be-
tween statutory benefit levels and actual benefits paid.
The panel recognizes that many more questions need to be an-
swered so that policymakers can improve workers’ compensation bene-
fit systems. For example, what is the distribution of wage losses? Do
most injured workers receive benefits that meet the yardstick of two-
thirds of gross earnings? Are there significant groups of workers who
receive more or less than this standard? As suggested in recent studies,
are large losses and replacement rates below the statutory yardstick
concentrated in a minority of long-duration cases? If so, what more can
we learn about why these losses occur, and what could be done to miti-
gate them? Appendix 6A includes an agenda of questions for further re-
search to improve our understanding of wage replacement rates and to
aid policy analyses.
Our last observation is that a problem of low or inadequate levels of
wage replacement in workers’ compensation programs might call for
several complementary solutions. Depending on the reasons for the lev-
el of wage replacement, and the public policy decision on benefit plan
design, which of necessity includes more factors than the wage replace-
ment rate, one obvious approach would be to increase the level or dura-
tion of workers’ compensation benefits. But another approach is to re-
duce wage losses. The ideal way to do this is by improving workplace
safety and health. In addition, many employers have found that they are
able to significantly reduce the incidence and duration of workers’ com-
pensation claims by improving the administration of claims, enhancing
their labor–management relations climate, and doing more to accom-
modate injured workers on their prior jobs or on other jobs with the
company.
State systems for claims administration and adjudication also make
a difference. They can smooth the way for fair and prompt decisions
that support adequate compensation and sustainable return to work, or
they can exacerbate friction costs with extensive litigation or perverse
incentives for workers, providers, and employers that undermine sys-
tem goals.
Thus, we conclude that the policy remedy for a mismatch between
the wage losses injured workers experience and the benefits delivered
under workers’ compensation programs requires attention to more than
the basic level of benefits. Solutions also involve improving the overall
performance of our 90-year-old workers’ compensation systems for the
benefit of injured workers, their employers, and our society as a whole.
Notes
1. We use the term statutory benefits to indicate that these are the benefits specified in
the workers’ compensation statute and not measures of actual benefits that have
been paid. Statutory replacement rates are subject to dollar minimums and maxi-
mums that cause benefits to be more or less than the statutory replacement rate.
2. The difference was due to whether periods of zero earnings were considered injury
related or not.
3. As noted earlier, not all members of the panel believe that two-thirds of gross
wages is necessarily an appropriate yardstick for cash benefits, nor has that yard-
stick been historically accepted as appropriate for PPD benefits.
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Appendix 6A
A Research Agenda
Modern wage loss studies are an important breakthrough in measuring the
level at which workers’ compensation benefits replace lost earnings. These
studies suggest that aggregate replacement rates are typically below the histor-
ical standard of two-thirds of gross earnings.
To act on these findings, policymakers will want to know more about why
replacement rates for particular categories of workers are “high” or “low.” Mi-
crodata on injured workers’ actual experience with their workers’ compensa-
tion system and their health and employment outcomes would be a valuable
complement to what we have learned from wage loss studies. New data collec-
tion initiatives now under way in a handful of states may provide data on post-
injury outcomes that would enable one to do these complementary analyses.
Beginning with a study in Wisconsin (see Galizzi, Boden, and Liu 1998;
and Victor, Barth, and Liu 2003), the Workers Compensation Research Insti-
tute (WCRI) is supporting injured worker surveys in Texas, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, and California, with plans to expand to additional states in the
next few years. In addition, opportunities to link data from other wage replace-
ment programs, such as Social Security Disability Insurance, would help us
understand how workers’ compensation fits into a broader concept of benefit
adequacy in replacing lost earnings.
More complete data on injured workers’ attributes and outcomes would
enable us to answer the following types of questions:
1. To what extent could replacement rates from workers’ compensation
be increased through more effective assistance with return to work
or job accommodations?
2. To what extent do workers with “low” replacement rates from work-
ers’ compensation receive benefits from other wage replacement
programs—such as Social Security disability or retirement benefits,
unemployment insurance, state temporary disability benefits, em-
ployer-sponsored pensions, sick leave, or private long-term disabili-
ty insurance? How different would total replacement rates be if they
included payments from other programs?
3. Do injured workers also lose nonwage (fringe) benefits? Which ben-
efits are lost, and what is the value of these losses to the worker?
Does this change the adequacy of benefits?
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4. How much are the offsetting savings to workers from reduced work
expenses, such as commuting, child care, food, and clothing? And
how do these savings impact benefit adequacy? How much are the
increased costs to families because they must care for injured work-
ers or replace household work formerly done by them?
5. How do benefits actually received compare to those set forth in the
worker’s compensation statute? Why the difference?
6. How are replacement rates affected by state maximums on workers’
compensation benefits? (Maximum weekly rates are expected to
lower replacement rates for higher earners.) And to what extent are
replacement rates reduced by wage losses that last longer than work-
ers’ compensation benefits are paid?
7. To what extent are replacement rates impacted by state minimum
benefit rules? (Again, this is an expected outcome that would in-
crease replacement rates for very low earners.)
8. To what extent are replacement rates affected by lump-sum pay-
ments and the manner in which they are allocated?
9. To what extent are replacement rates affected by payment of sched-
uled benefits—that is—benefits based on injuries to specific body
parts or physical impairment that are paid irrespective of actual
wage losses? How do the replacement rates for these injuries com-
pare to rates for nonscheduled injuries that are tied to predicted or
actual wage loss? If wage replacement for scheduled injuries is rela-
tively high, should this outcome be considered a problem? Or
should it be viewed as equitable compensation for permanent im-
pairment?
10. Are there differences in the level of wage replacement between
highly educated and less skilled workers? Are there differences by
skill level in terms of replacement rates during TTD versus PPD?
• On the one hand, highly educated (and therefore presumably
more highly compensated) workers might get lower replace-
ment rates while they are out of work, because of maximums on
benefits.
• At the same time, highly educated workers might be more like-
ly to recover their full preinjury earnings, despite permanent
impairments, and therefore get higher replacement rates under
scheduled payments for PPD.
11. Does absence from work, from any cause, lead to reduced future
earnings? If so, how long an absence must occur before the future
loss becomes significant? Does an absence as a result of work-relat-
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ed injury or disease exhibit the same or a different pattern of future
wage loss than an absence due to some other reason?
12. Do systems that attempt to take individual circumstances and char-
acteristics into account (and thus have higher friction costs) provide
more adequate and equitable benefits than systems that do not (indi-
vidual justice versus social justice approach)?
13. What impact do the costs of obtaining benefits have on the adequa-
cy of the benefits actually received by workers (e.g., what are the ef-
fects of delays and the reduction in claimants’ net recoveries after
payment of attorney fees and litigation expenses)?
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